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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the history of judge-made law in the federal
courts through the lens of the early-nineteenth-century federal courts’
equity powers. In a series of equity cases, and in the Federal Equity
Rules promulgated by the Court in 1822 and 1842, the Supreme Court
vehemently insisted that lower federal courts employ a uniform
corpus of nonstate equity principles with respect to procedure,
remedies, and—in certain instances—primary rights and liabilities.
Careful attention to the historical sources suggests that the uniform
equity doctrine was not simply the product of an overreaching,
consolidationist Supreme Court, but is best understood in the context
of important and surprisingly underappreciated early-nineteenth-

Copyright © 2010 by Kristin A. Collins.
† Associate Professor of Law & Peter Paul Development Professor, Boston University.
Many people have given generously of their time and insight, including Hugh Baxter, Jack
Beermann, Hamilton Bryson, Michael Collins, Martha Field, Philip Hamburger, Peter Charles
Hoffer, Andrew Kull, Alison LaCroix, Gary Lawson, Gerry Leonard, Maeva Marcus, Caleb
Nelson, Nick Parillo, Jim Pfander, Jed Shugerman, David Seipp, Ann Woolhandler, and Larry
Yackle. Earlier versions of this Article benefited from participants’ comments at the 2010
Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, at workshops held at the University of Virginia and
Boston University law schools, and at sessions held at the 2009 annual meeting of the American
Society for Legal History and the 2009 Junior Federal Courts Conference. My research
assistants, Kimberly Parr, Jarrod Schaeffer, and Diana Snyder, and Boston University law
librarian Stefanie Weigman, provided excellent assistance and tolerated completely
unreasonable research requests with good humor. The editors of the Duke Law Journal
provided superb editorial assistance. Any errors are mine.

COLLINS IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

250

10/17/2010 10:06:06 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:249

century debates concerning judicial reform. During this period, both
Congress and the Court were preoccupied with the disuniformity in
the administration of the federal judicial system, especially in the
farther reaches of the republic. When reform was not forthcoming
through legislation, the Supreme Court achieved a modicum of
uniformity in the federal courts through the application of a single
body of equity principles drawn from federal and English sources.
But the Court did not act unilaterally. Congress’s repeated
acquiescence to, and extension of, the Court’s uniform equity doctrine
reveals a complex, interbranch dynamic at work.
Retelling the story of nonstate, judge-made law in the federal
courts through the lens of equity is not intended to demonstrate that
such a formulation of federal judicial power was (or is) correct.
Rather, by recuperating the history of federal equity power, this
Article illuminates the significant metamorphosis of the meaning of
Article III’s grant of judicial power. This change has been elided in
modern accounts of federal judge-made law in an effort to bolster the
legitimacy of a modern vision of federal judicial power.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of judge-made law in federal civil cases is commonly
1
examined through the lens of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
(the original Rules of Decision Act) and the Supreme Court’s famous
2
interpretation of that Act in Swift v. Tyson. This Article examines the
history of judge-made law in the federal courts, but shifts attention
away from Section 34, focusing instead on early-nineteenth-century
3
federal courts’ equity powers. This alternative doctrinal perspective

1. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
2. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842). In this Article, I use the term “judgemade law” and variations thereof to describe judicial decisionmaking in the absence or near
absence of statutory or constitutional direction. Cf. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope
of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890 (1986) (defining “federal common law” as
“any rule of federal law created by a court . . . when the substance of that rule is not clearly
suggested by federal enactments—constitutional or congressional”). While commentators
generally use the term “common law” instead of “judge-made law,” I use the latter because my
focus is on cases brought in equity. Using the term “common law” to describe the judicial
exercise of equity power would be needlessly confusing. See infra Part I.B. I use the term
“common law” in this Article only when discussing judge-made law in the context of cases
brought in law. Some readers will object that the use of the term “judge-made law” necessarily
and incorrectly imposes a modern gloss on early-nineteenth-century judicial practices because,
at that time, it was generally understood that judges declared law, rather than made law. I
address this concern later in the article. See infra text accompanying notes 367–69.
3. This Article focuses on the federal courts’ adjudication of private-law litigation in
which a party sought enforcement of traditional equitable rights or remedies, or sought the
benefit of procedures available in equity. See infra Part I.B.1. The term “equity,” or “equity of
the statute,” was also used more broadly to describe a form of statutory interpretation—
employed in law and in equity—that authorized judges to follow a restrictive or expansive
interpretation of a statute to “prevent a failure of justice.” GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 457 (1969). Other scholars have examined the
early role of equitable principles as interpretive tools. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All
About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–
1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1040–55 (2001) (observing that founding-era judges did not
generally resort to the notion of “equity of the statute” to justify non-literal statutory
interpretation); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 79–85 (2001) (arguing that the ratification debates are inconclusive about whether the
Framers intended to imbue the judiciary with the discretion inherent in the equity of the
statute). Equity of the statute is not my focus here. Likewise, I do not consider the debates
concerning the scope of federal equity power with respect to remediation of constitutional
violations, nor the related debate concerning the federal courts’ inherent power to craft
equitable remedies in that field. See, e.g., PETER C. HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE:
EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 198 (1990) (“[F]ederal district courts
transformed the rudimentary Balance of Equity in Brown [v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1955),] from a remedial tool to a way of reading the Constitution.”); GARY L. MCDOWELL,
EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 3–4 (1982) (arguing that since the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court has
distorted the traditional view of equitable principles, resulting in excessive judicial discretion);
John Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot: The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal
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allows a fresh look at a long-standing debate concerning the historical
scope of federal judges’ power to apply nonstate, judge-made law,
and enables reevaluation of some of the historiographic and doctrinal
4
claims that are often at stake in that debate. The history of federal
equity told in this Article challenges the notion that one can make
broad generalizations about early-nineteenth-century views regarding
the use of nonstate, judge-made law in federal court and instead
forces one to recognize that modern conceptions of federal judicial
power are just that: modern.
Intense focus on the history of Section 34 can in part be traced to
5
the years leading up to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, and in
particular to Charles Warren’s research concerning the drafting of
Section 34 and his contention that the Swift opinion departed from
6
the Judiciary Act of 1789’s original intent. A decade later, Justice
Louis Brandeis famously relied on Warren’s work to repudiate the
7
Swift doctrine. For several decades after Erie, scholars largely
followed Warren’s and Brandeis’s lead, understanding Swift’s
ratification of the application of “general common law” in federal
courts as a perplexing, ill-advised, or even unconstitutional departure
from the otherwise standard practice of applying state law, including
8
“unwritten law,” in diversity actions. This characterization of Swift’s
Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1123–24 (1996) (“If the remedies needed to correct a
constitutional violation lie outside a court’s traditional remedial powers, then separation of
powers principles require that the answer come from the political branches . . . .”).
4. Although Section 34 is often at the center of modern discussions of the metes and
bounds of nonstate, judge-made law in early-nineteenth-century federal courts, those debates
have certainly extended beyond Section 34. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark,
The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 46–64 (2009) (examining the
debate over whether federal courts have power to enforce the law of nations without legislative
codification); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,
1039–84 (1985) (outlining early debate over federal courts’ common-law powers, with particular
attention to common-law crimes); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1254–90 (1985) (explaining how the association of expansive federal power
with federal common law shaped political debate between Federalists and Republicans); Beth
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 399–418 (1997) (analyzing the history of federal courts’ application of
customary international law).
5. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. See Charles Warren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV.
49, 52 (1923); see also text accompanying infra notes 52–54.
7. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73 & n.5.
8. As William Fletcher observed in 1984, “[t]he conventional wisdom of modern legal
scholarship is that [Swift v. Tyson] marked a sudden and dramatic change from prior practice.”
William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1513 (1984).
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significance did not go unchallenged. Over time, several scholars
marshaled impressive evidence demonstrating that during the early
nineteenth century, the application of general common law in federal
court was uncontroversial and consistent with contemporary
9
interpretations of Section 34. Nevertheless, the belief that application
of nonstate, judge-made law in federal civil actions was, as a general
matter, anomalous and problematic during the early nineteenth
century continues to inform some modern scholarly and judicial
10
accounts.
The persistence of such views is especially notable given that the
modern focus on Section 34 and Swift has dwarfed consideration of
various classes of federal cases in which Section 34 did not apply or
applied in an especially limited fashion, including federal equity
11
cases. Prior to 1938, when law and equity were merged in the federal
system, they occupied separate sides of a federal court’s civil docket
and were subject to distinct choice-of-law principles. As shown in Part
I, federal judges enjoyed considerably greater power to apply
nonstate, judge-made principles when sitting in equity than when
sitting in law—greater, even, than the power they were allowed under

9. See id. at 1516–54; sources cited infra note 55.
10. For example, Professor Bradford Clark asserts that “[f]ederal common law is a modern
phenomenon,” explaining that “[p]rior to this century, the Supreme Court confidently asserted
that ‘[t]here is no principle which pervades the Union and has the authority of law, that is not
embodied in the constitution or laws of the Union.’” Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law:
A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1255 (1996) (quoting Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657–58 (1834)); see also Kermit L. Hall, The Courts, 1790–1920, in 2 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 106, 123 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2008) (“[O]n comparable points of law federal judges had to regard holdings in
state courts as the rule of decision in their courts.”); EARL M. MALTZ, SLAVERY AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1825–1861, at 149 (2009) (“Prior to 1842 [and the Swift opinion], the Court
had uniformly held that the legal issues surrounding such a claim [to recover on a promissory
note] would be determined according to the common law of New York, pursuant to the
Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . .”); sources cited infra notes 385–86.
11. Cases brought in equity were not the only subset of cases in which federal courts had
significant power to apply nonstate, judge-made law. For example, the federal courts had
exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of admiralty cases and exercised significant
discretionary powers to apply nonstate admiralty law principles in some such cases. See Caleb
Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 514 (2006) (“At least with
respect to the high seas, the Supreme Court has long understood the Constitution to displace
the local law of individual states.”); The Chusan, 5 F. Cas. 680, 683 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No.
2717) (Story, J.) (“The subject-matter of admiralty and maritime law is withdrawn from state
legislation, and belongs exclusively to the national government and its proper functionaries.”);
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 188 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (observing that Section
34 applies in “suits at common law as contradistinguished from those which come before the
court sitting as a court of equity or admiralty”).
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the Swift doctrine. Indeed, federal courts generally applied a uniform
body of nonstate, judge-made equity principles with respect to
procedure, remedial laws, and—in certain instances—the primary
12
rights and liabilities of litigants. Importantly, these principles—
which were drawn from federal and English sources—were applied in
equity cases not despite, but precisely because of the failure of the
forum state’s laws to provide adequate relief. Accordingly, the
uniform equity principles applied in federal court in the early
nineteenth century were not drawn from a common reservoir of
general principles available to state and federal judges alike, but
rather in many jurisdictions were available in federal court only.
To be certain, some legal historians have considered equity’s
13
significance in light of the Swift doctrine, and recently a handful of
legal scholars have focused on early federal equity power in studies of
constitutional remedies, early administrative law, and federal subject
14
matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless, when describing judge-made law
in early-nineteenth-century federal courts, legal scholarship and
casebooks tend to ignore the equity side of the docket or significantly
understate the scope of federal judges’ power to apply nonstate,
15
judge-made principles in equity cases. As a consequence of the
narrow focus on Section 34 and Swift, and of the failure to fully
acknowledge the range of sources of law applicable in federal court,

12. See infra Part I.B.2.
13. See TONY ALLAN FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 26 (1979) [hereinafter FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER] (stating
that in the early nineteenth century, “[M]any litigants used [federal] diversity jurisdiction in
order to gain the benefit of equitable doctrines and procedures”); TONY FREYER, HARMONY
AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 35 (1981)
[hereinafter FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE] (“[I]n equity . . . federal courts did not
consider themselves obligated to follow the state law.”); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 222–23 (1977) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s use of “an independent equity power to establish the principle of negotiability in the
federal courts”).
14. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 149–52.
15. Other common sources more or less overlook federal equity power when describing the
history of judge-made law in the federal courts. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 321–27 (5th ed. 2007); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 222–24 (7th ed.
2008). Hart and Wechsler’s famous Federal Courts casebook briefly discusses the tradition of
federal equity power but gives a strangely contradictory assessment, first declaring that federal
courts sitting in equity had substantive lawmaking power, but then describing the cases as
“inconclusive.” RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 576
(6th ed. 2009); see also Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1529 (noting that “the federal courts sitting in
equity followed local state law”).
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highly generalized statements about antipathy for nonstate, judgemade law in early-nineteenth-century federal courts are common in
treatises and articles that purport to explain the limits on the
16
application of nonstate, judge-made law by federal courts today.
This Article demonstrates that such generalizations lack foundation.
The purpose of retelling the story of judge-made law in the
federal courts through the lens of equity is not to provide an
originalist or quasi-originalist justification for a particular
17
understanding of modern federal judicial power. Rather, by focusing
on federal equity, this Article sheds light on the radical
transformations that have occurred in our understanding of the
judicial power as set forth in Article III and, in that regard, the
limitations of originalist methodology in this context. Acknowledging
the dynamic and historically contingent nature of our understanding
of Article III also raises the question of why, notwithstanding an
unchanged textual constitutional mandate, federal equity power and
the federal courts’ power to apply nonstate, judge-made law have
evolved over the decades and centuries. Why did the uniform equity
doctrine take hold in the early nineteenth century, surviving multiple
direct challenges in the Supreme Court and in Congress? Why is it no
longer part of our commonsense understanding of federal judicial
power? And why is the story of federal equity’s earlier formulation—
and its transformation in modern jurisprudence—frequently elided in
accounts of judge-made law in the federal courts today?
Part II addresses the first of these questions. One could easily
attempt to explain the vitality of the federal uniform equity doctrine
using the familiar explanatory trope that animates many accounts of
Swift and Supreme Court behavior more generally during the early
nineteenth century: an overreaching Supreme Court used equity as a
means of further empowering itself and the lower federal courts at
18
the expense of state sovereignty. But careful attention to previously
unexamined historical sources suggests that such an assessment is
simplistic and misleading if applied to federal equity. Instead, this
Article argues that the Supreme Court’s insistence that lower federal
16. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 10, at 1255; sources cited infra notes 385–86.
17. William Crosskey offers such an analysis in WILLIAM CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 877–902 (1953).
18. For example, Grant Gilmore confidently asserted that in Swift, “[t]he federalizing
Supreme Court also succeeded in reversing, for all practical purposes, the outcome of the
constitutional debate which had allocated control of the substantive law to the states.” GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 30 (1977).
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courts apply a uniform body of equity principles is best understood as
a response to contemporary concerns about disuniformity and
institutional incapacity in the federal judicial system—concerns
shared by many jurists and legislators with otherwise substantially
different views regarding the proper scope of federal power.
Two heated contests regarding federal equity power originating
in Kentucky and Louisiana invite attention to an important and
surprisingly overlooked set of issues that preoccupied both the Court
and Congress during this period: the spectacular failure of the federal
judicial system to serve the needs of the rapidly expanding nation and
19
the related calls for judicial reform. For example, many states that
became part of the Union after 1789—the “new states”—were not
20
included in a federal judicial circuit and hence lacked a circuit court.
And for nearly four decades, federal legislation governing judicial
process in the federal courts simply did not apply in federal courts
21
located in the new states. But despite a constant stream of petitions
and complaints, especially from the new states, Congress consistently
failed to enact judicial-reform legislation that would have helped
ensure uniform federal judicial services throughout the nation. In the
absence of legislative judicial reform, the Court sought to secure a
modicum of institutional uniformity in the lower federal courts, in
part through the development of a uniform corpus of equity
22
principles that applied in federal court.
For some students of the federal courts, the most interesting
aspect of the uniform equity doctrine is not why it thrived in the early
nineteenth century but that it existed at all. Part III considers why
accounts of nonstate, judge-made law in the federal courts tend to
marginalize the story of federal equity power told in this Article.
There are surely many reasons, but an important factor is that the
story of federal equity and its demise does not fit neatly into a
standard narrative of continuity that characterizes many accounts of

19. The best analysis of the debates over judicial reform in the nineteenth century remains
FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY
IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1927).
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. By calling attention to the way institutional pressures and concerns shaped Supreme
Court jurisprudence, this Article builds on and contributes to a body of scholarship that focuses
on the centrality of institutional dynamics to the development of law. See infra Part II.D.
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23

the modern Erie doctrine. Thus, even as many jurists and scholars
acknowledge Erie as “a dramatic reversal in the relation between the
24
federal courts and state law,” they tend to tell the story of judgemade law in the federal courts as a story of the stasis of—or a return
to—purportedly timeless federalism and separation-of-powers
25
principles.
This point is demonstrated rather transparently in the
minimization of the federal uniform equity doctrine in modern case
law. A brief look at Justice Felix Frankfurter’s “surgical” treatment of
26
the history of federal equity in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York
illuminates why the early equity cases are obscured in modern
accounts of judge-made law in the federal courts. Under Frankfurter’s
pen, the robust uniform equity doctrine was largely erased in modern
jurisprudence to make way for the “outcome determinative”
principle: the notion that the “outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a
27
State court.” Such erasure is not unusual. Indeed, it is symptomatic
of the generic conventions of the judicial opinion in our precedentbased system, conventions that harness historical sources as authority
while simultaneously erasing any sense of “pastness” from the past
and any sense of change in our legal traditions.
I. FEDERAL JUDGE-MADE LAW IN LAW AND EQUITY
Although today we generally speak of one Rules of Decision
28
Act, which applies to all “civil actions,” in fact, the modern vertical
choice-of-law doctrine—the determination of whether to apply state,
federal, or another body of nonstate law in a given action—is far
more complex. Different statutes and standards apply depending on
whether the law in question is procedural or substantive. And the
most difficult Erie questions arise when it is impossible to neatly
classify the law at issue as either. The state of affairs in the late
23. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal
History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 275–76 (1973) (arguing that legal history’s “most
characteristic mark has been an emphasis on continuity and a corresponding deemphasis of
change”).
24. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 169 (1980).
25. See infra Part III.
26. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
27. Id. at 109.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was even more
complicated. Article III specifies three different substantive fields of
29
competence for federal courts: law, equity, and admiralty. Many
accounts of the history of vertical choice-of-law rules in civil cases are
framed in terms of the modern concern of whether the law in
question is procedural or substantive. Although such a focus is not
anachronistic, it obfuscates the categorization most salient to earlynineteenth-century jurists: whether a civil case arose in law, equity, or
admiralty. In each of these fields, different statutes and different
precedents governed the sources of law that would determine the
30
applicable procedures, the primary liability rules, and the remedies.
This Part examines the vertical choice-of-law doctrines that
applied in two tracks of federal litigation, law and equity, and focuses
in particular on the underexamined rules governing the exercise of
federal equity power. It is fruitful to study law and equity together, in
part because they were frequently paired in practice. Some cases
could have been brought in law or equity, depending on the specifics
31
of the case and on the remedy sought. Although a particular case
might be heard by a federal judge in law or in equity, the normative
and doctrinal predispositions of the vertical choice-of-law regimes
that applied on these two sides of the federal docket were distinctive.
On the law side of the docket, although the details are famously
contested and there are important exceptions, it is fair to conclude
that there was substantial recognition of the applicability of state law
in federal court, absent a controlling federal statute, treaty, or

29. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, . . . [and] to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .”).
30. The situation was more complex than I can reasonably describe in this Article.
According to G. Edward White, “[a] precise description of the nature and sources of American
law at the time of the Marshall Court requires the designation not only of source categories but
of subcategories within those categories and of hierarchies among the categories.” G. Edward
White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–35, in HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 112 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988).
31. For example, the plaintiffs in Riddle v. Mandeville first sued for payment on a
promissory note on the law side of the federal circuit court in Virginia, Mandeville v. Riddle, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 290, 292 (1803), but the Supreme Court found that no action could be brought
in law “by the assignee of a promissory note made in Virginia, against a remote assignor.” Id. at
298. Years later, the same plaintiff filed a bill in equity in the same court. The Supreme Court
found that in equity the remote endorsers would be “immediately responsible.” Riddle v.
Mandeville, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 322, 330, 333 (1809). Morton Horwitz provides a careful analysis
of the Riddle cases and argues that in the 1809 opinion, the Court “invoked an independent
equity power to establish the principle of negotiability in the federal courts.” See HORWITZ,
supra note 13, at 223.
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32

constitutional provision. This state-law-respecting norm applied to a
certain extent to substantive law and, to an even greater degree, to
remedial and procedural law. In equity, a significantly different
vertical choice-of-law doctrine prevailed. That doctrine empowered
federal judges to apply uniform, nonstate, judge-made equity
principles without regard to state legal or equity principles,
33
sometimes including those codified in state statutes.
A. Sources of Law in Cases Brought in Law
Article III ensures that federal courts have the power to decide
34
cases “in law,” but defining the contours of this power was left to
Congress and the Supreme Court. In particular, Article III says
nothing about which sources of law will guide adjudication in federal
court (for example, state law, federal law, or the law of nations). Nor
does it answer the related question of how much discretion federal
35
judges have in crafting or declaring the law. In the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, Congress and the Court gradually
attempted to resolve these ambiguities, but the resulting system for
determining which source of law would apply in federal cases was
complex. In actions brought at law, different statutes and precedents
governed this question, depending on whether the legal rule at issue
governed procedures, remedies, or substantive law.
With respect to procedures applicable in law, two judicial process
acts directed federal judges to generally conform to the procedural
laws of the forum state. Four days after it enacted the famed Judiciary
Act of 1789, Congress enacted a temporary process act, which
provided that the “modes of process . . . in the circuit and district
courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in each state
respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the
36
same.” This rule was explicitly reconfirmed in 1792 in what is often
called the Permanent Process Act, which stated that the processes in
common law suits “shall be the same as are now used in the said
37
courts” under the 1789 Process Act.
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
35. See White, supra note 30, at 113 (noting “that judges could themselves fashion the rules
for deciding which sources to give more prominence than others”).
36. Act of Sept. 29, 1789 (Temporary Process Act), ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (emphasis
added).
37. Act of May 8, 1792 (Permanent Process Act), ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
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Similarly, federal courts deciding cases brought in law generally
applied the state remedies and procedures used to execute judgments.
Although the distinction between state and federal remedial regimes
in law was unlikely to have been significant to determining damage
judgments, the federal-state distinction could be very important to the
processes available to enforce such judgments. Whether Congress
would enact a uniform policy for execution of judgments in federal
court was a subject of significant debate in the First and Second
38
Congresses. The Permanent Process Act addressed the issue of
conformity with state execution-of-judgment laws, requiring that
“writs [and] executions . . . shall be the same as are now used” in the
39
forum state courts. Thus, despite some conflicting evidence and
significant exceptions on this point, federal courts sitting in law
largely followed state law with respect to remedies and execution of
40
judgments.
Two observations about the process acts are warranted. First, the
procedural and remedial conformity required by these acts was static.
The Temporary Process Act of 1789 expressly stated that the
procedures used in the district and circuit courts in actions brought in

38. See Charles Warren, Federal Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REV. 421, 426–35
(1930).
39. Permanent Process Act § 2, 1 Stat. at 276.
40. See Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in
American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 453 (2006) (noting that states “retain[ed] legislative
authority over their own court procedures and remedial regimes, [and] . . . also insisted that the
federal courts recognize and implement the local state execution processes in the cases that they
decided”); Warren, supra note 38, at 427–28 (noting that the federal courts were “to administer
the same remedial justice, that would be administered in the proper state courts” (quoting Ex
parte Biddle, 3 F. Cas. 336, 337 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1391) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Professor Fletcher concludes that “questions of remedies . . . at law . . . would be
determined according to federal court practice.” Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1530 n.72 (citing
Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222 (1818); Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231,
1234–35 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 9341)). On this point, however, Robinson v. Campbell, 16
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818), and Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
9341), are better understood as establishing that federal courts would not rely on state
classifications of remedies as legal or equitable when determining appropriate treatment of a
case in federal court. Robinson, 16 U.S. at 222 (observing the need to preserve the traditional
distinction between law and equity in federal courts rather than “adopt[ing] the state practice,”
lest the federal courts “extinguish” in states without equity practice, “the exercise of equitable
jurisdiction”); Mayer, 16 F. Cas. at 1235 (“[A]s to suits in equity, state laws, in respect to
remedies . . . could have no effect whatsoever on the jurisdiction of the court, the act [of 1792]
having prescribed a rule, by which the line of partition between the law and the equity
jurisdiction of those courts is distinctly marked.”). For additional discussion of Fletcher’s
interpretation of Mayer, see infra note 129 and accompanying text.
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law were to be the same “as are now used” in the forum state courts.
Because the Permanent Process Act explicitly referenced the
Temporary Process Act, federal judges were required to follow state
42
procedure as it existed in 1789. For states admitted to the Union
after 1789, Congress in 1828 enacted another process act, which
provided that for actions in law, federal courts were to follow state
43
court procedures then in effect, hence providing for static
44
conformity with state procedure as of 1828. Because of the static
nature of the conformity requirements found in all three of these acts,
federal courts were not obliged to conform with the state legislatures’
prospective changes to state court procedural or remedial law. These
process acts thus did not require perfect conformity with all current
45
state procedural laws. However, federal judges were not left free to
apply any common law procedures or remedies. Rather, depending
on which process act applied, federal courts were generally required
to apply state procedural or remedial law as it existed in either 1789
or 1828.
Second, the process acts gave federal courts some discretionary
rulemaking authority. Under the Permanent Process Act, lower
federal courts could make “alterations and additions” to state
46
procedures “as [they] . . . in their discretion deem[ed] expedient.”
That Act also empowered the Supreme Court to prescribe
“regulations” as it “shall think proper . . . to any circuit or district

41. Temporary Process Act § 2, 1 Stat. at 93 (emphasis added).
42. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 32 (1825) (observing that the
Permanent Process Act “adopt[ed] the State law as it . . . stood [in 1789], not as it might
afterwards be made”). Because the Permanent Process Act of 1792 adopted the exact terms of
the Temporary Process Act of 1789, the general view was that federal courts sitting in law were
to apply state court procedures and remedies as they stood in 1789, rather than in 1792. But see
Mayer, 16 F. Cas. at 1234 (noting that the process acts established “that the forms and modes of
proceeding at common law, as used by [state courts] in 1792” applied in federal cases brought in
law).
43. Act of May 19, 1828 (Process Act of 1828), ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278, 278–79. Note that this
meant that in states admitted after 1789, no federal statute explicitly governed judicial process
in the federal courts for up to twenty-six years.
44. The events leading up to the Process Act of 1828 are discussed at length below. See
infra Part II.B.
45. With respect to the execution of judgments, the Process Act of 1828 specifically gave
federal courts the authority “to alter final process in said courts as to conform the same to any
change which may be adopted by the legislature of the respective states for the state courts,”
thus allowing but not requiring ongoing conformity with state laws governing execution of
judgments. Process Act of 1828 § 3.
46. Act of May 8, 1792 (Permanent Process Act), ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.

COLLINS IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

262

10/17/2010 10:06:06 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:249
47

court concerning” writs, executions, and other processes. Thus, the
process acts did not dictate absolute conformity with relevant state
law. Although the process acts required federal courts to conform to
state procedures and remedies in most instances, departures based on
judicial discretion were allowed, and this grant of discretion became a
48
point of serious dispute in the 1820s. Nevertheless, the default rule
in cases brought in law was that federal courts were to apply forum
state procedural and remedial laws, at least of a certain date.
The process acts did not address the vertical choice-of-law
principles applicable to substantive law. Instead, Congress addressed
that issue in Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which famously
required “[t]hat the laws of the several states, except where the
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they
49
apply.” Section 34’s mandate was oblique. Federal statutes, treaties,
and the Constitution were to provide the rules of decision in cases in
which they governed. But outside of these cases, Section 34 circularly
declared that “the laws of the several states” would apply “in cases
where they apply.”
Without trying to untangle the thicket of opinion concerning
Section 34, one can discern two modern schools of thought regarding
early-nineteenth-century interpretation of that provision. The first
school of commentators concurs with Justice Brandeis’s opinion in
50
Erie, arguing that absent a governing federal statute, treaty, or
constitutional provision, Section 34 commanded the federal courts to
51
apply state statutory and judge-made law. By this logic, the Supreme
Court erred in Swift v. Tyson, departing from the First Congress’s
intended allocation of power between the state and federal courts
Scholars in this camp included Charles Warren, who influenced
Justice Brandeis’s interpretation of Section 34 with his article New

47. Id.
48. See infra Part II.B.
49. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
50. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (“[T]he purpose of the section was
merely to make certain that, in all matters except those in which some federal law is controlling,
the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their
rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written.”).
51. See, e.g., FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE, supra note 13, at 35 (“There seems
little room for doubt that the ‘laws of the several states’ included statutes, decisions by state
courts, and vaguely defined ‘local customs’ . . . .”); sources cited supra note 10.
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52

Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. In New
Light, Warren argued that “the word ‘laws’ in this Section 34 was not
intended to be confined to ‘statute laws,’ as Judge Story held in the
famous case of Swift v. Tyson, but was intended to include the
53
common law of a State as well as the statute law.” The basic view
that, absent a controlling federal statute, treaty, or constitutional
provision, Section 34 was intended to deprive federal judges of the
power to apply principles other than the forum states’ law—whether
common law or statute law—continues to influence some scholars’
and jurists’ views about the historical and modern scope of federal
54
judge-made law.
Others have taken a different position on the meaning and effect
of Section 34, however, arguing instead that it required federal judges
to apply state judge-made law in limited situations, if at all. For
example, both Wilfred Ritz and William Fletcher have challenged
55
Warren’s famous and influential interpretation of Section 34. After
examining in detail the archival documents on which Warren relied,
Ritz argues that Warren’s conclusions concerning the legislative
history of Section 34 are “wholly illusory” and that his interpretation
56
of Section 34 is “erroneous.” Instead, Ritz argues, Section 34 was
intended to ensure that in trials at common law federal courts applied
57
American rather than English common law.
Fletcher provides particularly strong evidence that in the early
nineteenth century—well before Swift was decided in 1842—Section
34 was consistently interpreted to mandate the application of “local
58
law” (or lex loci) but generally not state statutes or state common
law unless they were understood to involve matters of “particularly

52.
53.
54.
55.

Warren, supra note 6.
Id. at 52 (citing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842)).
See sources cited supra note 10 and infra notes 385–86.
See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789:
EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 165 (Wythe Holt &
L.H. LaRue eds., 1990); Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1514; see also White, supra note 30, at 972
(“[I]n the period from 1815 through 1835 the federal courts were conceived of as free to follow
or to ignore relevant state law as they chose, subject to the dictates of their own established
practices[,] . . . despite the language of Section 34 . . . .”).
56. RITZ, supra note 55, at 9.
57. Id. at 148.
58. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1532 (“[T]o the degree that a law was local, the federal
courts were required under the lex loci principle to follow a state’s deviation from the general
common law.”).
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59

local concern.” This was not a minor exception, as lex loci would
have generally applied in cases concerning title to real property,
would have often applied in cases concerning locally recorded
instruments (such as wills), and would have sometimes applied in
60
cases concerning negotiable instruments. But in the absence of a
local law, federal courts applied law from a number of sources
including, perhaps most prominently, the “general common law”—a
reservoir of common-law principles that were generally applicable
61
and were not identified with a particular state or sovereign entity.
Given that federal judges regularly applied nonstate, judge-made law
in the pre-Swift era, Fletcher urges that Swift did not mark a
departure from the original meaning of Section 34—as both Warren
and Brandeis concluded—but was instead consistent with the early
62
understanding of that section.
Regardless of how one interprets Section 34, and hence resolves
the issue of whether Swift departed from existing norms and
practices, it remains the case that the law side of the federal docket
was characterized to a certain extent by a state-law-respecting norm.
Under the process acts, state law usually dictated the procedures used
in federal courts, even as the acts allowed for discretionary departures
from state procedural law. With respect to legal remedies, it appears
that federal courts generally followed state remedial schemes, and
that, unless the federal judge exercised his discretion to craft an
alternative rule, the process acts generally obliged conformity with
existing state laws designed to enforce those remedies. Finally, under
Section 34, federal courts generally applied local laws to resolve the
substantive rights and liabilities of the parties “in cases where they
63
appl[ied].” Conformity with state law was by no means absolute in
actions at law. However, with certain important exceptions, including

59. Id. at 1527–28 (noting that “federal courts usually felt obliged to comply with state laws
[created by state courts and legislatures] only in subject areas of particularly local concern, such
as title to real property”); id. at 1532 (“To the degree that a law was general rather than local,
federal courts had equal status with state courts in its exposition and development. . . . But to
the degree that a law was local, the federal courts were required under the lex loci principle to
follow a state’s deviation from the general common law.”).
60. Id. at 1536–38.
61. See id. at 1517 (“The American courts resorted to this general body of preexisting law
to provide the rules of decision in particular cases without insisting that the law be attached to
any particular sovereign.”).
62. See id. at 1514.
63. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
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the general common law, conformity was the general and expected
practice.
B. Sources of Law in Cases Brought in Equity
Scholars and jurists have given considerable attention to Section
34 and the federal courts’ application of the general common law in
the early nineteenth century, but have given far less consideration to
judicial practices on the equity side of the docket. Several legal
scholars have noted that federal judges had greater latitude to apply
64
nonstate, judge-made decisional rules when sitting in equity. But
many accounts of nonstate, judge-made law in the early-nineteenthcentury federal courts simply overlook equity or operate under the
65
view that Section 34 always applied in federal equity cases.
Accordingly, the story of judge-made law on the equity side of the
docket is usually considered, if at all, as a subplot in the Section 34–
Swift narrative. As this section demonstrates, that impression is
66
misleading.
Although the law and equity sides of the federal docket were
67
interrelated in important ways, the vertical choice-of-law doctrines
that developed on the two sides of the federal docket were both
technically and normatively distinctive. On the equity side, the
vertical choice-of-law rules were maddeningly complex. But overall,
federal judges applied nonstate uniform equity principles to
determine the applicable procedures, remedies, and—in certain
cases—substantive principles. Those nonstate equity principles were
drawn from federal and English chancery sources, statutory and
judge-made.
This Section details the development of the uniform equity
principles that applied in federal court. First, it briefly describes the
tepid reception courts of equity received in many of the colonies, the
resulting varied availability of equity in colonial and state courts, and
the decision to include equity in Article III and the early judiciary
acts. It then considers, in some detail, the Supreme Court’s efforts to
64. See sources cited infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 15.
66. Indeed, it might be more accurate to characterize the general common law and Swift as
a subplot of the story of federal equity power. After all, in Swift, Justice Story referenced the
uniformity requirement in equity as support for the application of general common law on the
law side of the docket. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 22 (1842).
67. For example, equity jurisdiction was possible only if the remedy available in law was
incomplete or inadequate. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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clarify what sources of equity would supply procedural, remedial, and
substantive equity principles in federal court. By the 1810s—more
than twenty years before Swift was decided—horizontal uniformityof-equity principles within the federal court system was the explicit
norm in federal equity cases, rather than vertical conformity with
state law or equity. One important implication of the existence of the
uniform equity doctrine in the early nineteenth century is that—
regardless of what one concludes regarding the acceptance of the
general common law under Section 34—analyses of judge-made law
in federal courts that draw general conclusions based on judicial
practices in actions at law are misleading. Specifically, they tend to
mistake a part for the whole of federal judicial practices by failing to
account for the commonplace application of nonstate, judge-made
equity principles in federal courts in the early nineteenth century.
1. The Origins of Federal Equity Power. Equity had a varied
reception in the American colonies, and that variation significantly
influenced how equity was later applied in federal courts. Both
historically and today, the term “equity” refers to a set of rights,
remedies, and procedures available ostensibly to ameliorate defects
of the common law (such as in the cases of fraud, mistake, and
forgery) and to enforce equitable instruments that required the
68
ongoing supervision of a court (such as trusts and guardianships). In
eighteenth century England, equity was available in separate courts
69
with equity powers but was not available in the law courts. As a
doctrinal matter, a court of equity had jurisdiction only when no
remedy was available in law, or when the available legal remedy was
70
incomplete or inadequate.
68. See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 1 (2d ed. 1936) (noting the difficulty of defining equity
without a historical explanation and stating that “[e]quity is that body of rules which is
administered only by those Courts which are known as Courts of Equity”). See generally J.H.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 106–13 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing
the development of equity courts in England and the relationship between law and equity); see
also infra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
69. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 108 (describing how, from the mid-sixteenth century
onward, equity in England was regarded as the “peculiar prerogative” of the Court of
Chancery).
70. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33, at 32
(Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 4th ed. 1846) (1836) (“Perhaps the most general, if
not the most precise, description of a Court of Equity, in the English and American sense, is,
that it has jurisdiction in cases of rights, recognised and protected by the municipal
jurisprudence, where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had in the Courts of
Common Law.”).
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Despite equity’s association with higher notions of justice and
the chancellor’s conscience, by the seventeenth century equity had
developed a sullied reputation in some sectors. Especially among
religious and political dissenters, the English Chancery Court was
associated with royal prerogative, judicial overreaching, and
71
standardless discretion —hence, the often-repeated saying that
72
“Equity is a Roguish thing,” measured only according to “a
73
Chancellor’s Foot.” Even absent ideological objections to equity, its
74
critics complained of complex procedures and endless delay.
At least in part as a consequence of these concerns, several
American colonies refused to create separate equity courts. Some of
these colonies empowered courts of law, the legislature, or the
governor to apply certain equitable principles, but equity practice as
75
traditionally understood was often partially or totally unavailable.
Equity’s mixed reception in the colonies resulted in significant
variation of equity practices in the individual states—variation that
was duly noted and lamented in the early nineteenth century. As
explained by Justice Story in an 1821 address to the Suffolk Bar in
71. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 55 (2d ed. 1985)
(“Chancery was closely associated with executive power, in turn with the English overlords.
Equity also worked without a jury; thus there were no barriers against the use of these courts as
tools of imperial policy.”); Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America:
Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 5
PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 260 (Donald
Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971) (“By the late sixteenth century, and especially with the
accession of the Stuarts, the court of chancery was closely associated with the royal prerogative
and became the target of opposition.”); Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 1181, 1203 (2005) (noting that in the seventeenth century the Chancery Court was “tarred
by the conceptual link forged in the revolutionary era between courts drawing on the Romancanon tradition and the perceived threat of tyranny”).
72. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 43
(London, E. Smith 1689).
73. Id. at 44.
74. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 111–13 (discussing the basic procedural defects in
chancery).
75. See Katz, supra note 71, at 265–83 (discussing early-American equity practice and
opposition to chancery courts in the colonies). Katz urges that, in the colonial period, the
primary debates were not over whether equity should be available at all, but whether there
should be separate courts of equity. Id. at 265. Nevertheless, the states’ varied adoption of
equity—whether administered by courts of equity, law courts, the legislature, or the executive—
appears to have shaped the availability of equity as a mode of adjudication. See infra notes 76–
82 and accompanying text. See generally Solon Dyke Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the
American Colonies, in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779–809
(Ass’n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1908) (discussing the operation of courts of equity in the American
colonies).
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Massachusetts, “equity jurisdiction . . . exists in complete operation in
some states, in partial operation in others, and in others again is
76
obsolete, or totally prohibited.” Story counseled that, even in
jurisdictions in which the state courts enjoyed full equity powers, the
“general doctrines of the English Chancery” had been “so modified
by local statutes, usages, and decisions, that it would be somewhat
hazardous for a lawyer at the chancery bar of Westminster to form an
77
opinion as to the authority to give, or to deny relief.” Significantly,
Story concluded that “the deviations in America from the established
principles of equity were far more considerable than from those of
78
the common law.”
Other jurists shared Story’s general assessment. In his
Commentaries on American Law, James Kent described the
79
significant variation in state equity practices. In an 1831 American
edition of an English equity treatise, Philadelphia editor Antony
Laussat explained that “[t]he Equity powers of the courts under the
80
several state governments, are very various,” and dedicated nine
81
pages of his tome to an exposition of their many forms. In 1841, the
editor of The American Chancery Digest, Jacob Wheeler, lamented
this state of affairs, observing that “we have these numerous separate
and independent judicatories, as much uninfluenced and unconnected
between themselves as they are with the equity courts of Great
Britain, deciding general abstract principles of jurisprudence at
82
variance with each other.” The sheer variety in state equity practice
and jurisprudence warrants emphasis because it helps to explain the
strongly felt need for uniform principles of equity in the federal
83
system.

76. Joseph Story, An Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at Their
Anniversary, at Boston (Sep. 4, 1821), in 1 AM. JURIST 1, 22 (1829); see also 1 STORY, supra note
70, § 56, at 62 n.1 (“Equity Jurisprudence scarcely had an existence, in any large and appropriate
sense of the terms, in any part of New England, during its Colonial state.”).
77. Story, supra note 76, at 22.
78. Id.
79. 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 163 n.d (New York, O. Halsted,
2d ed. 1832).
80. 1 HENRY BALLOW, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 13 (John Fonblanque & Antony Laussat
eds., Phila., John Grigg 3d ed. 1831).
81. Id. at 13–21.
82. 1 JACOB D. WHEELER, AMERICAN CHANCERY DIGEST, at xii–xiii (New York, Gould,
Banks & Co., 2d ed. 1841).
83. See infra Part I.B.2.
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Despite misgivings about equity, and despite—or because of—
the variation in the availability of equity in colonial and state court
systems, the drafters of the Constitution included equity as one of the
federal courts’ basic powers. Some Antifederalists proclaimed their
distrust of equity because of its traditional association with broad
judicial discretion and because they worried about the preservation of
84
trial by jury in common law cases. But the practical need for equity
power was overwhelming. Without equity jurisdiction, federal courts
would have no power in actions raising issues of fraud, mistake,
85
hardship, or trusts. Relatively little debate concerning Article III
occurred at the Constitutional Convention, and the decision to give
86
federal courts powers in equity was no exception. Article III in its
final form simply commanded that “[t]he judicial Power” of federal
87
courts “extend to all Cases[] in . . . Equity.”
As with much of the design of the federal judicial system, the
details of the federal courts’ equity powers were left to Congress and
the Supreme Court to resolve. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
recognized and formalized the federal courts’ equity powers in two
88
provisions. Section 11 of the 1789 Act endowed circuit courts with
89
the authority to decide cases in equity. And in Section 16, Congress
simultaneously confirmed the availability of equity in circuit courts

84. The worry was that by empowering a single court with both legal and equitable powers,
equity would subsume the law, nullifying the right to jury available in law. See HOFFER, supra
note 3, at 95 (“Anti-federalists immediately seized upon the proposed equity power to warn
against the dangers of uncontrolled discretion in the federal courts. They cited as proof of that
danger the absence of juries in the chancellors’ chamber.”); RITZ, supra note 55, at 144 (noting
that, in debates over equity, the First Congress’s “overriding consideration . . . was trial by jury,
not applicable law” (footnote omitted)).
85. With respect to the Constitutional Convention, Hoffer notes the “relative absence of
controversy over equity at the convention” and suggests that there was “a generally perceived
need [for federal courts to have equity power] among the delegates.” HOFFER, supra note 3, at
96–97. Alexander Hamilton observed the necessity of federal equity power. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 480 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“There is hardly a subject of litigation
between individuals which may not involve those ingredients of fraud, accident, trust, or
hardship, which would render the matter an object of equitable rather than of legal
jurisdiction . . . .”).
86. See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1460 (“Little space in members’ sparse
notes of the Convention’s debates . . . is devoted to the judiciary branch . . . .”).
87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
88. For a discussion of the legislative history relating to the inclusion of equity in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, see 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 483–84, 492–94 (1971).
89. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
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and memorialized the traditional limitation on equity by making it
unavailable “in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy
90
may be had at law.” But nothing in the 1789 Act determined what
source or sovereign would provide equity principles in the newly
91
created federal courts.
National legislators trained their attention on federal equity
when debating the Temporary Process Act of 1789 and the
Permanent Process Act of 1792, but the resulting statutory language
provided little clarity regarding what body of equity principles would
apply in federal court. In a provision that confused as much as it
elucidated, the Temporary Process Act provided that “the forms and
modes of proceedings in causes of equity . . . shall be according to the
92
course of the civil law.” Three years later, Congress returned to the
drafting table and produced the Permanent Process Act, which stated
that in equity cases, federal courts were to proceed “according to the
principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity . . . as
93
contradistinguished from courts of common law.” Although in its
basic contours the Permanent Process Act duplicated the Temporary
Process Act, the permanent act shed some light on the temporary
act’s ambiguous reference to “civil law”: the processes to be applied
by federal courts sitting in equity were not those to be applied at law,
94
but instead were those that “belong[ed] to courts of equity.”
This clarification was partial, as it did not explain which “courts
of equity” were to provide the principles for adjudication of federal
equity cases. This issue was briefly raised in debates leading up to the
enactment of the Permanent Process Act. The slim legislative record
suggests that at least some legislators may have believed that the
90. Id. § 16, 1 Stat. at 82. Section 16 codified the longstanding limitation on chancery
jurisdiction. See Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231, 1233 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 9341)
(observing that “the sixteenth section of the judiciary law . . . does no more than affirm the
general principle[s]” that “regulate the jurisdiction of a court of chancery”).
91. See RITZ, supra note 55, at 144 (“The First Congress argued about the extent to which
the national courts should be authorized to exercise any equity jurisdiction, not over the law to
be applied in such equity jurisdiction as they were allowed.”). Despite reference to “trials at
common law” in Section 34, some early-nineteenth-century commentators and advocates urged
that Section 34 required application of state law and equity in actions brought in equity, and
some modern commentators have followed their lead. See infra note 154. But this was not the
prevailing view at the time. See infra Part II.C.3.
92. Act of Sept. 29, 1789 (Temporary Process Act), ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (emphasis
added). Julius Goebel describes the inclusion of the term “civil law” in the Temporary Process
Act as “something done in haste.” 1 GOEBEL, supra note 88, at 534.
93. Act of May 8, of 1792 (Permanent Process Act), ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
94. Id.
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federal courts would apply nonstate equity procedures, rather than
95
conforming to state equity practice. But the process acts themselves
were riddled with ambiguity and failed to resolve the matter. In short,
Article III extended the judicial power of the federal courts to cases
brought in equity, but neither the drafters of the Constitution nor the
early Congresses did much to clarify what, exactly, that would mean
in a federal judicial system.
2. Uniformity in Federal Equity. Given the ambiguity of the
process acts, determining what sovereign or source would provide
equity principles in federal court was largely left to federal judges. At
the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Jay promulgated an order in 1791
adopting the rules of the Court of Chancery in England to “afford[]
96
outlines for the practice of this court” in equity cases. But in lower
federal courts, resort to local equity practice and principles was surely
the most natural course in states where equity practice existed.
Evidence suggests that in the 1790s, lower federal court judges were
indeed applying state equity principles in federal court without
97
correction by the Supreme Court. In the late 1810s, however, the
95. In 1792, prior to the enactment of the Permanent Process Act, the Senate introduced a
process bill that would have eliminated the use of civil law in federal equity cases, replacing it
instead with directions to follow forum-state equity principles. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 85
(1792) (“[T]he forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity . . . shall be, except where
the laws of the United States otherwise provide, according to the course which hath obtained in
the States respectively in like causes . . . .”). In states without equity courts, the Senate bill
would have required federal courts to follow the state equity practices of “the nearest State in
which [equity courts] have been instituted.” Id. The House rejected the equity-conformity
requirement and replaced it with language similar to that found in the final version of the
Permanent Process Act: federal equity cases were to be conducted “according to the principles,
rules and usages, which belong to a court of equity as contra-distinguished from a court of
common law.” 1 GOEBEL, supra note 88, at 545.
96. Rules & Orders of the Supreme Court of the U.S., 5 U.S. (1 Cranch), at xvi (1804)
(Rule VII, dated Aug. 8, 1791).
97. See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 88, at 580–85 (discussing variation in equity practice in the
circuit courts in the 1790s). Resort to local equity principles may have been particularly
common in early cases involving disputes over titles to real property. See Bodley v. Taylor, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 191, 221–23 (1809) (relying, in a case brought in equity, on the forum state’s
court of appeals rulings to determine whether a party could resort “to a court of chancery in
order to set up an equitable against the legal title” to a parcel of land, and to determine the
legitimacy of titles); cf. Gilman v. Brown, 10 F. Cas 392, 401–02 (C.C.D. Ma. 1817) (No. 5441)
(finding that no lien existed on property located in Massachusetts under either general
principles of equity or, alternatively, on the ground that the absence of chancery courts in
Massachusetts meant that no lien was available). But other cases from the first decade of the
nineteenth century portended the application of nonstate equity principles in federal court.
Riding circuit, for example, Chief Justice Marshall observed that Section 34, by its own terms,
applied to “suits at common law as contradistinguished from those which come before the court
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Supreme Court developed a firm principle of uniformity in federal
equity cases. In equity cases brought in federal courts, a uniform body
of nonstate, judge-made principles would apply.
a. Procedure in Equity. By 1819 at the latest, any doubts
regarding the source of procedural rules to be followed in federal
98
equity cases were settled. In United States v. Howland, Chief Justice
Marshall made clear that federal courts would apply a uniform body
of equity procedures, regardless of whether the forum state courts
had equity power, and regardless of whether the forum state courts’
equity procedures differed from equity procedures available in
99
federal court. In Howland, the United States brought an action in
equity to enforce a judgment against a firm for “duties on imports and
tonnage” owed. The United States sought an accounting of “goods,
effects, money and credit” in the hands of one of the firm’s other
creditors and an injunction to restrain the creditor firm from
100
disposing of the assets. The enforcement action was brought in
federal court in Massachusetts, a state that had no court of equity and
101
had endowed its law courts with only limited equity power. One of
those limited grants of equity power was an attachment and joinder
provision, enacted in 1794, that allowed “a creditor to sue the debtor
102
of his debtor.”
Defendants urged that the federal court lacked power to hear the
case in equity because the Massachusetts statute provided an
adequate and complete remedy under Massachusetts law. Hence,

sitting as a court of equity or admiralty.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 188 (C.C.D. Va.
1807) (No. 14,694).
98. United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108 (1819).
99. Id. at 115.
100. Id. at 109.
101. The earliest Massachusetts courts lacked equity powers altogether, but over the course
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the state legislature gradually expanded
the state courts’ equity powers. When Howland was decided, Massachusetts state courts had
particular equity powers in cases of foreclosure and redemption of mortgages, Act of Nov. 4,
1785, ch. 22, 1785 Mass. Acts 474, and in cases involving estates and specific performance of
contracts, Act of Feb. 10, 1818, ch. 87, 1818 Mass. Acts 486. State statutes empowered courts of
law to use procedures or provide remedies that traditionally would have been available only in
equity, including the particular provision at issue in Howland, which allowed courts of law to
attach the property of a debtors’ debtor. See Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 41, 1794 Mass. Acts 120;
see also Act of Feb. 18, 1819, ch. 98, 1819 Mass. Acts 148, 148 (providing for the addition of
parties in suits for the redemption of lands or tenements when such addition is “necessary to the
attainment of justice”).
102. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 115.
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under Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the case did not qualify
for federal equity jurisdiction and state law must apply. The United
States Attorney General argued that the Massachusetts attachment
and joinder statute was irrelevant, not because it did not apply by its
own terms, but because “[t]he power and practice of the Circuit
Courts, in Chancery cases, are not to be controlled by the local laws
of the states where those Courts sit. They are the same throughout
103
the Union.” The Court agreed, finding that federal equity’s more
generous joinder procedure would apply:
[T]he remedy in Chancery, where all parties may be brought before
the Court, is more complete and adequate, as the sum actually due
may be there, in such cases, ascertained with more certainty and
facility; and as the Courts of the Union have a Chancery jurisdiction
in every state, and the judiciary act confers the same Chancery
powers on all, and gives the same rule of decision, its jurisdiction in
104
Massachusetts must be the same as in other States.

In 1822, three years after Howland, the quest for uniform equity
procedure was aided by the promulgation of the first federal rules of
equity. Likely drafted by Justice Story, the rules codified certain
105
uniform equity procedures to be used in the lower federal courts.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court issued
106
equity rules on one other occasion, in 1842. Both sets of Federal
Equity Rules covered various aspects of equity practice, aiding in the
pursuit of uniformity in federal equity cases. But the scope of the
early-nineteenth-century equity rules was limited, and in recognition
103. Id. at 112.
104. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). Several cases followed the Howland principle. See Union
Bank v. Stafford, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 327, 340 (1851) (rejecting application of a Texas statute of
limitations on the basis that “these sections can have no application to a bill in equity”); Russell
v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 147 (1851) (“This being a suit in equity, and oral evidence
being admitted, or rejected, not by the mere force of any State statute, but upon the principles
of general equity jurisprudence, this court must be governed by its own views of those
principles.”); Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 669, 674–75 (1850) (“Whatever may be
the laws of Texas [regarding pleading], they do not govern the proceedings in the courts of the
United States . . . . [If a party asserts an equitable claim], he must proceed according to the rules
which this court has prescribed . . . regulating proceedings in equity in the courts of the United
States.”); Harding v. Handy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 103, 132 (1826) (rejecting the applicability of a
Rhode Island law allowing suits by heirs to set aside a conveyance to proceed without making
all heirs parties, noting that the state law’s “influence on a suit in equity is not so certain”).
105. See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the U.S., 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.), at v, v–
xiii (1822).
106. See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the U.S., 42 U.S. (3 How.), at xli, xli–
lxx (1842).
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of their limited scope, both sets of equity rules endowed the circuit
courts with the authority to “make further rules and regulations, not
107
inconsistent with the rules hereby prescribed, in their discretion.”
What procedural rule applied in the absence of a federal equity
rule or a local federal rule? One could imagine a world in which the
Supreme Court would direct federal judges to default to forum state
equity procedures, especially in states that recognized equity as part
108
of their legal systems. Indeed, such a course was strongly urged. But
consistent with then-established Supreme Court precedent, including
Howland, the Federal Equity Rules of both 1822 and 1842 pointed
federal judges to the “practice of the High Court of Chancery in
109
England” to fill any gaps left after consulting the equity rules and
any local rules promulgated by the circuit courts.
The fact that the Federal Equity Rules defaulted to English
chancery practice may appear a fairly minor, arcane point of earlynineteenth-century procedural law. But upon reflection, it is quite
striking that the first procedural rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court directed lower federal court judges to default to English equity
principles. In the absence of an applicable federal equity rule, for
example, a federal court sitting in Georgia was to look to English
chancery practice to determine what procedures to follow, rather than
110
to the practices of Georgia state courts. Today, this approach is
striking because the application of foreign law in federal courts has
become a lightning-rod issue. But it was equally striking to some
early-nineteenth-century critics of federal equity, who complained
111
bitterly about the application of “alien” law in federal equity cases.
b. Equitable Remedies. By the late 1810s, it was similarly well
established that a uniform corpus of remedies applied in actions

107. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity in the U.S., 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.), at xiii, r. 32;
see also Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity in the U.S., 42 U.S. (3 How.), at lxix, r. 89
(“The Circuit Courts . . . may make any other and further rules and regulations for the practice,
proceedings and process . . . not inconsistent with the rules hereby prescribed . . . .”).
108. See infra Part II.B–C.
109. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.), at
xiii, r. 33; see also Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity in the United States, 42 U.S. (3
How.), at lxix, r. 90 (requiring that, absent an applicable rule, federal courts “be regulated by
the present practice of the High Court of Chancery in England”).
110. See, e.g., Neves v. Scott, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196, 208–09 (1850) (citing English chancery
cases in an opinion regarding an action filed on the equity side of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Georgia); see also text accompanying infra notes 162–65.
111. 4 REG. DEB. 364 (1828) (statement of Sen. Rowan). See generally infra Part II.B–C.
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brought in federal equity cases, remedies that were derived from
federal and English sources rather than state law or state equity
112
principles. This was the case even—and especially—when state law
or equity would dictate a different result than that mandated by
equity principles applicable in federal court. Indeed, it was precisely
in cases in which the law (state or federal) failed to give a complete or
adequate remedy that federal equity jurisdiction attached under
Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, hence triggering the
113
application of uniform nonstate equity principles.
114
In 1818, the Supreme Court decided Robinson v. Campbell,
which quickly became the leading case in this area. Robinson
presented a tricky choice-of-law question, but one that was not
entirely unusual in the early 1800s. Both parties claimed ownership of
four hundred acres of property located in a region that had once been
part of Virginia but that had become part of Tennessee pursuant to
115
an 1802 compact. A question arose as to whether the defendant in
the action could assert an equitable title as a defense in an ejectment
action—an action at law—as was allowed in Tennessee courts
116
pursuant to a state statute governing priority in land titles. Even
while conceding that the doctrine of lex loci and Section 34 dictated
117
that Tennessee law governed, Justice Todd rejected the suggestion
that the Court was required by Section 34 to follow a Tennessee
118
statute with respect to the equitable remedies available.
In certain respects, Robinson is an odd case to have become a
leading authority establishing the federal uniform equity doctrine.
Robinson involved an action brought in law. According to the
defendant’s attorney, the core issue was whether, in an action brought
112. This has been called the “equitable remedial rights doctrine.” See 19 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4513 (2d ed. 1996) (recognizing that, historically, “in some circumstances federal equity courts
could grant equitable relief that was not available in the courts of the forum state”). The
existence of this doctrine was discussed and questioned in the years following Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, presumably because that opinion seemed to disclaim the existence of a federal
decisional law of equitable remedies. See, e.g., Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal
Remedies, 71 HARV. L. REV. 513, 518–19 (1958); Note, The Equitable Remedial Doctrine: Past
and Present, 67 HARV. L. REV. 836, 843–45 (1954). Guaranty Trust’s disclaimer of a history of
judge-made law in federal equity cases is discussed in Part III, infra.
113. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §16, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
114. Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818).
115. Id. at 214.
116. Id. at 220–21.
117. Id. at 219–21.
118. Id. at 222–23.
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at law, the defendant could assert an equitable title in real property
119
because a Tennessee court would have allowed him to do so. But
Justice Todd posed the question differently. To him, the issue was
whether, Section 34 notwithstanding, Congress had intended to
“confine the courts of the United States in their mode of
administering relief to the same remedies, and those only, . . . which
120
existed in the courts of the respective states.” In other words, were
lower federal courts required to follow state remedial schemes, in
which “remedial” was used rather liberally to describe assertion of an
equitable title? Justice Todd’s answer to this question was negative:
he explained that the remedies in federal court “are to be, at common
law or in equity, not according to the practice of state courts, but
according to the principles of common law and equity, as
distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our
121
knowledge of those principles” —England.
Although Justice Todd’s references to remedies “at common law
or in equity” may seem strange, their context suggests that he sought
to protect the uniformity of federal equitable remedies against the
radical disuniformity of state equity practice. Todd was particularly
concerned about the significant variation in the application of equity
in state courts:
In some states in the union, no court of chancery exists to administer
equitable relief. In some of those states, courts of law recognise and
enforce in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which a
court of equity would recognise and enforce; in others, all relief is
denied and such equitable claims and rights are to be considered as
mere nullities at law. A construction, therefore, that would adopt
the state practice in a[ll] its extent, would at once extinguish, in such
122
states, the exercise of equitable jurisdiction [in federal court].

Hence, equitable remedies in federal court would conform to a
national standard and default to English chancery practice, regardless
of the remedies available in the forum state courts, in law or equity.
119. Id. at 215 (argument of counsel) (“By the law, as settled in Tennessee, the prior
settlement right of the defendant, though an equitable title, might be set up as a sufficient title
in an action at law.”).
120. Id. at 222 (opinion of the Court). In other words, Todd explained, the question was
“whether it was [Congress’s] intention to give the party relief at law, where the practice of the
state courts would give it, and relief in equity only, when according to such [state] practice, a
plain, adequate, and complete remedy could not be had at law.” Id.
121. Id. at 222–23.
122. Id. at 222.
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This would be so even when those state remedies were defined in a
statute, and even when those remedies would result in a different
123
outcome. Over the following decades, Robinson came to stand for
this basic principle, which was reconfirmed by the Court with great
124
vehemence throughout the period and (generally) followed with
great diligence in the circuit courts. Judge Betts of the Southern
District of New York, sitting in his capacity as circuit court judge,
made the point exceedingly clear: “The state laws furnish the rule of
decision in the courts of the United States in cases at common law.
But the equity jurisdiction of those courts is one and the same in
125
every state, and is in no respect dependent upon the local law.”
Careful consideration of just two of these many cases highlights
126
the significance of the Robinson holding. In Mayer v. Foulkrod, a
circuit court opinion involving a dispute over the administration of an
estate, Justice Washington rejected an attempt to defeat the circuit
court’s equity power to order discovery and an accounting. Counsel
for the defendant argued that under a Pennsylvania statute, an action
at law could be maintained for recovery of a legacy, including a
process that would allow the plaintiff to seek an accounting, and
127
hence the federal court lacked equity jurisdiction. Pennsylvania had
never established equity courts, but its courts of law had adapted
some equitable principles and practices, and the state legislature had
enacted several statutes that provided the law courts with a limited
128
range of equitable powers. But Justice Washington was adamant
that neither the state statute respecting legacies nor Pennsylvania’s

123. Id. at 222–23.
124. See, e.g., Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 660 (1835) (reversing the lower
federal court in Louisiana for failing to apply federal equity rules of discovery and refusing to
make federal equitable relief available); Boyle v. Zacharie (Boyle II), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 658
(1832) (“[T]he remedies in equity are to be administered, not according to the state practice, but
according to the practice of courts of equity in the parent country, as contradistinguished from
that of courts of law.”); see also infra Part II.B–C.
125. Lamson v. Mix, 14 F. Cas. 1055, 1056 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1837) (No. 8034) (citing Robinson
v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818)). For other circuit court opinions following the
Robinson rule, see Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231, 1235 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 9341),
and Bean v. Smith, 2 F. Cas. 1143, 1150 (C.C.D.R.I. 1821) (No. 1174). As discussed in Part II.C,
infra, not all lower federal court judges were inclined to apply uniform equity principles.
126. Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231, 1235 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 9341).
127. Id. at 1234; see also Act of Mar. 21, 1772, ch. 654, 1772 Pa. Laws 195, 195 (declaring it
lawful for a person “to commence, sue and prosecute an action” to recover a legacy).
128. See John G. Buchanan, Sources of the Development of Pennsylvania Equity, 8 U. PITT.
L. REV. 1, 5–9 (1941) (discussing the limited application of equity in the Pennsylvania state
courts before 1836).
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limited acceptance of equity practice was of any consequence as to
what equity principles would apply in federal court. He took the
opportunity to explain the stark difference between law and equity in
the federal courts:
[S]tate laws, respecting rights, are to be considered by the courts of
the United States as rules of decision . . . . But as to suits in equity,
state laws, in respect to remedies, . . . could have no effect whatever
on the jurisdiction of the court, the [Permanent Process Act of 1792]
having prescribed a rule, by which the line of partition between the
129
law and the equity jurisdiction of those courts is distinctly marked.

Washington spoke of equity jurisdiction, but that should not lead one
to think that he meant subject matter jurisdiction, which was
130
governed by Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Rather, he
used the term in a general sense to mean the power of the federal
court to apply traditional equitable remedies in a case in which legal
remedies were unavailable or inadequate. And in these cases,
uniform equitable remedies would apply in federal equity cases
regardless of the availability or unavailability of equity in the state
courts.
The Supreme Court made this point clear in the 1832 case of
131
Boyle v. Zacharie. In Boyle, Louisiana merchants James Zacharie
and Samuel Turner sued Baltimore merchant Hugh Boyle in federal
court in Maryland for monies owed. In 1821, the circuit court had
132
entered a judgment against Boyle for approximately $3,000.00. But
129. Mayer, 16 F. Cas. at 1234–35. One reason to focus on the Mayer case is that Fletcher
relies on it to support his contention that Section 34 applied to actions brought in equity.
Fletcher argues that, in Mayer, “Washington . . . interpreted [Robinson v.] Campbell to mean
that questions of rights, both at law and in equity, would be determined according to local state
law, whereas questions of remedies, both at law and in equity, would be determined according
to federal court practice.” Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1529 n.72. Certainly language in Mayer
could be read to mean that federal courts followed state substantive law in equity. However, as
discussed below, that practice was limited in scope: in certain cases federal courts sitting in
equity looked to state law to determine the substantive rights of the parties, while in cases
where equitable rights were at issue, the federal courts turned to uniform nonstate substantive
equity principles. See infra Part I.B.2.c. Moreover, it is clear that Justice Washington did not
understand Section 34, even as it applied in cases brought in law, to require conformity with
respect to all “questions of rights,” as he explained that “[t]he thirty-fourth section of the
judiciary law of 1789 is very correctly stated . . . to apply only to the rights of persons and of
property.” Mayer, 15 F. Cas. at 1234.
130. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
131. Boyle v. Zacharie (Boyle I), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 635 (1832); Boyle v. Zacharie (Boyle II),
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648 (1832).
132. Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 649.
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Boyle was insolvent, and Zacharie and Turner would have to wait to
collect. Several years later, when Boyle’s fortunes had changed, the
Louisiana merchants sued again to execute the original judgment
133
through attachment of a ship owned by Boyle, the General Smith.
Boyle filed a bill in equity in federal circuit court, seeking an
injunction on the grounds that a Maryland insolvency statute barred
134
execution of the 1821 judgment. The federal circuit court in
Maryland temporarily granted Boyle’s request for an injunction
staying execution of the judgment but then promptly allowed the
135
execution to go forward.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, reciting the standard
refrain that “[t]he chancery jurisdiction given by the constitution and
laws of the United States is the same in all states of the union,” and
explaining that “the remedies in equity are to be administered, not
according to the state practice, but according to the practice of courts
of equity in the parent country, as contradistinguished from that of
136
courts of law.” With this in mind, the Court insisted that “the effect
of the injunction granted by the circuit court was to be decided by the
general principles of courts of equity, and not by any peculiar statute
137
enactments of the state of Maryland.” As in Mayer, the fact that a
state statute would have dictated a very different result was of no
138
moment.
It is worth pausing to consider just how different this doctrinal
world was in contrast to the modern Erie doctrine. Today, in federal
diversity cases, absent a specific, codified federal procedural rule or
statute on point, a state rule applies under basic vertical choice-of-law
133. Boyle I, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 642.
134. Id. at 638; Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 654–55. Boyle also filed a motion to quash the
venditioni exponas, a writ of execution directed at the sheriff or marshal to order the sale of
property in satisfaction of a judgment. Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 654–55.
135. Boyle I, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 643.
136. Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 658 (citing United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
108, 115 (1819); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 220 (1818)).
137. Id.
138. In fact, Boyle relied on two state statutes to support his case: the insolvent act of
Maryland, which the Court held not to apply in a federal equity case, Boyle I, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at
642–43, and a Maryland statute governing the effect of injunctions on executions of judgments,
Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 657–58. The circuit court granted Boyle’s request for a temporary
stay of the execution and apparently had not vacated that stay in equity before issuing or
reissuing the writ of execution. Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 655. Boyle claimed that, in so doing,
the circuit court violated a Maryland statute governing equity practice. Id. at 657–58. The
Supreme Court made clear that such state statues had neither force nor effect in federal court.
Id. at 658–59.
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doctrine if application of that state rule is outcome determinative.
But in the early nineteenth century, a contrary vision of federal equity
power prevailed. According to this vision, it was commonsensical that
a federal court sitting in equity would supply a remedy even when a
state court would not. A central purpose of equity was to remedy the
deficiencies of the common law, and equity traditionally did so by
providing a remedy only when no such remedy was available in law or
when the available legal remedy was incomplete or inadequate. Thus,
equitable remedies were by their very nature “outcome
140
determinative” relative to legal remedies.
And in the early
nineteenth century this truism was incorporated into the federal
system, resulting in a vertical choice-of-law doctrine that required
application of uniform nonstate equity principles when state law or
equity failed to provide adequate relief.
c. Equitable Rights. By today’s jurisprudential standards, the
most complex and controversial aspect of the uniformity principle in
federal equity cases was its application to what early-nineteenthcentury jurists labeled “equitable rights.” This was not just the
provision of an equitable remedy when legal liability had been
demonstrated but could not be remedied at law. It was the provision
of a substantive right or liability rule.
Equity jurisprudence was (and is) often described as a system of
remedies and procedures. Thus, one function of equity courts was to
provide remedies for the violation of rights that, although recognized
141
in courts of law, could not be adequately remedied in those courts.
But as Justice Story explained in his monumental treatise on equity
jurisprudence, courts of equity could also “administer remedies for
rights, which rights Courts of Common Law do not recognise at all;
or, if they do recognise them, they leave them wholly to the
142
conscience and good-will of the parties.” Thus, for example, over

139. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (applying the “outcome-determination”
test of Guaranty Trust in light of the “twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws”); Guar. Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (interpreting Erie to require that “the outcome of the litigation in the
federal court should be substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a State court”).
140. See infra Part III.
141. 1 STORY, supra note 70, at 28.
142. Id. As examples of equitable rights, Story listed trusts and certain kinds of mistake,
accident, and fraud claims, as well as penalties, oppressive proceedings, undue advantages,
betrayals of confidence, and unconscionable bargains, “in all of which Courts of Equity will
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time the Chancery Court developed expertise and authority over
particular fields, including trusts, fraud, mortgages, and
guardianships. Although some equitable rights originated in the
Chancery Court’s substantial remedial authority, by the early
nineteenth century equity also provided a well-developed body of
substantive jurisprudence that governed the primary rights and
143
liabilities of individuals in a range of matters. And in federal court
in the early nineteenth century, federal or English equity provided
those principles.
Schooled as we are in legal realism, the application of nonstate,
judge-made equitable rules to determine the substantive rights of the
parties should not offend our modern sensibilities any more or less
than the provision of an equitable remedy when a state court would
have supplied none. In both cases the outcome of the litigation—the
final entry of judgment by the court and the execution of that
judgment through court-ordered processes—turned on a nonstate,
144
judge-made rule. And for this reason, discriminating between
equitable remedies and equitable rights in certain cases is difficult, if
not impossible. But because the application of judge-made
substantive law in federal courts threatens a vital fault line in modern
theories of federal judicial power, twentieth-century analyses of
nineteenth-century federal equity have tended to focus on whether
federal courts had authority to apply substantive judge-made
equitable principles distinct from the legal or equity principles
applicable in the forum state courts.
These analyses have resulted in conflicting accounts.
Immediately following Erie’s condemnation of the application of
general common law in federal court, the question arose as to
whether—and to what extent—Erie’s holding applied in federal
equity cases. Guaranty Trust v. York provided the definitive answer,
resolving that the Erie principle applied to all aspects of a case in

interfere and grant redress; but which the Common Law takes no notice of, or silently
disregards.” Id. at 28–29.
143. As Christopher Langdell would explain in the late nineteenth century, equity was not
“simply a different system of remedies from those administered in courts of law; for there are
many extensive doctrines in equity, and some whole branches of law, which are unknown to the
common-law courts.” C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING, at xxv
(Cambridge, Charles W. Sever 1877).
144. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897)
(“[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things
he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;—and so of a legal right.”).
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which equitable remedies were sought. But Frankfurter did little to
distinguish the Court’s early-nineteenth-century equity cases,
proclaiming instead that “[i]n giving federal courts ‘cognizance’ of
equity suits in cases of diversity jurisdiction, Congress never gave, nor
did the federal courts ever claim, the power to deny substantive rights
created by State law or to create substantive rights denied by State
146
law.”
Some contemporary commentators agreed with Justice
Frankfurter’s assessment, arguing that application of nonstate equity
principles in federal court had, in fact, never extended to questions of
147
substantive law. In more recent commentary, in the context of
Section 34 jurisprudence, William Fletcher essentially concurs with
that assessment, concluding that, “as a routine matter, the federal
courts sitting in equity followed local state law,” and that “questions
of rights, both at law and equity, [were] determined according to local
148
state law.”
149
Others have taken a very different position on this issue.
Examining the federal right to a jury trial in the early nineteenth
century, Professors Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins observe
that “the substantive law that applied in federal equity proceedings
150
was frequently either federal or general law rather than state law.”

145. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (declaring that state law “ought to
govern” in federal court “whether the remedies be sought at law or may be had in equity”); see
also discussion infra note 391.
146. Id. at 105. For further discussion of Justice Frankfurter’s treatment of the historical
record in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, see infra Part III.
147. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1027–28
(1953) (“[A]nalysis of the pre-Erie cases shows that almost invariably the uniformity of decision
in federal equity was understood to be a uniformity only in matters of practice and remedy.”).
148. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1529, 1529–30 n.72.
149. In addition to the sources discussed herein, see John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in
Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1999), Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary
Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 469 (2003), and Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1985). An earlier generation of legal
scholars also discussed the existence of a more robust tradition of federal judge-made law in
equity. See, e.g., CROSSKEY, supra note 17, at 877–902 (arguing that, when sitting in equity,
early-nineteenth-century federal courts often disregarded state equity and common-law
principles); Howard Newcomb Morse, The Substantive Equity Historically Applied by the U.S.
Courts, 54 DICK. L. REV. 10, 13 (1949) (“The equity jurisdiction of the United States courts in
the several states has repeatedly been held to be uniform . . . .”); Seymour D. Thompson,
Federal Jurisdiction in Equity, 12 GREEN BAG 119, 119 (1900) (showing examples of federal
courts in equity recognizing substantive rights that did not exist under the laws of the states).
150. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 619
(2001); see also Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled
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In the context of an analysis of the scope and operation of federal
subject matter jurisdiction, Professor Laura Fitzgerald similarly
argues that the Judiciary Act of 1789 “authorized the federal judiciary
to develop for itself a uniquely federal law of equity,” observing that
“[a]lthough Congress required federal courts to follow state rules of
decision in common law cases, absent controlling federal
constitutional or statutory authority, they were not so confined when
151
deciding cases in equity.” And in the course of examining the
origins of federal common law review of the actions of federal and
state officials, Professor John Duffy describes nineteenth-century
152
federal equity as “a domain of federal judge-made law.”
A closer look at early federal equity jurisprudence helps explain
why modern jurists and scholars disagree about the choice-of-law rule
governing substantive law in early-nineteenth-century equity cases, as
there appears to have been some truth in both positions. Section 34,
by its own terms, applied only to actions at common law—a fact that
led early-nineteenth-century treatise writer Thomas Sergeant to
153
declare that the provision was irrelevant to suits filed in equity. But
others had a different view. For example, William Rawle, the United
States Attorney for Pennsylvania under President Washington and a
successful Supreme Court advocate in the 1810s, contended in an
1825 treatise that Section 34’s apparent mandate that federal courts
apply state law was “so convenient and appropriate” to “appl[y] to
cases in equity, that we may consider it likely to be adopted,” though
he conceded that “[i]t does not appear that this point has yet been
154
directly decided.”
This conundrum was gradually, and imperfectly, resolved
through a rather complicated doctrinal scheme. As a general matter,
Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 104–05 (1997) (“In equity, where Congress had not directed the use
of state procedures, the federal courts provided effective relief for federal rights claimants with
even less attention to the strictures of state law than in actions at law.”).
151. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1263 (2001).
152. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113,
126 (1998).
153. See THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 148 (Phila., P.H. Nicklin & T.
Johnson 2d ed. 1830) (1822) (“[The 34th] section is confined to civil proceedings . . . . A case in
equity must be governed by those rules and principles which prevail in equity.”).
154. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 249 (Phila., H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825). In support of his contention that “the federal
courts sitting in equity followed local state law,” Fletcher observes that “Rawle considered the
lex loci principle to apply to suits in equity,” Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1529–30. Fletcher,
however, does not reference Rawle’s caveat that, as of 1825 when Rawle’s treatise was
published, the matter had not yet been directly decided, RAWLE, supra, at 249.
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the question of what source of law would provide the substantive law
in a federal equity case turned on whether the right or claim being
asserted was traditionally understood as legal or equitable. If the
underlying right derived from a legal source—for example, the
common law or a statute providing a legal right or obligation—then
Section 34 generally governed, requiring judges to engage in the
rather confusing process of determining whether the case before them
155
was one in which state law “applied.” But if the right or claim was
traditionally defined in equity, then federal judges generally applied
federal or English equity principles rather than state equity or law.
Riding circuit in Massachusetts, Justice Story applied this
156
principle in Powell v. Monson & Brimfield Manufacturing Co., a
157
case in which a widow sought assignment of her dower. Defendants
urged that Mrs. Powell had released her dower rights pursuant to a
158
Massachusetts statute, despite apparent irregularities in that release.
Story explained that, in this scenario, the court was obliged to look to
the language of the Massachusetts statute to determine whether Mrs.
159
Powell’s release in fact complied with the statute. He concluded that
it had not, rejecting the defendants’ contention that in “a case in
equity, . . . the court will grant great indulgences to the imperfect acts
of parties to sustain their intentions; and that it will not lend its aid to
160
enforce any inequitable claim.” Story explained,
The parties stand upon their legal rights, and what is not a bar of
dower at law ought not, under the circumstances of the case, to be
held a bar in equity. Here, no fraud or imposition is set up. The case
stands upon its naked rights; and the relief asked, is not rebutted by
161
any counter equity . . . .

155. See supra Part I.A. Even when a federal court turned to state law to determine the
primary right or liability, that federal court might still provide a federal equitable remedy when
such a remedy would not be available under state law. See discussion and sources supra note 31.
156. Powell v. Monson & Brimfield Mfg. Co., 19 F. Cas. 1218 (C.C.D. Mass. 1824) (No.
11,356).
157. Id. at 1219.
158. Id. at 1219–20.
159. Id. at 1220.
160. Id. at 1222.
161. Id. (emphasis added). Examples abound of federal courts applying state law to
determine the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties in equity cases. See Walker v.
Parker, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 166, 174 (1839) (applying Maryland law to interpret the will to resolve
the claims of a decedent’s widow and infant son in an action at equity); McCormick v. Sullivant,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192, 201 (1825) (dismissing a bill in equity on the ground that the will
allegedly conveying the real property had not been “duly proved” according to the laws of the
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In such a case, the federal court would follow the state statute.
As Justice Story intimated, however, if the right in question derived
from equity—if it had evolved from jurisprudence developed by the
Chancery Court, such as the law of “fraud or imposition”—then
equity principles would apply. And when equitable rights were at
stake in federal court, uniform nonstate equity principles would
generally apply.
162
The 1850 Supreme Court case Neves v. Scott provides a good
example of this phenomenon. The Neves case concerned the
163
enforceability of what was then known as a marriage settlement, a
type of trust traditionally administered in equity. The question before
the Court in Neves was whether a federal court in Georgia would
enforce a bilateral marriage settlement against third parties,
notwithstanding the fact that under Georgia’s own equity principles
such a settlement was enforceable only against parties to the
164
agreement and consanguineous relations. Thus, the Justices were
forced to choose between the broader federal equity rule and the
explicitly narrower rule required under the forum states’ equity
jurisprudence. By choosing the former, the Justices indicated that
they understood that federal equity provided a distinct rule of
decision with respect to the underlying rights and liabilities of the
parties:
Wherever a case in equity may arise and be determined, under the
judicial power of the United States, the same principles of equity
must be applied to it, and it is for the courts of the United States,
and for this court in the last resort, to decide what those principles
are, and to apply such of them, to each particular case, as they may
find justly applicable thereto. . . . [I]n all the States, the equity law,
recognized by the Constitution and by acts of Congress, and

state in which the property lay); Talbot v. Simpson, 23 F. Cas. 644, 646 (C.C.D. Pa. 1815) (No.
13,730) (finding that a husband’s conveyance of his wife’s property to a third party conformed
with the statutory requirements of privy examination of the wife by a magistrate, and rejecting
the argument that principles of equity mandated a different result).
162. Neves v. Scott (Neves I), 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196 (1850).
163. Id. at 197; see also Neves v. Scott (Neves II), 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268 (1851) (rehearing
and approving of Neves I).
164. Neves II, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 271; see also MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE
LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 89–90, 112–15 (1986) (discussing the evolution of the
enforcement of bilateral or “simple” marriage settlements).
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modified by the latter, is administered by the courts of the United
165
States, and upon appeal by this court.

In both the language and tenor of Neves, the Court registered its
insistence that the lower federal courts apply uniform equity
principles, even when doing so required the court to disregard state
equity principles.
This basic principle applied even when no state law or equity
provision provided an analogous right or liability. Perhaps the most
dramatic example of this phenomenon is Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
166
Belmont Bridge Co. In Wheeling Bridge, Pennsylvania sued the
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company, seeking to enjoin the
construction of a bridge across the Ohio River. Because of its height,
the bridge would have obstructed steamboat traffic to key trading
167
outlets on the Ohio River, including those in Pennsylvania. One of
the significant obstacles for Pennsylvania in Wheeling Bridge was the
absence of a statutory or common law basis for its assertion that the
bridge constituted a nuisance warranting an injunction. Plans for the
bridge had been approved by the Virginia legislature and acquiesced
to by Congress. Hence, counsel for the defendants urged that the
168
bridge could “in no sense be considered a nuisance.” Conceding
that “the federal courts have no jurisdiction of common-law
offences,” and that in law such offenses were defined by state
common law or a federal or state statute, the Court turned to its
chancery power, citing Robinson for a well-settled principle:
In exercising this jurisdiction, the courts of the Union are not limited
by the chancery system adopted by any State, and they exercise their
functions in a State where no court of chancery has been established.
The usages of the High Court of Chancery in England, whenever the
jurisdiction is exercised, govern the proceedings. This may be said to
be the common law of chancery, and since the organization of the
169
government, it has been observed.

165. Neves II, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 272. Although the Court was insistent that federal equity
principles governed in federal equity cases, it was not entirely insensitive to the status of the
Georgia Supreme Court. It took pains to examine relevant Georgia precedent and expressed
great “respect . . . for that learned and able court.” Id.
166. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851).
167. Id. at 557.
168. Id. at 563.
169. Id. (citing Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222 (1818)).
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Pursuant to its broad chancery powers, the Court found that the
bridge caused “private and . . . irreparable injury,” which “makes the
obstruction a private nuisance to the injured party” that could be
170
remedied in equity.
Wheeling Bridge was heard by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
original jurisdiction, but the same principles applied in cases brought
in lower federal courts, even when the state courts did not recognize
or enforce the particular right in question in law or equity. For
171
example, in Fletcher v. Morey, a London merchant sought to
enforce an equitable lien against a bankrupt Boston firm to which it
172
had extended credit pursuant to a written agreement. The plaintiff
claimed that the lien was created by the agreement, but the defendant
urged that such a lien could not be recognized or enforced by the
federal court because Massachusetts courts would not recognize such
173
a lien. Relying on English and federal case law, Justice Story, riding
174
circuit, found that the agreement indeed created an equitable lien,
and he rejected the notion that such a lien could not be created by a
contract executed in Massachusetts:
It has been long since settled in the courts of the United States, that
the equity jurisdiction and equity jurisprudence administered in the
courts of the United States are coincident and coextensive with that
exercised in England, and are not regulated by the municipal
175
jurisprudence of the particular state, where the court sits.

Several years earlier, Justice Story had also made clear that
rights defined and created in English chancery court would be
enforced in federal court, even when they conflicted with a state
statute or the state supreme court’s interpretation of that statute.

170. Id. at 564. Although the Court used the language of “relief,” id., the Court in Wheeling
Bridge was not simply determining whether the infringement of a right could be remedied, but
also was ascertaining the rights of Pennsylvania to be free of the alleged nuisance that would be
caused by the bridge. This point is underscored and illuminated by Chief Justice Roger Taney’s
dissent, in which he questioned “by what law, or under what authority, this court can adjudge it
to be a public nuisance and proceed to abate it, either upon a proceeding in chancery or by a
process at law.” Id. at 580–81 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
171. Fletcher v. Morey, 9 F. Cas. 266 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 4864).
172. Id. at 267.
173. Id. at 269.
174. Id. at 270.
175. Id. at 271 (citing United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 115 (1819);
Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 220 (1818)).
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Flagg v. Mann —a case that, because of allegations of fraud, fell
177
within the Massachusetts federal court’s equity jurisdiction —
demonstrates just how far the uniformity principle extended to ensure
the application of nonstate equity instead of state law or equity. In
Flagg, Henry Flagg filed a bill in equity to set aside certain
conveyances of property by Samuel Mann as fraudulent. A central
question in the case was whether Flagg and Mann were tenants in
common or were otherwise in a fiduciary relationship at the time of
178
the conveyance—a precondition for Flagg’s fraud claim. As of the
late 1830s, when Flagg filed suit in federal circuit court in
Massachusetts, the state courts had been given limited equity powers
by the state legislature, including the power to “determine in equity,
all disputes between co-partners, joint tenants and tenants in
179
common.” Hence, the issue was whether the federal court was
bound by such state legislation, and state court interpretation of such
legislation, when exercising its equity power.
In Flagg that issue was particularly salient because, in a prior
action involving the same parties and facts, Massachusetts’s highest
court had held that, under the relevant state statute, Flagg and Mann
were not tenants in common, “and that therefore the bill was not
180
maintainable.” Flagg refiled in federal court, and Justice Story,
sitting as Circuit Justice, expressed his “distress” regarding the
Massachusetts court’s determination of Flagg and Mann’s status.
Story purportedly objected not to the Massachusetts court’s
interpretation of its “local law,” but rather to its views “upon general
principles of interpretation applicable to courts of equity,” which “are
not, and cannot from their nature be, conclusive upon this court, in a
181
suit in equity addressed to its general jurisdiction.” In a lengthy
opinion that relied on “ancient and modern authority, . . . the positive
rule of the Roman law, . . . [the law of] continental Europe, and the
182
actual jurisprudence of England and America,” Story found that
Flagg and Mann were “in a court of equity at least, . . . tenants in

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Flagg v. Mann, 9 F. Cas. 202 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 4847).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 215.
Act of Feb. 21, 1824, ch. 140, § 2, 1824 Mass. Acts 399, 399.
Flagg, 9 F. Cas. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 216.
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183

common,” and that the defendant “was guilty of a wrong and
184
constructive fraud upon the rights and equity of the said Flagg.”
In sum, the vertical choice-of-law regime that determined the
substantive legal and equitable principles applicable in federal equity
cases was exceedingly complex. In a case like Powell, the plaintiffs
rested their claim to an equitable remedy—assignment of dower—on
a legal right to dower and on a Massachusetts statute. In such cases,
the federal courts would first determine, pursuant to Section 34,
whether to apply local law or general common law to resolve the
185
underlying legal issue, and then apply federal equity principles to
determine whether a violation was remediable in equity. By contrast,
Neves, Wheeling Bridge, Fletcher, and Flagg were all cases in which a
party asserted claims based on rights as defined in equity. In those
cases, nonstate uniform equity principles were used to resolve those
claims.
These general principles were not always followed perfectly,
especially because the line between an equitable right and an
186
equitable remedy was so imperfectly discernible. And in the 1850s,
the application of nonstate equity principles to determine the rights of
the parties found a critic in Chief Justice Taney, even as he endorsed
187
federal uniformity in equitable remedies and procedures. But

183. Id. at 223.
184. Id. at 231.
185. See supra Part I.A.
186. In addition, by the 1840s the Court seems to have developed two exceptions to the
general practice that equitable rights would be defined by a uniform corpus of nonstate equity
principles. First, in the case of land titles, the Court made clear that “when investigating and
decreeing on titles in this country, we must deal with them, in practice, as we find them, . . . so as
to give effect to state legislation and state policy.” Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 204
(1839). The Court, however, was also careful to note that, when sitting in equity, it would not
“depart[] . . . from what legitimately belongs to the practice of a Court of Chancery.” Id.
Second, after struggling to determine the force and effect of English equity principles governing
charitable trusts in Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart’s Executors, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 1 (1819), the Court in Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844),
found that a challenge to a charitable trust established for the benefit of Philadelphia failed
under “the law of charities in Pennsylvania,” id. at 196.
187. Although Chief Justice Taney generally endorsed the proposition that federal courts
sitting in equity followed uniform federal principles, sitting as a Circuit Justice in Meade v.
Beale, 16 F. Cas. 1283 (C.C.D. Md. 1850) (No. 9371), Taney suggested a different view of the use
of federal principles in determining “equitable rights.” Although Taney recognized that “the
jurisprudence of England is to be observed in [federal courts] in administering the remedy for
an existing right,” that rule “applies to the remedy and not the right.” Id. at 1291. “[T]he right
must be given by the law of the state, or of the United States.” Id. For discussion of Taney’s
dissent in Wheeling Bridge, see supra note 170.

COLLINS IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

290

10/17/2010 10:06:06 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:249

despite such criticism, and although Section 34 and general principles
of comity sometimes led federal courts to apply local law in equity
cases, federal courts generally applied federal equity principles, with a
default to English chancery practice.
*

*

*

It is tempting to understand the uniform nonstate equity
principles applied in federal court as a direct analogue to the general
common law—a general body of principles that were employed by
188
both state and federal judges. Nineteenth-century jurists sometimes
referred to the equity principles that applied in federal courts as
general or universal. But it is important to recognize the significant
differences between the general common law and the uniform equity
principles applied by federal courts. Although some state courts
surely drew on the same equity principles, it was routinely
acknowledged that the equity principles applicable in federal courts
were not available in many state courts. Indeed, Section 16 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 required federal judges to evaluate the
189
adequacy of state law against traditional equity principles. When
state law (or equity) failed to provide an adequate or complete
remedy—as measured by federal judges against traditional equity
principles—a uniform corpus of federal and English equity principles
would apply in their stead. In this regard, the equity principles
applied in federal court were, in the United States context, federal
rather than general in character.
The equity principles applied in federal court were not, however,
considered supreme federal law that state courts were required to
apply, and in that regard they were unlike today’s federal common
190
law. Indeed, it was not even intimated that state courts would or
should apply federal equity principles, as was sometimes suggested of
191
the general common law principles provided in federal opinions.
Rather, the uniform equity doctrine was understood only to require
188. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
189. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (“[S]uits in equity shall not be
sustained . . . in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”).
190. See Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (observing that post-Erie federal common law “is truly uniform
because, under the supremacy clause, it is binding in every forum”).
191. Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) (noting that the Swift doctrine
had failed to lead the state courts to conform with general common law as provided in federal
court decisions).
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application of a single body of equity principles throughout the
federal judicial system.
Finally, as the foregoing analysis of early-nineteenth-century
federal case law demonstrates, the equity principles applied in federal
court were federal in the sense that federal judges frequently
distinguished them from state law that generally applied on the law
side of the docket. Discursively, the equity side of the federal docket
was a recognized site of judge-made decisional rules that, in many
states, were available in federal courts only.
II. FOREIGN LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Shifting attention to federal equity power provides a fresh
perspective on the history of judge-made law in the federal courts and
also prompts consideration of a different set of issues: Why did the
federal uniform equity doctrine evolve as it did? What does it reveal
about early-nineteenth-century understandings of the role of the
federal courts vis-à-vis the states and Congress? If there was vocal
resistance to the application of nonstate equity in federal courts—as
there was—why didn’t Congress rein in federal equity power? After
all, for much of this period, Congress was dominated by legislators
who tended to resist, or purported to resist, efforts to nationalize
government functions.
A focus on the history of federal equity illuminates
underexamined sources that help answer these questions. The
uniform federal equity doctrine prompted substantial debate, a fact
192
that makes federal equity a particularly fruitful subject for analysis.
National legislators quarreled over whether federal courts sitting in
equity should be required to apply state law and equity. State officials
petitioned Congress, challenging the availability of federal equitable
remedies in cases in which state law or equity provided none. And in
at least in one state, lower federal court judges simply refused to
apply federal and English equity principles, openly resisting repeated
Supreme Court mandates. Thus, analyzing the history of judge-made
law in the federal courts through the lens of equity prompts
examination of a host of sources generated by players from different
corners of the early-nineteenth-century legal community. Considering
192. By contrast, the Swift opinion was unanimous; it was readily followed by lower federal
judges; it received very little attention in legal periodicals and reviews; and it did not give rise to
cries for congressional intervention. FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE, supra note 13, at
2–3.
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these perspectives provides a much fuller account of contemporary
views regarding nonstate, judge-made law in federal courts than could
be provided by focusing on judicial opinions alone.
Analysis of two episodes in which federal judges’ application of
nonstate equity principles precipitated significant contests helps
explain why the federal uniform equity doctrine prevailed. The first
episode occurred in the aftermath of the Panic of 1819 and concerned
the particular response of Kentucky state and federal courts to the
wave of lawsuits that followed as debtors were unable to fulfill their
contractual obligations. The second is the cause célèbre of Myra Clark
Gaines, a fraud case that originated in New Orleans and captured the
attention of both the nation and the Supreme Court.
Upon first impression, these two contests concerning federal
equity power may seem to have concerned outlier cases in the
Supreme Court—literally, cases that involved federal courts on the
territorial fringes of the republic—and hence would not have
reflected concerns central to the operation of the federal courts more
generally. But I argue that it was precisely because these two contests
were geographically remote from the metropolitan centers of the East
Coast that they raised an issue of substantial importance: institutional
uniformity and the capacity of the federal judicial system.
A primary concern during this period was the failure of the
federal courts to keep pace with westward expansion. New states—
states incorporated into the Union after 1789—often received
inadequate federal judicial resources and were entirely left out of
important federal judicial legislation. Such systemic inadequacies
were a constant source of complaint, debate, and calls for judicial
reform. And they also occasioned and created—in the Supreme Court
and in Congress—a felt need for system-wide uniformity in the
federal courts. Although social needs do not necessarily translate into
193
law, in this situation the institutional conditions and realities of the
early-nineteenth-century federal court system helped shape the
federal uniform equity doctrine and prompted Congress’s repeated
acquiescence to it. In the face of concerns over the federal judiciary’s
failure to provide uniform judicial services, and significant disparity in
the states’ embrace of equity, the Supreme Court used uniform equity

193. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 101 (1984) (“If a
society’s law can’t be understood as an objective response to objective historical processes,
neither can it be understood as a neutral technology adapted to the needs of that particular
society.”).
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as one way to secure a modicum of horizontal consistency throughout
the federal judicial system. And it did so in the context of a complex
institutional relationship with a Congress that was unable or unwilling
to engage in substantial, and much-needed, judicial reform.
A. New States, Orphan States, and Quasi-Circuit Courts
In many accounts, the Supreme Court in the early national
period is portrayed as a Leviathan-like adjudicative body. Federalcourt-empowering opinions of the 1810s and 1820s are explained as a
consequence of institutional aggrandizement by Chief Justice
194
Marshall and other federalist-minded Justices on the Court.
Extending this characterization of the Court into the tenure of Chief
Justice Taney, scholars have argued that even as President Andrew
Jackson’s appointees gained presence and power on the Court in the
195
1830s and 1840s, it continued to exhibit nationalizing tendencies.
With little effort, one can see how the uniform equity doctrine would
seem to fit into this narrative. Through this doctrine, the Court
empowered itself and the lower federal courts to largely disregard
state law and equity when sitting in equity, thereby strengthening
federal judicial authority and concomitantly weakening the authority
of state courts and legislatures.
There is, however, another perspective on the Supreme Court’s
institutional status in the early nineteenth century, one that draws
attention to the Court’s role as the head of a rather loosely organized
system of lower federal courts and its complex relationship with
Congress. In this period, the federal judiciary was still a system in the
making, and the lower courts frequently labored with woefully
inadequate institutional resources, especially in the farther reaches of
the republic. Undoubtedly, concerns about the Court’s nationalizing

194. As G. Edward White has noted, historians regularly use “four talismanic labels” to
describe the Marshall Court: “[I]t was a ‘nationalistic,’ ‘Federalist,’ ‘property-conscious,’ and
‘Chief Justice-dominated’ Court.” G. Edward White, The Art of Revising History: Revisiting the
Marshall Court, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 659, 671 (1982).
195. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Article IV and Federal
Powers, 1836–1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 695, 742 (“A summary of the achievements of the Court
over which Taney presided would include a rather generous interpretation of congressional and
presidential power . . . [and] a striking expansion of federal judicial authority beyond the
boundaries set by the Marshall Court . . . .”). Some scholars emphasize the Court’s ideological
transformation under Presidents Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren. See FORREST
MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776–1876, at 118–19
(2000); Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political Fragmentation,
and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 95, 145–46 (2009).
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tendencies gave rise to episodic efforts to restrict the authority of the
196
federal courts. But concerns about the lower federal courts’
institutional inadequacies gave rise to constant complaints and myriad
legislative proposals to reform and expand the federal judicial system.
A brief sketch of the organization and operation of the federal
judicial system during this period is essential to understanding
contemporary fears of institutional incapacity, and how the felt need
for institutional judicial reform helped shape the Court’s equity
doctrine.
Although contemporaries referred to it as a system, the lower
federal courts of the early nineteenth century hardly resembled
today’s well-organized and well-staffed federal judiciary. First, the
judiciary was quite small during this period. In 1789, there were
197
198
thirteen district court judges; by 1840, there were twenty-nine.
District courts exercised original jurisdiction over certain cases
199
involving crimes, admiralty law, and land law. The circuit courts
functioned both as intermediate courts of appeals and as courts of
original jurisdiction in several significant classes of cases, including
diversity cases, certain criminal cases, and certain cases in which the
200
United States was a plaintiff. Until the late nineteenth century, the
circuit courts were composed of two judges: the itinerant Circuit
Justice assigned to the particular judicial circuit and the local district

196. The most famous of these efforts was the proposal to repeal Section 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which empowered the Supreme Court to review state-court judgments in which the
constitutionality of a federal law was “drawn in[to] question,” or where the constitutionality of a
state law was upheld. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86. For deeper
background on Section 25, see Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme
Court of the United States—A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act [Part
One], 47 AM. L. REV. 1 (1913); Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme
Court of the United States—A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act [Part
Two], 47 AM. L. REV. 161 (1913).
197. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 2, 1 Stat. at 73.
198. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 394 (2d ed. 2002) (“As
new states were admitted to the Union, each was organized as a single judicial district with a
single judge without regard to the size of the district.”). Although there were only twenty-six
states in 1840, in three of the original thirteen states Congress had created two districts. See Act
of Apr. 29, 1812, 2 Stat. 719 (New York); Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 108, § 3, 3 Stat. 462
(Pennsylvania); Act of Feb. 4, 1819, ch. 12, § 1, 3 Stat. 478 (Virginia); see also RUSSELL R.
WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 13 (2d ed.
1994).
199. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77.
200. Id. §§ 11, 22, 1 Stat. at 78–79, 84–85.
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201

judge. Consequently, district court judges wore two hats: They sat as
district court judges and as circuit court judges alongside a Supreme
202
Court Justice acting as Circuit Justice.
The lower federal courts’ operational resources were quite
limited. Those courts had no courthouses and often held court in state
or local public buildings, in private homes, or in the public rooms of
203
taverns. Due to significant delays in the reporting of Supreme Court
decisions, district judges were likely to learn about opinions of the
204
Court by reading reports of the opinions in newspapers or from a
Supreme Court Justice sitting as a Circuit Justice. By statute, the
district court judges were required to reside in their appointed
district, generally hundreds of miles from their closest colleague in
205
the federal judiciary.
The circuit-riding system was the glue that was to hold this
system together, connecting the center to the periphery and binding
these far-flung outposts of federal justice into a system. But circuit
riding was poorly suited for the vast, ever-expanding territory of the
United States. The Justices’ complaints about circuit riding and the
toll it took on their physical constitutions almost register as quaint
206
today, but the original circuit system had significant limitations that
201. Originally, each circuit court was constituted by two Supreme Court Justices and the
district court judge. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75. But owing to the difficulty of ensuring that two
Justices attend circuit, the requirement was reduced in 1793 to one Supreme Court Justice.
Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333.
202. See Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 3–4, 1 Stat. at 73–75.
203. SURRENCY, supra note 198, at 81.
204. See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective
on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1310 (1985) (“Delay . . . in the reporting
of the decisions of the nation’s highest court necessarily diminished, in many instances almost to
the vanishing point, the immediate impact that the Court’s actions might otherwise have been
expected to have on the bar and the public at large. For the newspapers of the period, the only
other significant means of disseminating information concerning the jurisprudence of the Court,
routinely reported even its most major doctrinal pronouncements in almost summary fashion.”).
205. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 3, 1 Stat. at 73.
206. See, e.g., Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 9,
1792), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT, 1790–1794, at 288 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) (“We
really, Sir, find the burthens laid upon us so excessive that we cannot forbear representing them
in strong and explicit terms.”); Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to John Adams
(Aug. 15, 1797), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT, 1795–1800, at 220–21 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990)
(opposing a change in the scheduling of the circuit court for Delaware because it would be
inconvenient for the assigned judge to travel immediately from Virginia to Delaware); John
McKinley, Praying an Alteration in the Judicial Circuits of the United States, S. DOC. NO. 27-99,
at 1–2 (2d Sess. 1842) (noting that the “business of the [ninth] circuit [was] greatly beyond the
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exemplified a larger set of institutional deficiencies of the federal
courts, especially with respect to the states that became part of the
Union after 1789. Eleven of the fifteen states added between 1789
and 1842 were “orphan states”—they were not included in a federal
judicial circuit and, hence, lacked a Circuit Justice—for anywhere
207
between one and forty-two years. A host of other states had what
were dubbed “quasi Circuit Courts” during this period because,
although nominally part of a circuit, they were rarely, if ever, graced
208
with the presence of their assigned Circuit Justice.
New states were marginalized from the federal judicial system in
other ways, too. Neither the Temporary Process Act nor the
Permanent Process Act technically applied in the new states. Thus,
until the situation was corrected by the Process Act of 1828, no
statute formally guided the procedure or the execution of judgments
in federal cases brought in law or equity in federal courts located in
209
the new states. This statutory omission not only created problems in
the lower federal courts but also signaled the more general failure of

physical capacity of any one man,” and observing that he was required to travel 10,000 miles to
attend to his circuit duties).
207. A federal district court was created for each state when it gained statehood, but there
was substantial delay in integrating these district courts into a federal judicial circuit. Hence,
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio became states, with district courts, in 1791, 1797, and 1803,
respectively, but those states were not made part of a judicial circuit until 1807. See Act of Feb.
4, 1791, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189 (recognizing Kentucky statehood); Act of Jan. 31, 1797, ch. 2, § 2, 1
Stat. 496, 496 (recognizing Tennessee statehood); Act of Feb. 19, 1803, ch. 7, § 2, 2 Stat. 201,
201–02 (recognizing Ohio statehood); Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 2, 2 Stat. 420, 420 (creating
the Seventh Circuit to comprise the district of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio). In 1837, a
portion of the district of Louisiana, created by Act of Apr. 8, 1812, ch. 50, § 3, 2 Stat. 701, 703,
the district of Indiana, created by Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 100, § 2, 3 Stat. 390, 390, the district of
Mississippi, created by Act of Apr. 3, 1818, ch. 29, § 2, 3 Stat. 413, 413, the district of Illinois,
created by Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 70, § 2, 3 Stat. 502, 502–03, the district of Alabama, created
by Act of Apr. 21, 1820, ch. 47, § 2, 3 Stat. 564. 564, the district of Missouri, created by Act of
Mar. 16, 1822, ch. 12, § 2, 3 Stat. 653, 653, the district of Arkansas, created by Act of June 15,
1836, ch. 100, § 4, 5 Stat. 50, 51, and the district of Michigan, created by Act of July 1, 1836, ch.
234, § 2, 5 Stat. 61, 62, were integrated into circuits, see Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat.
176, 176–77.
208. S. REP. NO. 20-50, at 5 (2d Sess. 1829); see also 2 REG. DEB. 510 (1826) (statement of
Sen. White) (noting that, due to the failure of an ailing Circuit Justice to ride circuit, Tennessee,
Kentucky, and Ohio were “no better provided with an opportunity of obtaining a due
administration of justice in their Federal Courts, than the other six Western States” that were
not included in a circuit at all); 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 419 (1817) (statement of Rep. Claiborne)
(noting that “unless some remedy [is] provided” for the Justice assigned to the Seventh Circuit,
Tennessee would continue to be denied “justice as to the laws of the United States”).
209. See infra notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
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Congress to implement needed judicial reform as the country
expanded westward.
These institutional deficiencies had significant consequences for
litigants, prompting calls for judicial reform and preoccupying the
210
early-nineteenth-century Senate and House Judiciary Committees.
Starting with Edmund Randolph’s Attorney General Report of
211
1790, proposals to reform and expand the federal judicial system
were standard fare for national legislators. They included various and
sundry proposals to abandon or curtail circuit riding, to create an
independently staffed intermediate federal court of appeals, and to
remedy the significant lacunae in judicial legislation for the new
212
states. Regardless of the specific reform proposal, by the 1820s, two
discursive refrains characterized advocacy for judicial reform:
uniformity and equality. There was a general understanding that
litigants in all regions should have equal access to the federal courts
(including the circuit courts) and that the federal judiciary should
operate uniformly in all regions.
Thus, although historians have tended to focus on contemporary
213
fears of the Court’s consolidationist tendencies in the 1820s that
informed proposals to limit federal judicial power, during the same
period concerns about the federal judiciary’s incapacity regularly
animated debates concerning how best to expand the federal judicial
system. Calls for expansion of the lower federal judicial infrastructure
often came from what, at first appearance, may seem to have been
unexpected quarters. In 1826, Senator John Eaton of Tennessee—a

210. One of the most common complaints of orphan states and quasi-circuit states was that,
absent a Circuit Justice, the resident circuit judge sat alone on appeal and hence was the sole
judge to review his own decision as a district judge. Because of the practical and jurisdictional
limits of appeal to the Supreme Court, this meant that there was no means of effective appellate
review in the vast majority of cases heard in federal court in states which, de jure or de facto,
lacked a Circuit Justice. See J.E. DAVIS, MEMORIAL OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE
OF MISSISSIPPI, H.R. REP. NO. 18-94, at 5 (2d Sess. 1825) (“At present, in the absence of the
Circuit Court System, the decision of the District Judge, in all cases where the amount in
controversy does not exceed $2,000, is final and conclusive.”); Geo[rge] M. Bibb et al., Petition
to the Congress of the United States, 2–3 (Frankfurt, KY Jan. 10, 1824) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (observing that in the “[s]ix states that are without the benefit of the circuit
system . . . the opinion of the single District Judge is final and without appeal in all causes of less
value than two thousand dollars”).
211. See EDMUND RANDOLPH, JUDICIARY SYSTEM, H.R. REP. NO. 1-17, at 21 (3d Sess.
1790).
212. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 19, at 14–55 (describing pre-Civil War
legislative proposals to reform the federal judiciary); see also sources cited infra notes 215–24.
213. See source cited supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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close personal ally of President Jackson—delivered a lengthy address
in Congress that was typical of dozens of similar complaints
articulated by national legislators of the western states. “We are one
people living under a Government common to us all,” Eaton
emphasized, “and each State has a right to expect from the Federal
Government, that a like provision will be made for her citizens, with
that made for the citizens of the other States. This has not been done
214
[with respect to the judiciary].”
Such concerns were voiced in petitions submitted to Congress by
state legislatures, bar associations, and other concerned groups. For
example, in 1836, the Alabama legislature petitioned Congress for an
extension of the circuit system to that state to secure “equal blessings
and equal benefits upon the citizens of every portion of the
215
republic.” In his address to Congress in 1829, President Jackson
decried the inequality of the federal courts in different states and
regions, observing that a “uniform operation of the Federal
Government in the different States is certainly desirable; and, existing
as they do in the Union, on the basis of perfect equality, each State
has a right to expect that the benefits conferred on the citizens of
216
others should be extended to hers.” Jackson repeated this message
217
in substance in 1831, 1832, 1834, and 1835.
Such calls for judicial reform and expansion of the lower federal
court system did not necessarily signal the embrace of a
consolidationist vision of federal judicial power—the strengthening of
214. 2 REG. DEB. 511 (1826) (statement of Sen. Eaton). For similar complaints by other
Jacksonian senators, see id. at 1061–62 (statement of Rep. Hemphill); 1 REG. DEB. 587–88
(1825) (statement of Sen. Van Buren); 1 REG. DEB. 527–28 (1825) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
Party affiliations of legislators are taken from KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS
OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1789–1989, at 88 (1989).
215. S. REP. NO. 24-130, at 1 (1st Sess. 1836). For similar statements regarding the unequal
and defective organization of the federal judiciary, especially in the western states, see G.W.
CAMPBELL, MEMORIAL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BAR OF NASHVILLE IN THE STATE OF
TENNESSEE, H.R. REP. NO. 18-29, at 3 (2d Sess. 1825); DAVIS, supra note 210, at 4–5; JOHN
HENDERSON, MEMORIAL OF JOHN HENDERSON, SUBMITTING A PLAN FOR THE
REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES, S. MISC. DOC. NO. 31-4,
at 1 (1st Sess. 1849); Bibb et al., supra note 210, at 1.
216. ANDREW JACKSON, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
REP. NO. 21-1, at 18 (1st Sess. 1829).
217. See Andrew Jackson, Third Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1831), in 2 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 544, 558 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1897) [hereinafter CMPP]; Andrew Jackson, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1832), in 2
CMPP, supra, at 591, 605; Andrew Jackson, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 1, 1834), in 3 CMPP,
supra, at 97, 117; Andrew Jackson, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1835), in 3 CMPP, supra,
at 147, 177.
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the federal government at the expense of the states. Legislators with
significantly different views on other federalism-sensitive issues
agreed that the lower federal court system created by the 1789 Act
needed to be modified and expanded to ensure uniform federal
judicial services throughout the country.
Despite that broad consensus, judicial reform was exceedingly
difficult for Congress. An 1823 House Judiciary Committee report
responding to a memorial submitted by the State of Indiana reported
its efforts to determine “‘whether any . . . alterations are necessary to
be made in the organization of the Courts of the United States, so as
218
more equally to extend their advantages to the several states.’” The
Committee recognized that the new states ought “to be placed upon a
footing of equality with the old [states], in respect to their judicial
219
establishments,” but it dodged the issue by presenting several
reform options “in hopes that the subject may attract the attention of
the country generally,” explicitly leaving the issue of reform to “the
220
next Congress.” An 1829 Senate Judiciary Committee report
revisited the issue of inequality in the administration of justice in the
federal courts, denominating as “quasi Circuit Courts” those states in
which a “District Judge alone” undertook the responsibilities of
221
circuit judge due to the absence of the assigned Circuit Justice. But
substantial reform was not forthcoming.
At least in part, significant judicial reform was unsuccessful
during this period because reform proposals did not readily map onto
existing partisan alignments and thus were unable to attract a crosspartisan coalition. Some legislators who opposed centralization
nevertheless generally supported expansion of the federal judiciary
222
through, for example, the creation of additional circuits. But other

218. H.R. REP. NO. 17-105, at 1 (2d Sess. 1823).
219. Id. at 2.
220. Id. at 3.
221. S. REP. NO. 20-50, at 5 (2d Sess. 1829). For additional committee reports considering
various judicial-reform measures, see H.R. REP. NO. 23-429, at 1 (1st Sess. 1834); H.R. REP. NO.
19-95, at 1 (1st Sess. 1826); S. REP. NO. 19-89, at 1 (1st Sess. 1826); H.R. REP. NO. 17-105, at 2–3;
S. DOC. NO. 15-12, at 1 (2d Sess. 1818); S. DOC. NO. 15-80, at 1 (1st Sess. 1818); and see also
Courts of the United States, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 271, 271 (1854).
222. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 208. Some legislators urged that creating a permanent
intermediate court of appeals and abolishing circuit riding would maximize the presence of local
judges who would be sensitive to local law. Hence, expansion of the institutional capacity of the
lower federal courts through the creation of circuit judgeships would be consistent with a robust
understanding of state sovereignty in the context of a federal system. See, e.g., 2 REG. DEB. 520
(1826) (statement of Sen. White) (advocating expansion of the Supreme Court to ensure that all
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legislators sensitive to states’ rights associated expansion of federal
223
judicial resources with increased federal judicial power generally —a
224
painful hangover from the infamous 1801 Judiciary Act. At the
same time, some legislators who generally embraced broad national
power nevertheless objected to certain judicial reforms that would
have involved the addition of Justices or judges, likely because the
creation of new judgeships would have given significant appointment
225
power to an opposing-party administration. Although unlikely
factions can sometimes build coalitions, in this instance disagreement
over how to address the very obvious problems facing the judiciary
led to legislative paralysis. In their famous study of the administration
of the federal courts, Felix Frankfurter and James Landis noted that
legislative activity on judicial reform during this period largely “spent
226
itself in talk.”
Amid calls for judicial reform—and the failure of Congress to
implement substantial judicial reform legislation—the Supreme
Court’s insistence on federal uniform equity principles takes on a
different light. Although uniformity of institutional infrastructure was
by no means synonymous with uniformity of the equitable principles
to be applied in federal court—or vice versa—the two concepts were
tightly linked in the legislative and judicial debates over federal
equity power. Viewed in this context—and as stories from one-time
orphan states Kentucky and Louisiana show—the federal uniform
equity doctrine serves less as evidence of the Supreme Court’s
states have a Circuit Justice who will bring “an intimate knowledge of the municipal laws of the
respective States” to the high Court).
223. See, e.g., 2 REG. DEB. 537 (1826) (Statement of Sen. Berrien) (objecting to an increase
in the number of Supreme Court Justices to supply the need for Circuit Justices in part on the
ground that “[t]he federal government is already too strong for the States”).
224. On the eve of Jefferson’s presidential inauguration in 1801, the Federalist-dominated
Seventh Congress enacted a judicial-reform statute, abolishing circuit riding for Supreme Court
Justices, creating a federal intermediate court of appeals, redrawing the boundaries of the
federal judicial districts, and endowing the federal courts with federal question jurisdiction. Act
of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, §§ 1–7, 2 Stat. 89, 89–90. It was immediately and famously repealed by
the Republicans in 1802. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132. For a probing discussion
of the 1801 Act, see generally Alison L. LaCroix, The New Wheel in the Federal Machine: From
Sovereignty to Jurisdiction in the Early Republic, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 381–93 (2008).
225. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 133
(1922).
226. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 19, at 44. In 1837, Congress finally enacted
legislation that brought Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, the eastern district of Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, and Missouri into the circuit system—a move that required the creation
of two new Associate Justice seats on the Supreme Court. Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, §§ 1–3, 5
Stat. 176, 176–77.
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unilateral effort to consolidate federal judicial authority at the
expense of state sovereignty and more as evidence of an effort to
ensure litigant equality and uniform administration of justice
throughout the federal judicial system.
B. Kentucky: Panic, Process, and Alien Law
In February 1822, Abraham Venable executed a deed conveying
over three hundred acres of real property, as well as slaves and
227
personal property, to George M’Donald, Venable’s brother-in-law.
As consideration, M’Donald promised that he would support
228
Venable’s stepchildren. The timing of the conveyance was telling. In
1821, the Bank of the United States had filed suit in federal court
against Venable and several others as endorsers of a promissory note
for $4700 that had changed hands several times and was eventually
229
purchased by the bank at a discount. As the Supreme Court
explained, “Here then is the case of a person upon the eve of a decree
being rendered against him for a large sum of money, which it is
admitted would go far to his ruin, making conveyances of his whole
230
property real and personal to his brother-in-law . . . .” Such lastditch efforts to stave off complete financial ruin were not unusual in
Kentucky in the wake of the Panic of 1819, which brought destitution
to many in that state and gave rise to a state constitutional crisis
231
concerning judicial power.
Perhaps with more zeal than other states caught in the grip of the
Panic, Kentucky moved swiftly to enact legislation that would bring
some measure of relief and protection to debtors. Starting in 1819, the
Kentucky legislature enacted a series of relief measures, including
stay laws, debt exemption provisions, minimum pricing for execution
of judgments on real property, laws that eased or abolished
232
imprisonment for debt, and relief-driven monetary policies. These

227. Venable v. United States, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 107, 107 (1829).
228. Id. at 111.
229. Id. at 110.
230. Id. at 112.
231. For discussions of the Panic of 1819 in Kentucky and the state legislature’s response,
see 2 WILLIAM ELSEY CONNELLEY & E.M. COULTER, HISTORY OF KENTUCKY 599–600
(Charles Kerr ed., 1922); 2 WARREN, supra note 225, at 93–111; Theodore W. Ruger, “A
Question Which Convulses the Nation”: The Early Republic’s Greatest Debate About the Judicial
Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826, 835–55 (2004).
232. 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 231, at 608, 613–14; 2 WARREN, supra note 225,
at 104.
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relief laws occasioned political mayhem, a state constitutional crisis,
and the complete upheaval of the Kentucky state courts. In 1824, as a
direct response to the invalidation of a stay law by Kentucky’s highest
court, the state legislature abolished the existing Court of Appeals
(the Old Court) and created a new court staffed with prorelief judges
233
(the New Court). The members of the Old Court refused to
acknowledge their removal from office, paralyzing the Kentucky
234
judicial system for well over a year.
As others have chronicled, the Old Court–New Court
controversy led to substantial debates over, and a referendum
235
concerning, the power of judicial review in Kentucky state courts.
But the Panic of 1819 also occasioned significant controversy over the
power of the federal courts, including their equity powers. Given the
state of affairs in Kentucky in the 1820s, creditors were
understandably concerned about the prospect of collecting on
contracts in the state courts. For creditors—including the Bank of the
United States—who could satisfy subject matter jurisdiction
requirements, the federal court in Kentucky became the only hope.
Indeed, at certain junctures, it was the only functional adjudicative
body available in that state.
In a series of cases, including most famously Wayman v.
236
Southard, the Supreme Court affirmed the Kentucky circuit court’s
refusal to apply state relief laws, including laws that directed courts to
237
stay the execution of judgments. Similarly, in Venable v. United
238
States, a case brought in equity, the Court affirmed the Kentucky

233. 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 231, at 629–31. The constitutional crisis
concerning judicial and legislative authority became a central feature of the conflict between the
relief and antirelief factions, so much so that “New-Court” and “Old-Court” came to stand for
their respective platforms. Id. at 636–40.
234. Id. at 636–37.
235. These debates that have been examined in great detail by Theodore Ruger. See Ruger,
supra note 231.
236. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
237. 2 WARREN, supra note 225, at 104. Although the Kentucky stay laws varied in their
details, they all stayed execution of judgments issued by any court in the state for a designated
time period unless the creditor agreed to accept notes issued by the Bank of the
Commonwealth, in which case the stay of execution was of a shorter duration. Unlike most
contemporary paper currency, notes issued by the Bank of the Commonwealth were not
redeemable for specie. Thus, when the state legislature approved massive printing of notes in
1824 (secured, in theory, on certain assets in the state’s treasury), the notes plummeted in value.
Consequently, under the stay laws, a creditor could wait one year to be paid in a near-worthless
currency, or wait two years to be paid in specie or U.S. notes. Warren, supra note 38, at 437–38.
238. Venable v. United States, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 107 (1829).
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circuit court’s 1822 determination that Venable’s conveyance to
M’Donald was, in fact, fraudulent, and that Venable’s property could
239
be sold at a marshal’s sale in satisfaction of a promissory note. Such
rulings by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts triggered
significant debate in Congress over the scope of federal judge-made
240
law and, of particular concern here, federal equity power.
The Kentucky episode also illuminated an embarrassing lacuna
in existing federal legislation. As Wayman made clear, federal courts
in the new states were not covered by the Permanent Process Act, as
that statute applied only to the states that were part of the Union in
241
1789. This revelation was another piece of evidence that the new
242
states were orphaned from the federal judicial system.
For some, then, the Kentucky situation revealed the lack of
243
uniformity and institutional incapacity of the federal judicial system.
For others, however, the Kentucky cases betrayed a different kind of
defect in the federal judicial system—the discretion allowed to federal
judges sitting in law and, to a much greater extent, in equity to usurp

239. See id. at 120.
240. The Wayman decision and the resulting legislative debates concerning the Process Act
of 1828 have received significant attention from federal-courts scholars. See, e.g., Warren, supra
note 38, at 435–50 (summarizing the legislative debates over the Process Act); Woolhandler,
supra note 150, at 103 (discussing Wayman v. Southard and noting that in that opinion “Chief
Justice Marshall indicated . . . that the process acts had been designed specifically to allow
federal courts to avoid using state debtor relief legislation.”). But to my knowledge, little, if any,
attention has been given to the fallout over federal equity power that was also part of the
debates leading up to the Process Act of 1828.
241. Wayman, 23 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 32 (observing that the Permanent Process Act “adopts
the State law as it . . . stood [in 1789], not as it might afterwards be made”); 2 REG. DEB. 11
(1825) (statement of Sen. Kane) (noting that in Wayman the Court determined that “benefits”
of the Process Act of 1789 applied “to the citizens of those States only which had existence
when the act was passed. It was for the purpose of placing the citizens of other States upon the
same footing, that he ventured to introduce this resolution”); see also Warren, supra note 38, at
436 (“[U]nder the Act of 1792, only State [practice] laws existing in 1789 in the original thirteen
States were automatically applicable to the Federal Courts . . . .”).
242. The fact that the Permanent Process Act did not apply in the new states was not news
to those who had been alert to legislative debates concerning judicial policy. Efforts to remedy
the omission of new states from the process acts began as early as 1809. See Warren, supra note
38, at 436–37.
243. For example, the day after Senator Kane proposed that the Senate Judiciary
Committee consider the failure of the existing judicial process acts to reach the new states, see
supra note 241, Senator John Eaton expressed enthusiasm for the proposal because he sought
resolution of an allied problem: the failure of the circuit system to reach the new states in the
west, 2 REG. DEB. 13 (1825) (statement of Sen. Eaton).
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the function of the state legislature and, in turn, to undermine
244
important state-level prodebtor legislation.
1. Senator Rowan Versus Senator Webster, and the Process Act of
1828. Senator John Rowan—a former Kentucky Court of Appeals
judge who was elected to the United States Senate in 1825 as a
member of the New Court faction—was of the latter opinion. Federal
courts, he believed, possessed too much discretion and lawmaking
245
authority, especially in equity. Impatient with judicial power—
especially federal judicial power—and a proponent of legislative
supremacy—especially state legislative supremacy—Rowan thought
that putting such discretion in the hands of federal judges defeated
246
basic principles of republican government. In January 1827, amid
ongoing debates regarding judicial reform and the new-state problem
illuminated by Wayman, Rowan seized upon the issue in an effort to
end the tyranny of lawmaking by federal judges, particularly when
sitting in equity. Notably, however, Rowan was unable to turn his
colleagues, the majority of whom were Jacksonians, against federal
equity. Even among those lawmakers who tended to be suspicious of
policies that would strengthen federal power, there was no consensus
that the federal uniform equity doctrine represented an
encroachment on state sovereignty or a violation of separation of
powers.
Senator Rowan threw his energies behind a judicial-reform bill
that was intended to bring the new states into the federal judicial
system by clarifying the processes that would apply in federal courts
247
both in law and equity. The bill, which had been proposed by the

244. See, e.g., 2 REG. DEB. 12 (1825) (Statement of Sen. Johnson) (expressing support for the
resolution to evaluate the operation of the process acts in the new states out of concern that
“irresponsible judicial officers [may have] assumed the right, and exercised . . . the power, of
making laws for a sovereign and independent State”); see also infra text accompanying notes
245–70.
245. Senator Rowan was a veteran of judiciary politics, as he had been a member of the
second Kentucky state constitutional convention in 1799, where debates and power struggles
focused on the proper institutional design of Kentucky’s judiciary. See 2 CONNELLEY &
COULTER, supra note 231, at 626–47.
246. See Stephen W. Fackler, John Rowan and the Demise of Jeffersonian Republicanism in
Kentucky, 1819–1831, 78 REG. KY. HIST. SOC’Y 1, 11–13 (1980).
247. S. 81, 19th Cong. (2d Sess. Feb. 2, 1827). This bill was virtually identical to a bill that
had been reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee several months earlier, S. 158, 19th
Cong. (1st Sess. May 11, 1826). Both S. 81 and S. 158 would have required that, in the new states
only, the “forms of writs of execution and other process, except their style, and the forms and
modes of proceeding in suits in the Courts of the United States . . . in proceedings in equity,
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Senate Judiciary Committee, would have significantly altered the
scope and nature of federal equity power by requiring conformity
248
with state equity in federal courts sitting in the new states. In this
way, the bill departed from well-established uniformity in federal
equity cases. Rowan seized the opportunity, proposing an amendment
that would have required conformity with state equity in all lower
249
federal courts —not only in the new states. In addition, his
amendment would have stripped federal judges of any discretionary
rulemaking power in law or equity, thus departing even further from
250
existing practice. But Rowan’s aggressive tactics backfired. By
calling attention to the changes to federal equity practice that the
Committee’s bill would have effected, and by proposing amendments
that would rein in federal equity power even further, Rowan
prompted a response from Senator Daniel Webster that ultimately
doomed his efforts to require conformity with state equity practices
and principles.
Although Justice Story later described it as “a most masterly
251
speech,” Webster’s address to the Senate on the pending judicial
process bill has not survived. The brief reference to Webster’s speech
in the legislative record indicates that he “addressed the Senate at
great length,” arguing that modification of the process acts, and
particularly any disruption of the way “equity process was to be
252
regulated,” would be “disastrous.”
Newspapers reported that
Webster delivered a “most powerful speech on the Bill regulating the
process in the Courts of the United States” to a Senate chamber
packed with “[a]ll our most distinguished lawyers . . .” and most of the

[shall be] according to the principles, rules, and usages, which belong to Courts of Equity of the
said States, respectively.” S. 81; accord S. 158. It is not apparent that the Chair of the
Committee, Senator Martin Van Buren, appreciated the full significance of the bill, as he later
remarked that, prior to Webster’s intervention, the process bill “was allowed to progress merely
through an oversight of the Senate.” 4 REG. DEB. 343 (1828).
248. See S. 81, 19th Cong. (2d Sess. Feb. 2, 1827).
249. See S. 11, 20th Cong. § 1 (1st Sess. Jan. 30, 1828) (requiring conformity with state laws
governing process and execution of judgments, in cases brought in law and equity, “held in any
of the States composing this Union”).
250. See id. § 2 (“That so much of any act of Congress as authorizes the Courts of the United
States, or the Supreme Court thereof, at their discretion, to add to, or modify, any of the rules,
forms, modes, and usages aforesaid, or the forms of writs of execution, and other process, except
their style, shall be, and the same is hereby, repealed.”).
251. Letter from Joseph Story to George Ticknor (Mar. 6, 1828), in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF
JOSEPH STORY 536 (William W. Story ed., London, John Chapman 1851).
252. 4 REG. DEB. 342–43 (1828) (statement of Sen. Webster).
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253

members of the House. In his address, Webster “replied in detail to
arguments urged by Messrs Tazewell and Rowan,” specifically
addressing the significance of the term “civil laws” in the Temporary
254
Process Act. Webster urged that “if the process bill passed in its
present shape, it would destroy all Equity process in many of the old
255
states.” Faced with a bill that threatened to minimize, or even
eliminate, the federal courts’ distinctive equity powers, Webster
delivered an encomium for equity that, according to one report,
“seemed to flash on every mind instant conviction that the subject
had not before been fully understood; and [that] placed one or two
lawyers of that body . . . in a situation in which no high minded man,
256
no man of genius or ambition, could desire to be.” Rowan was one
of those men.
Whatever the precise nature of Webster’s remarks, they were
enough to incite Senator Rowan to make a forceful and complete
defense of state legislative supremacy and the concomitant need for
complete federal conformity with state law in both common law and
equity cases. Rowan reserved his most scathing remarks for federal
equity. The requirement of uniform equity principles Webster
embraced offended every tenet of government that Rowan held dear,
beginning with rudimentary principles of separation of powers.
“Legislative power,” admonished Rowan, “is never to be exercised
but under strict responsibility to the people, whose will gives
257
obligatory force to the law.” According to Rowan, federal judges—
“in office for life” and removable by impeachment only—“were
commissioned to judge, not to legislate—to expound, not to make
258
laws.”
In making his defense, Senator Rowan was not solely, or even
largely, concerned with protecting congressional power from
encroachment by federal judges; he was concerned with
encroachment upon the sovereign rights of states and state
legislatures. The fact that some state courts lacked equity powers was
no justification for federal courts to employ uniform equity principles
in the federal courts, as defenders of federal equity suggested.
253. From the Massachusetts Journal, PORTSMOUTH J. & ROCKINGHAM GAZETTE, Mar. 1,
1828, at 2.
254. In the Senate, PROVIDENCE PATRIOT & COLUMBIAN PHOENIX, Feb. 27, 1828, at 2.
255. Id.
256. From the Massachusetts Journal, supra note 253, at 2.
257. 4 REG. DEB. 349 (1828) (statement of Sen. Rowan).
258. Id.
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Instead, it was precisely because of the variation in state equity
principles that the federal courts should be required to conform to
state equity practice, or the lack thereof. “[W]hat ought to be
conclusive,” Rowan argued, “is, that those States have not chosen to
259
administer justice through Chancery forms.”
If [equity] does not exist in each State, it must be owing to the want
of power, or of wisdom, in the State which has it not. It cannot be
want of power, for all the States are sovereign and equipollent—
quoad hoc. . . . [Will any Senator] say that the rights and interests of
the citizens of his State shall be decided, whenever drawn into
question in the Federal Court, . . . not by those principles and rules
of equity, which have been ordained by the wisdom, and consecrated
by the usage of that State, but by a code imparted by the [federal]
260
Judges, and unknown to the State?

If Senator Rowan’s ideological sensibilities were thoroughly
offended by the thought of a federal judge, “unknown to the State,”
usurping the role of the state legislator and deciding the “rights and
interests of the citizens of his State,” Webster’s insistence that “civil
261
law regulates proceedings in equity” was the final insult. Taking
apparent joy in trying to school the schoolmaster, Rowan started with
first principles. “Now, . . . by the civil law, every lawyer understands
that the municipal law of the Roman empire is meant. That law,
[Webster] tells us, regulated proceedings in equity in England, and
performs the same office in our country. Mr. President, can the
262
gentleman be serious?” Taunting Webster, Rowan continued, “the
gentleman will have it from England; we must get the rules of equity,
says he, from England, through learned judges and lawyers, who have
263
made it (the civil law) their study. . . .” But according to Rowan,
resort to judges and lawyers as the “medium of [equity’s]
264
intromission” was itself a usurpation. “[T]he Judges have given that
State law enough . . . . [Kentucky] will acknowledge nothing as law,
which has not . . . had legislative sanction. She will insist . . . that the
265
Judges shall neither make nor import law.”

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 362.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 363–64.
Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
Id. at 365.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, the notion that federal judges were to import a “foreign
266
or alien code” of equity offended Senator Rowan’s republican
vision of law as organic to the people, and as a core dimension of
state sovereignty. A state’s “mode or form of administering justice . . .
267
is essential to its sovereignty,” he explained.
“Free states
appropriate, by legislative sanction, those universal rules and
principles of equity and justice, and use them as their own. Vassal
268
states are regulated by laws enacted or adopted for them by others.”
Senator Rowan’s understanding of federal courts’ obligation to
follow state law and equity—and his corresponding critique of judicial
“legislation”—was coherent and passionate. And it was animated by
criticisms of federal judge-made law that are sometimes purported to
represent the prevailing understanding of the limits of federal judicial
269
power in the early nineteenth century. If it was indeed generally
understood that application of judge-made law in federal courts made
270
“[f]ree states” into “vassal states,” however, one might expect that
Rowan’s proposed amendment to the judicial-reform bill would have
passed without controversy. Yet Rowan’s vision of the federal courts
as functionaries of the state legislatures ultimately failed to capture a
majority of his fellow senators’ support. Not only was his specific
amendment requiring absolute federal conformity with state equity
principles rejected, but upon Webster’s motion, the entire bill was
271
sent back to committee for reconsideration.
The resulting legislation, the Process Act of 1828, finally
remedied the glaring omission of the existing process acts by
stipulating the sources of procedural and remedial law applicable in
272
federal courts in the new states. But notwithstanding Rowan’s best
efforts, and after sustained debate in Congress, with one significant
273
exception the Act did nothing to limit the application of a uniform
corpus of nonstate equity principles in federal equity cases.
2. Judicial Reform and Federal Equity in Kentucky. How does
the legislative fallout over, and the final response to, the state and
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 368.
See sources cited supra note 10 and infra notes 385–86.
4 REG. DEB. 368 (1828) (statement of Sen. Rowan).
Id. at 371–72.
Process Act of 1828, ch. 68, §§ 1, 3, 4 Stat. 278, 278–81.
See infra text accompanying notes 295–96.
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federal courts’ conduct in the wake of the Panic of 1819 help explain
the vitality of the federal uniform equity doctrine during the early
nineteenth century? As an initial matter, in light of congressional
acquiescence to the uniform equity doctrine in the Process Act of
1828, it would be misleading to characterize that doctrine as a product
of the Supreme Court’s particular institutional tendency to
unilaterally aggrandize federal judicial power. As discussed
previously, when viewed through the lens of Section 34 and the Swift
case, the history of judge-made law in the federal courts in this period
is sometimes told as a story about the federal courts’ particular
tendency to overreach, repudiating Congress’s statutory
274
pronouncements.
However accurate that characterization may be with respect to
275
Section 34, events in Congress following the Panic of 1819 suggest
that the Supreme Court’s uniform equity doctrine cannot be so easily
reduced. It cannot be gainsaid that Congress was well aware of the
federal courts’ equity powers after the Rowan-Webster debate.
Despite that awareness, Congress was unwilling or unable to enact
legislation requiring the federal courts to conform to state law in
federal equity cases. Instead, in 1828 national legislators extended the
geographical reach of existing legislation that, although not
particularly clear, had been interpreted by the Court for a decade to
require uniformity in federal equity cases. The uniform equity
doctrine was not a product of a unilateral power grab by the Supreme
Court but rather was the product of a complex, institutional dynamic
276
between the Court and Congress.
Second, debates over the Process Act of 1828 suggest that
uniform equity was not predominantly understood as a doctrine that
violated prevailing federalism and separation-of-powers principles.
Some legislators—like Senator Rowan—described federal equity in
such terms. But for many legislators, including many Jacksonians in
Congress, such concerns were either nonexistent or were outweighed
by other factors. Defenders of state sovereignty—such as Senator
277
278
Martin Van Buren of New York, Senator Elias Kane of Illinois,
274. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
275. As discussed earlier, William Fletcher’s important contribution on this point called that
characterization of Section 34 into question. See Fletcher, supra note 8.
276. See infra Part II.D.
277. See 4 REG. DEB. 203–04 (1828) (statement of Sen. Van Buren) (“It appears to me that
it was the duty of the State legislature to have adopted rules; and if they did not establish them,
it was their own fault. The Courts, in the performance of their duties, finding none, were forced
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and several other Jacksonians in Congress—opposed Rowan’s efforts
279
to secure absolute conformity with state law and equity. The point
here is not that these senators were sympathetic to Webster’s
nationalist views on federal judicial policy in general. Rather, it is that
even among legislators whose ideological inclinations tended toward
the limitation of federal power, there was a range of views about the
proper scope of federal judicial power, and the uniform equity
doctrine did not generally offend a shared understanding of the
constitutional limits of federal judicial power.
Recognizing that debates over federal uniform equity were part
of a larger conversation concerning the institutional capacity of the
federal judicial system helps explain why Rowan’s anti-federal equity
campaign failed. In judicial-reform debates, uniformity in equity was
seen by many as a jurisprudential device that would help standardize
the administration of justice in the judicial system—an issue that
appealed across partisan lines. The process bills, triggered in
significant part by the Kentucky crisis, would not remedy all of the
federal courts’ institutional problems, such as those stemming from
the circuit-riding system and chronically understaffed circuit courts.
But they were designed to remedy the related problem of the

to make rules to govern their process.”); id. at 93 (statement of Sen. Van Buren) (“It was
impossible to give up all the power of the Federal Courts without involving the country in
confusion.”).
278. Id. at 94–95 (statement of Sen. Kane) (observing that the Process Act of 1792 struck a
wise path by “g[iving] the Circuit Courts power to alter and amend the laws of process, passed
by the State Legislatures; and to the Supreme Court of the United States, power to supervise
and overrule them”); id. at 371 (statement of Sen. Kane) (making the same argument); see also
id. at 372 (statement of Sen. Berrien) (“[T]he power to prescribe rules for their own courts had
been hitherto given to the Federal Judges, under certain limitations; and it could not be
confined . . . without doing serious injury.”).
279. For example, seven Jackson-supporting senators voted against the Rowan amendment
that would have required strict conformity with state law and equity. See id. at 327–28
(recording the nay votes of Jackson-supporting Senators Chandler, Dickerson, Kane, McLane,
Smith of Maryland, Van Buren, and Williams). Determining the political allegiances of national
legislators in this period is fraught with difficulty because “the mass political party did not
become established as an institution of public authority until at least the 1830s.” GERALD
LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 9 (2002). But the Rowan-Webster
showdown occurred at a moment during which there was an unusual degree of clarity
concerning nascent party affiliation among national legislators. In the congressional elections of
1826 and 1827, support for President John Quincy Adams or challenger Andrew Jackson was a
crucial factor, and—although the Jacksonians were a heterogeneous group—support for the
latter generally signaled a rejection of Adams’s nationalist program and stronger support of
states’ rights. See MARTIS, supra note 214, at 30 (noting that Jackson’s support came in part
from the fact that the American people perceived him as a “champion of states’ rights”).
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omission of the new states from the original process acts. For
legislators bent on bringing some measure of consistency to the
federal court system, Senator Rowan’s demand for total conformity
with state equity and zero discretion in rulemaking was out of step
with the larger goals of judicial reform—uniformity and equality
throughout the federal system.
In theory, institutional uniformity of the sort sought by western
legislators and others did not require the application of uniform
281
equity principles in federal court. When deciding cases in law,
federal judges typically applied the forum state’s procedure,
282
remedies, and—with important exceptions—substantive law.
Rowan’s proposed amendment would have required even stricter
283
conformity with state equity practice in old states and new. But
conformity of this sort was unworkable on the equity side of the
docket. Variety in state equity systems, including a near-total absence
of equity in some states, meant that conformity with state equity
would result in radical disuniformity in the administration of justice in
284
federal courts. From a modern perspective, this may seem like a
trivial concern. But even defenders of state sovereignty understood
that the purpose of the federal judiciary was to bring some measure of
uniformity to the national administration of justice. For example, an
1824 petition by Mississippi’s bar association authored by Joseph
Davis, Jefferson Davis’s older brother, explained that precisely
because of the diversity of laws, “the system of national tribunals,
ordained to enforce them, should be uniform in every part of the
Union, in order that the spirit of system and uniformity prevailing in
the one, might counteract the tendency to anarchy and confusion in
285
the other.” Although one might conclude that Davis’s enthusiasm
for uniformity in the federal courts was of limited scope, Davis went
on to laud the “Napoleon Code” and to suggest that “if there was no
other motive for the extension of the Judicial System of 1789 to the

280. See sources cited supra note 241 and accompanying text.
281. An 1824 petition by a group of Kentucky lawyers proposed a plan that would have
remedied the institutional defects of the federal courts in the west and also would have required
greater deference to state law through limitation of diversity jurisdiction. See Bibb et al., supra
note 210, at 1, 10. But the sometimes subtle distinction between uniform administration of
justice and uniform law was by no means evident. See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
282. See supra Part I.A.
283. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
285. DAVIS, supra note 210, at 4.
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new States, but that the system should be uniform and universal, that
286
alone would be sufficient to induce Congress so to extend it.”
In the immediate context in which the debates over federal
equity power took place in the 1820s, Davis’s concerns about
287
“anarchy” and, at the very least, “confusion,” seemed plausible,
making federal uniform equity appear particularly important to both
national legislators and members of the Court. Uniformity in federal
equity cases functioned as a quasi-constitutional bulwark against the
fragmentation of the Union and localist excess. Thus, within the limits
of their jurisdictional grant, lower federal courts sitting in equity were
to provide a national floor of remedies and, sometimes, rights for
288
those litigating in federal court. In light of the Kentucky crisis, strict
judicial conformity with state law and equity would arguably involve
the federal courts in similar turmoil. It would require them to
conform with state law even when state judges would not—a problem
289
that even Martin Van Buren could appreciate. If that was the kind
of conformity required under Senator Rowan’s amendments, then
perhaps this was taking too far the concept of federal judicial
conformity with state law and equity. Rowan’s insistence that federal
courts conform to state equity thus ran contrary to the general desire
for some level of uniformity in the federal judicial system.
Finally, any analysis of federal judge-made law in the early
nineteenth century would be incomplete without considering the
possibility that economic interests motivated the development and
perpetuation of the federal uniform equity doctrine. Professors
Morton Horwitz and Tony Freyer have both demonstrated how the
perceived need for a uniform body of commercial law generated
significant support for general common law and uniform equity
290
principles, especially among the commercial classes.
Another

286. Id. at 5.
287. Id. at 4.
288. In this regard, application of uniform federal equity principles in private-law litigation
is consistent with the application of federal equitable remedies in constitutional cases filed in
federal court during the same period. As Woolhandler has demonstrated, diversity jurisdiction
was an important means of bringing federal constitutional litigation into federal court well
before statutory recognition of federal question jurisdiction in 1875. See Woolhandler, supra
note 150, at 84–85. Her observation that there was a “settled consensus that the federal courts
should administer a federalized set of rights and remedies for federal constitutional rights,” id.
at 81, applies in parallel fashion to the private rights asserted in federal equity cases.
289. See sources cited supra note 247.
290. FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE, supra note 13, at 40 (explaining how Swift
made it possible for federal judges to create a “federal commercial law” which “served the
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important possibility, then, is that Congress failed to rein in the
Court’s uniform equity doctrine because it was generally sympathetic
to the Court’s apparent efforts to create a national uniform
commercial law, one that tended to favor out-of-state creditors.
At first blush, such an interpretation seems directly applicable to
the Process Act of 1828. After all, in cases like Wayman, the Supreme
Court ratified federal procedural rules that aided the collection of
debt and thwarted the operation of state debtor-relief laws, thus
helping to create and enforce national norms concerning creditors’
291
rights.
And in the 1820s, as in 1789, congressional debates
concerning judicial process and equity were bound up in contests over
292
debtors’ and creditors’ respective rights. In debates following the
Kentucky crisis, strong defenders of debtors’ rights—such as Senator
Rowan—advocated that federal courts apply state law and equity, in
no small part because state legislatures had enacted laws tending to
favor debtors. Given this important context, it is inviting to
understand the Process Act of 1828 as evidence of a general
procreditor bias in national judicial policy. Under this theory,
national legislators ratified federal uniform equity by refusing to rein
in federal equity power when the opportunity arose, thereby further
entrenching the power of a national commercial elite.
As tempting as such an interpretation is, the final version of the
Process Act of 1828 demonstrates that, in this instance, creditordebtor tensions played a rather nuanced role in shaping federal
judicial policy. Given the immediate context of cases like Wayman
that gave rise to debates regarding judicial reform and federal equity
in the 1820s, national legislators could not have failed to recognize the
significance of judicial policy to the relative rights of creditors and
293
debtors. But national legislators also perceived the need for
institutional uniformity in the federal judicial system.
The final form of the Process Act of 1828 reflects a compromise
struck between these two competing concerns. Like the earlier

interests of merchants involved in interstate trade”); HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 250 (“[T]he
much heralded quest for legal uniformity . . . can also be seen more concretely as an attempt to
impose a procommercial national legal order on unwilling state courts.”).
291. See Warren, supra note 38, at 437–39 (describing Kentucky’s debtor-relief laws and the
Supreme Court cases that made the laws ineffective in federal courts).
292. See Holt, supra note 86, at 1478–1503 (describing the debate and history surrounding
the passage of The Judiciary Act of 1789 as a struggle between procreditor and prodebtor
legislators).
293. See supra notes 232–40 and accompanying text.
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process acts, the Process Act of 1828 provided that in “proceedings in
equity,” federal cases would be conducted “according to the
294
principles, rules, and usages, which belong to courts of equity.” By
1828, this phrasing was understood to refer to federal and English
equity principles. But the 1828 Act also contained an important
exception. The third section of the Act required federal conformity,
in law and equity, with respect to “writs of execution” and final
295
process. This third section of the 1828 Act was a triumph, albeit a
limited one, for Senator Rowan and other supporters of debtors’
rights, for it generally required federal courts to apply debtor-friendly
stay-of-execution statutes like Kentucky’s.
Thus, while the Process Act of 1828 by and large perpetuated
and expanded the federal uniform equity doctrine geographically, it
slightly narrowed the scope of that doctrine by directing federal
judges to apply the execution provisions that had been enacted by
state legislators—many of which were debtor friendly—in equity.
Given this particular exception to federal uniform equity, it would be
a misstatement to suggest that the Act’s perpetuation and extension
of the uniform federal equity doctrine can be attributed to
procommercial interests in Congress. Out-of-state creditors who
frequently litigated in federal courts to collect debts surely lost
important ground in the final version of the Act. Other concerns were
also at work in the debates leading to the Process Act of 1828,
including the felt need for institutional coherence and uniformity in
296
the federal judicial system.
In sum, by reading the debates leading up to the enactment of
the Process Act of 1828 for what they were—judicial reform
debates—one sees that it is impossible to understand the vitality of
federal uniform equity without also understanding contemporary

294. Act of May 19, 1828 (Process Act of 1828), ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278, 280.
295. Id. § 3, 4 Stat. at 281.
296. It is worth noting, moreover, that although commercial cases were certainly an
important part of the federal equity docket, equity jurisdiction also extended to a whole host of
subjects unlikely to involve typical commercial interests. The federal courts applied, and insisted
on the application of, a uniform body of equity principles in cases involving all manner of
subjects—from disputes over dower, Powell v. Monson & Brimfield Mfg. Co., 19 F. Cas. 1218
(C.C.D. Mass. 1824) (No. 11,356), to marriage settlements, Neves v. Scott, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196
(1850), to wills, Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 619 (1844). See infra Part II.C.1. Thus, to use
modern terminology, the uniform equity doctrine was transsubstantive, at least within the
federal equity docket. This does not mean that the perceived need for a national, uniform
commercial law did not animate the push for uniformity in federal equity jurisprudence. But it
does suggest that other factors were also at work.
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concerns about institutional uniformity. Amid cries from orphan
states for uniformity, equality, and expansion of the institutional
infrastructure in the federal court system, uniform equity in the 1820s
was not generally understood as a violation of federalism or
separation-of-powers principles. Nor was it identified exclusively, or
even largely, with an overreaching, nationalizing, and creditorfriendly Supreme Court. In important ways, it appealed to a desire for
uniformity and equality in the federal judicial system, especially on
the fringes of the republic.
In so concluding, one need not naïvely dismiss the significance of
partisan disagreement and economic interests in shaping the behavior
of federal judges and legislators. Surely some proponents of federal
uniform equity sought expansion of federal judicial power based on a
consolidationist understanding of government, while others sought to
protect the interests of out-of-state creditors. But it would also be a
mistake to suggest that uniformity always and only functioned as a
code word for consolidation at the expense of state sovereignty, or for
protection of particular interests. Institutional considerations—broad
agreement that there was a minimum requirement for institutional
uniformity in a federal judicial system—created an additional,
distinctive set of conditions that provided a fertile and necessary
context for the development and vitality of the federal uniform equity
doctrine.
C. Louisiana: “Foreign Law” in the Federal Courts
The dynamic created by the Supreme Court’s use of federal
equity power to secure institutional uniformity in the federal courts,
and Congress’s acquiescence to that power, played out dramatically in
the case of Louisiana. In the 1812 statute granting Louisiana
statehood, Congress also created a federal judicial district, the
“Louisiana district,” staffed with a district judge “who shall reside
297
therein.”
But the socio-legal culture of Louisiana remained
distinctive, presenting the Supreme Court and national legislators
with a dilemma: defer to the particular legal culture of the state and
297. Act of Apr. 8, 1812, ch. 50, § 3, 2 Stat. 701, 703. As was the case in all territories,
Congress established federal courts in Louisiana prior to statehood. James Pfander
demonstrates that one of the pre-statehood federal courts in Louisiana was, in fact, an Article
III district court. See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial
Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 618, 712 (2004) (“In the legislation that
implemented the Louisiana Purchase . . . Congress created both a territorial court and an
Article III district court.”).
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risk complete loss of a distinctive federal judicial authority, or insist
upon uniformity and risk trammeling Louisiana law. Measures had
been taken to ensure, to a certain degree, the application of Louisiana
298
civil law in federal court. In part because of the value placed on
institutional uniformity in federal courts, however, the Supreme
Court insisted upon the application of uniform equity principles in the
federal courts in Louisiana. Once again, Congress demurred.
It is difficult to imagine a state that was more on the national
fringes geographically, legally, culturally, linguistically, and politically
than Louisiana in the early nineteenth century. Louisiana state law
was generally based on the civil law system that governed in most
continental European countries rather than on the English common
299
law system that governed in other states. In Louisiana state courts,
300
judicial proceedings were conducted in French rather than English.
And with respect to its federal courts, Louisiana was truly an orphan
state for much of the period. Until 1837, Louisiana was not part of
any federal judicial circuit, and no Justice had been appointed to
301
serve as its Circuit Justice.
Because of Louisiana’s distinctive legal system and culture,
however, the application of uniform equity in Louisiana federal court
encountered significant resistance in that state. But resistance to
federal equity in Louisiana differed from that in Kentucky in an
important respect. In Louisiana it was not only certain legislators who
viewed federal equity as a usurpation of state sovereignty; the federal
district judges likewise resisted federal equity. Thus, debates
concerning federal equity in Louisiana illuminate a different
dimension of the call for institutional uniformity in the federal courts.
Given the limits of the circuit-riding system—especially in states like
Louisiana—it was important that the lower federal court judges

298. See infra text accompanying note 305.
299. See MARK F. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY: THE EVOLUTION OF
LOUISIANA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 1712–1862, at 31 (2001) (describing how Louisiana’s private law
was based on the Roman, French, and Spanish civil-law traditions).
300. Although the Louisiana State Constitution of 1812 required that all laws be
promulgated in English, French prevailed as the legal lingua franca in state legislative debates,
judicial proceedings, and legal arrangements between private parties. Alain A. Levasseur &
Roger K. Ward, 300 Years and Counting: The French Influence on the Louisiana Legal System,
46 LA. B.J. 300, 304 (1998).
301. In 1837, Congress created the Ninth Circuit and included the Eastern District of
Louisiana within that circuit. Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176, 176–77. The entirety
Louisiana was incorporated into the circuit system in 1842. See Act of Aug. 16, 1842, ch. 180, 5
Stat. 507.
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complied with Supreme Court precedent and mandates. The creation
of a lower federal judiciary would have been of little use if the jurists
appointed did not identify, at some level, as federal judges willing to
302
follow Supreme Court precedent. But in a state like Louisiana,
ensuring that federal courts conformed with and followed Supreme
Court precedent was no mean feat.
In the early nineteenth century, the judges appointed to the
303
federal district court in Louisiana were drawn from the local bar. In
Louisiana, that meant the appointment of judges trained in civil law—
judges who, as it turned out, earnestly defended Louisiana’s legal
system as the authentic civil law system over the bastardized version
304
that was English chancery practice. In this institutional context,
mandates that Louisiana federal courts apply uniform equity
principles were contested and defined in a series of federal cases
brought from the 1830s through the 1850s. It was in part because of
the Louisiana federal judges’ fierce resistance to federal equity—a
resistance that led nearly to the impeachment of one federal judge—
that the Supreme Court insisted upon the use of uniform equity
principles with such vehemence.
1. Equity in Louisiana Federal Courts. Responding to proposals
by Louisiana legislators, Congress enacted a special process act in
1824 to regulate adjudication in federal courts in Louisiana. The 1824
Act stipulated that “the mode of proceeding in civil causes in the
courts of the United States . . . established in the state of Louisiana,
305
shall be conformable” to the mode of practice in the state courts.
But like most judiciary acts of the period, the 1824 Act was vague

302. One might imagine a unitary judicial system in which lower-court judges were not
obliged, explicitly or implicitly, to follow clear precedent established by superior courts.
Acceptance of such a practice, however, would have constituted a significant departure from
well-accepted norms in Anglo-American judicial practice. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must
Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994) (noting that
in American courts, “long-standing doctrine dictates that a court is always bound to follow a
precedent established by a court ‘superior’ to it”).
303. See Act of Apr. 8, 1812, ch. 50, § 3, 2 Stat. 701, 703.
304. Although some commentators claimed the civil law as one of the important sources of
English equity principles—thus tying Anglo-American equity to a glorious history of European
civil law—the connections between civil law and English Chancery (and, hence, federal equity)
remain unclear. See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Civil Law in England, 84 YALE L.J. 167, 170
(1974) (book review) (describing connections between areas of law and courts, but noting that
finding a connection for the “civil law element in the law applied in Chancery . . . is more
problematic”).
305. Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 181, § 1, 4 Stat. 62, 62–63.
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with respect to the source of procedures, remedies, and substantive
principles to be applied in actions brought in equity. In fact, the 1824
Act made no reference to equity at all.
The Supreme Court first addressed that issue in 1835, in an
opinion authored by Jackson-appointee Justice Smith Thompson. In
306
Livingston v. Story, Thompson explained that because Louisiana
courts did not recognize “equitable claims or rights” as traditionally
understood in the Anglo-American tradition, the 1824 Act simply did
307
not apply to equity cases brought in Louisiana federal court. Citing
Robinson v. Campbell, he reasoned that equity principles applied in
308
Louisiana federal courts as they applied in all federal courts.
Although not the only possible interpretation of the 1824 Act, it was
the interpretation that would both preserve uniformity across the
federal judicial system and ensure that Article III’s reference to
equity was honored and enforced. Three years later, the basic holding
of Livingston was affirmed by Chief Justice Taney in Poultney v. The
309
City of La Fayette.
Both before and after Livingston was decided, the federal judges
in Louisiana balked at the suggestion that uniform nonstate equity
principles would apply in Louisiana federal court. Judge Samuel
Harper, appointed in 1829 by President Jackson after personally
assuring the president of his states’ rights views, was the first to joust
310
with the Supreme Court over equity power. It was his ruling that the
Supreme Court reversed in Livingston. And, more generally, it was
his rules of court that prohibited the application of equity in the
circuit court in Louisiana even after the Livingston Court held
311
otherwise.

306. Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835).
307. Id. at 660.
308. Id. at 655–56. This is particularly significant because the Process Act of 1828 explicitly
exempted Louisiana federal courts, Act of May 19, 1828 (Process Act of 1828), ch. 68, § 4, 4
Stat. 278, 282, and—as per the Supreme Court’s interpretation—the 1824 Act did not apply to
equity cases, Livingston, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 632. Hence, the Supreme Court had no statutory
foundation for its rulings concerning the applicability of federal uniform equity in the Louisiana
circuit court.
309. Poultney v. City of La Fayette, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 472 (1838).
310. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829–61, at 6–7 (1979) (discussing Harper’s preappointment visit with Jackson, during which he stressed his states’ rights beliefs).
311. See Opinion of the Court, Whitney v. Relf (No. 3823) (Mar. 9, 1837) (Harper, J.), at 28,
32, reprinted in Certificate of Division from the U.S. Circuit Court for E. La., Gaines v. Chew,
40 U.S. 9 (1841), at 385, 386 [hereinafter Certificate of Division].
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Judge Harper’s rules were in place in 1835 when Myra Whitney
(later, Myra Gaines) filed suit in federal circuit court in Louisiana
312
claiming fraud against the executors of her alleged father’s estate.
The Gaines case, as it came to be known, demonstrates just how
valuable federal equity could be for out-of-state litigants who often
sought out a federal judicial forum. In addition, it shows just how far
the Supreme Court would go to ensure that the lower federal courts
applied uniform equity principles. Myra’s lawsuit was made for the
313
tabloids. On the eve of her marriage to William Whitney, Myra
learned from her father—or the man she had believed to be her
father—that she had in fact been adopted. She was actually the
biological child of the then-deceased Daniel Clark, an extraordinarily
314
wealthy man whom Myra had known only as a close family friend.
Myra also learned of evidence suggesting that the executors of Clark’s
estate defrauded her out of an enormous inheritance by suppressing a
will that named her as his legitimate daughter and primary
315
beneficiary.
In 1834, Myra and William began investigations and sought the
assistance of the Louisiana state probate court in securing documents
relevant to their case. But their investigations generated little more
than the ire of the executors, a libel suit against William, and
William’s imprisonment when he was unable to pay the related
316
bond. Once William was out of prison, the couple decided to try
their luck in federal court. They filed a bill in equity in federal court,
charging that Clark’s last will and testament of 1813 had been
fraudulently suppressed, and asking initially for discovery in the form
317
of documents and deposition testimony.
But Myra and William fared only slightly better in federal court.
Ruling on the defendants’ motion in 1837, Judge Harper ignored the
recently decided Livingston opinion and held that the equity

312. See Petition for a Rehearing at 33, 34, Gaines v. Relf (June 1, 1839), reprinted in
Certificate of Division, supra note 311, at 387, 387.
313. For fuller accounts of the Gaines case, see generally ELIZABETH URBAN ALEXANDER,
NOTORIOUS WOMAN: THE CELEBRATED CASE OF MYRA CLARK GAINES (2001); Kristin A.
Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of
States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1830–37 (2005).
314. ALEXANDER, supra note 313, at 13–14; Collins, supra note 313, at 1830–32.
315. Collins, supra note 313, at 1830–32.
316. ALEXANDER, supra note 313, at 54–56.
317. See Order of Court, Whitney v. Relf (No. 3823) (Mar. 9, 1837) (Harper, J.), at 28, 28,
reprinted in Certificate of Division, supra note 311, at 384, 384.
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principles available in all other federal courts were inapplicable in
318
Louisiana. Instead, he required that the proceedings be regulated by
Louisiana practice rules, ordered that no discovery would be allowed
under those rules, and mandated that all papers filed in the action be
319
drafted in French.
Judge Harper’s opinion employs much of the same anti-federalequity reasoning that one finds in Senator Rowan’s speeches in
Congress. But Harper’s opinion was specifically tailored to
Louisiana’s unusual situation. Harper insisted that Louisiana’s civillaw tradition was closer to the original source of equity jurisprudence
than England’s borrowed and partial version of equity. “It was from
the civil law that England derived her system of chancery courts; but
while she borrowed only that part of the civil law, we recognize the
320
whole code.” In other words, Louisiana courts were not bound by
equity as defined in common law countries, but instead by a truer
version of equity. If “want of the name [equity] is a fatal objection” to
the application of Louisiana’s civil law in equity cases filed in
Louisiana federal court, Harper complained, “it might as well be said
321
that a house is not a house, because it is called maison in French.”
Notably, Harper also responded directly to the prevalent
argument that application of federal and English equity principles
was necessary to provide uniformity in the federal judicial system:
“When equity, in the true sense of the word, can be administered in
this court under the present practice in every case, why should a
foreign system be introduced, merely to preserve, as it is said, a
322
uniformity of practice throughout the Union?” Pointing to the Act
of 1824 and other statutes, Harper reasoned,
[N]o foreign system of practice can be imposed on this State; and
until these acts of the national legislature shall be declared
unconstitutional by the competent authority, it is insisted that this
State is exempted from the onerous, and (to us,) odious rules of
323
procedure with which we are threatened.

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. at 28–29.
See id. at 32–33.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 31–32.
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In response to Myra’s first appeal, Ex Parte Whitney, the
Supreme Court made quick work of Judge Harper’s impassioned
opinion. “That it is the duty of the Circuit Court to proceed in this
suit according to the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for
proceedings in equity causes at the February term thereof, A. D.
325
1822, can admit of no doubt.” But by the time the opinion in Ex
Parte Whitney was issued in 1839, Judge Harper had died. So when
Myra returned to the circuit court in Louisiana—by this point
widowed and remarried to General Edmund Gaines—she
encountered Harper’s successor, Judge Philip Lawrence.
One might have thought that Judge Lawrence would have been
more amenable to federal equity than was his predecessor, given that
he was the judicial candidate of a more moderate faction of the
326
Democratic Party in Louisiana. But Lawrence would have nothing
of federal equity in his court. For two years Myra’s case foundered in
the circuit court. In 1841 she appealed to the Supreme Court again,
complaining of the circuit court’s continued refusal to apply equity
327
and unwillingness to require the defendants to answer the bill. In
another opinion by Justice Thompson, the Supreme Court declared it
to be a “matter of extreme regret, that it appears to be the settled
determination of the District Judge, not to suffer chancery practice to
prevail in the circuit court in Louisiana, in equity causes; in total
328
disregard of the repeated decisions of this Court.”
On appeal before the Supreme Court yet again in 1844, counsel
for the executors raised the well-rehearsed objections to the use of
329
equity in Louisiana federal courts. At this juncture, Myra had
attempted to rescind the executors’ transfer of estate property using

324. Ex parte Whitney, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 404 (1839).
325. Id. at 408.
326. Judge Lawrence was a New York native and had worked as an editor for a newspaper
that began as a pro-Van Buren newspaper, hence giving him a direct connection to President
Van Buren. Although not a native of Louisiana, Lawrence lived in Louisiana and worked in the
political and legal community, serving as the U.S. District Attorney. His appointment as the
district judge enjoyed considerable support from the local Democratic Party. See HALL, supra
note 310, at 30–31 (“Divisions in the Louisiana Democracy provided Van Buren with some
discretion in choosing a new judge, but ultimately he responded to the recommendations of
party moderates.”).
327. Gaines v. Relf, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 9, 12 (1841) (“The counsel for the plaintiffs contended
that the single question in the case was, whether the Circuit Court of Louisiana has chancery
jurisdiction.”).
328. Id. at 17.
329. Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 619, 628–31 (1844).
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an implied trust. Explaining that trusts had been abolished by the
Louisiana Code of 1808, and again by the Code of 1825, counsel for
the defendants queried, “[How can] this court fasten upon the people
of Louisiana all the doctrine of uses and trusts, against their positive
331
law? . . . The English cases are not applicable.” “Our system has
been called a mongrel system,” counsel explained, “but it is good
332
enough for us.”
Countering the argument that uniform equity equalized the
treatment of litigants throughout the federal judicial system, defense
counsel observed the inequality created by the imposition of equity
principles: “How can a citizen of another state claim more rights than
a citizen of the state itself[?] The Constitution requires all to be
333
placed upon an equal footing, but nothing more.”
The Supreme Court did not relent. At the pen of Justice John
McLean—a dissenter in Robinson—the Court once again insisted on
the application of uniform equity, declaring that “the Circuit Court of
the United States, exercising jurisdiction in Louisiana, as in every
other state, preserves [as] distinct the common law and chancery
334
powers.” McLean then dismissed the notion that “the federal
government has imposed a foreign law upon Louisiana,” denying that
“[t]he courts of the United States have involved [a] new or foreign
335
principle in Louisiana.” Either unaware of or unconcerned about
the tension within his reasoning, McLean declared that “local law
governs” disputes in federal court in Louisiana “the same as in every
other state,” but that equity applies, “produc[ing] uniformity in the
336
federal courts, throughout the Union.”
That such “uniformity” in the federal courts came at the cost of
conformity with Louisiana’s civil law was of no moment. So, too, was
the fact that the application of equity principles almost necessarily
altered the outcome of a lawsuit, which would lead to inequality in
the administration of justice among litigants depending on whether
the suit was brought in federal or state court. “No right is jeoparded
by” the application of uniform equity principles in the federal court,
330. See id. at 649–50 (discussing the availability of the equitable remedy of the implied trust
in federal court).
331. Id. at 639.
332. Id. at 637.
333. Id. at 639.
334. Id. at 650.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 650–51.
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McLean explained. Rather, “to say the least, wrongs are as well
redressed, and rights as well protected, by the forms of chancery as by
338
the forms of the civil law.”
On Myra’s next appeal to the Court in 1848, the Justices
effectively took over the case. Rather than remanding to the
Louisiana federal judge, they reviewed all of the evidence de novo
and resolved the ultimate question of Myra’s legitimacy. In an
opinion by Justice Wayne—a Jackson appointee and former Georgia
state court judge—the Court applied federal and English equity
339
principles and practices, declared that Myra was legitimate, and
340
found that the executors had committed fraud. Although Myra’s
legal battles did not end there, the Court’s insistence on the
application of uniform equity principles in Louisiana federal court did
341
not wane.
2. Institutional Stalemate. The struggle over federal equity power
in Louisiana recorded in Livingston, Poultney, and, most vividly, the
Gaines case, was part of the larger debate concerning the institutional
authority and operation of the federal courts throughout the nation.
That debate was taking place in Congress, the state legislature, and
342
local bar associations. As in the case of Kentucky, the struggle over
federal equity in Louisiana correlated with a breakdown in the
administration of justice. But in this case it was a breakdown of the
operation of the federal courts, rather than of the forum state courts.
Judge Lawrence’s stalwart refusal to apply federal uniform
equity principles is notable, not only because it was the subject of
Myra’s appeals to the Supreme Court, but also because it figured in
two legal actions initiated by the Clerk of the United States Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, Duncan Hennen. By filing a

337. Id. at 651.
338. Id.
339. See Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 550, 584 (1848) (observing that “[t]he
practice of granting issues” is “not a matter of right” in either “American courts of equity” or
“[i]n the English chancery, except in the case of an heir at law or of a rector or vicar”).
340. See id. at 602 (finding that Myra “is the lawful and only child of [the] marriage”
between Daniel Clark and Zuline Carriere and that the property in question had been “illegally
sold by those who had no right or authority to make a sale of it”); Collins, supra note 313, at
1835–36 (summarizing the Court’s analysis of the evidence regarding Myra’s legitimacy).
341. Myra and her heirs appeared before the Supreme Court at least thirteen more times
before the saga was concluded. See Collins, supra note 313, at 1816 n.196 (listing the Supreme
Court opinions issued in the Gaines case).
342. See supra Part II.A.
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mandamus action in the Supreme Court and an impeachment petition
in Congress, Hennen alerted both bodies to the breakdown of the
Louisiana federal court caused by Judge Lawrence’s refusal to apply
343
federal equity principles.
344
Hennen had been appointed clerk by Judge Harper in 1834.
Shortly after Judge Lawrence took his oath of office, he terminated
Hennen’s appointment. The termination was not for cause, as
Lawrence himself declared that Hennen had performed his duties
345
Instead,
“methodically, promptly, skillfully, and uprightfully.”
Lawrence fired Hennen to replace him with a personal friend.
Hennen refused to relinquish his office, and, more materially from
the perspective of litigants with pending cases, “refused to deliver the
346
records of the said court to” the new clerk of court.
Hennen’s complaints against Judge Lawrence were many. In
addition to wrongful discharge and unlawful patronage, Hennen
charged Lawrence with absenteeism from the state in dereliction of
his duties and statutory mandates, ethical violations of various sorts,
“notorious[] and inveterate[] addict[ion] to the intemperate use of
ardent spirits,” and refusal “to allow . . . petitioner . . . to keep any
chancery docket, to keep any order-book, to issue any subpoena in
chancery, or to perform any of the duties of his said office connected
347
with the mode of proceeding in chancery.” In particular, Hennen
noted that “in the case of Whitney vs. Relf et al.”—Myra’s “bill in
chancery” against the executors of Clark’s estate,
Judge Lawrence . . . refused to allow the solicitor of the
complainants to have an attachment to compel the defendant to
answer the bill, on the ground that such proceeding was not
warranted by the State practice of Louisiana; and on said solicitor
requesting that said application and refusal, as it occurred, should be
stated on the records of the court, that it might be brought to the
supervision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the said
Judge Lawrence refused, and commanded your petitioner not to
make any entry on the records of said application and refusal, nor

343. See In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839); H.R. REP. NO. 25-272, at 2 (3d Sess.
1839); H.R. DOC. NO. 25-63, at 5 (3d Sess. 1839).
344. H.R. DOC. NO. 25-63, at 1.
345. H.R. REP. NO. 25-272, at 2.
346. Id. at 2–3.
347. Id. at 6, 7.
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any mention thereon of said proceeding, which took place in open
348
court at said November session, 1837.

The result, Hennen explained, was a complete breakdown of the
federal court in Louisiana. “[T]he consequences of the said acts of
Judge Lawrence have been to suspend the administration of justice
349
for the period of one judicial year.” Although a mandamus petition
350
in the Supreme Court yielded no relief for Hennen, a House select
committee appointed to review Hennen’s allegations recommended
that the House impeach Lawrence “for high misdemeanors in
351
office.”
Lawrence died before his impeachment was finally decided. But
the dispute over equity in Louisiana federal court did not die with
him. In 1841, while Myra’s second appeal was pending before the
Supreme Court, the Louisiana legislature petitioned Congress,
“[a]sking the act of 1824 to be so amended as . . . to adopt the
proceedings in civil cases for equity causes, and prevent the chancery
352
law of Great Britain from being introduced in such causes.” The
legislators complained about “repeated decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States” which have determined that “complicated
and artificial modes of proceeding called the Chancery Practice,
consisting of the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court . . . and the
rules of proceedings of the Court of Chancery in England” apply in
353
equity cases brought in Louisiana federal court. The gravamen of
their petition was that application of equity in Louisiana federal court
made Louisiana citizens foreigners in their own federal courts: “[T]he
whole of the chancery law of Great Britain is introduced among us,
and established upon us contrary to the desires and interests of the
354
State.” However forceful, the 1841 petition went nowhere. In 1844,
355
the Louisiana legislature submitted a nearly identical petition. This
petition likewise fell on deaf ears.

348. Id. at 6.
349. Id. at 7.
350. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 262 (1839) (denying the relief requested by
Hennen).
351. H.R. REP. NO. 25-272, at 1.
352. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-14, at 1 (1st Sess. 1841) (emphasis omitted); see also S. DOC. NO. 2714 (2d Sess. 1841) (presenting the same resolution to the Senate).
353. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-14, at 1.
354. Id. (emphasis omitted).
355. See H.R. DOC. NO. 28-207 (1st Sess. 1844).
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Within a couple years, and at the height of the contest
concerning the application of equity in the Gaines case, two other
groups filed petitions in Congress objecting to federal equity power.
356
In 1848, “judges and members of the bar of New Orleans” filed a
particularly bold petition in the Senate. They argued that by applying
equity, the Court had “introduce[d] a new and extensive system of
jurisprudence, unconnected, if not incompatible with the system of
357
laws which prevail in this State.” If the Supreme Court continued on
its path, explained the judges, “our State w[ould] present the singular
spectacle of a country in which two distinct tribunals, exercising a
concurrent jurisdiction, are governed by principles and forms
358
essentially different.” This, they continued, would lead to what we
now call forum shopping. Where equity is available in the federal
courts but not the state courts, they observed that a “different
measure of justice may frequently prevail” in the two forums, and
“foreigners or citizens of other States have the privilege of selecting
359
that court which is most favorable to themselves.”
In addition to creating a strategic advantage enjoyed by the outof-state litigant, this arrangement had overtones of the worst aspects
of colonial rule. The judges predicted that the federal courts would be
looked at “as a foreign tribunal sitting in their midst, trampling on
their laws, overruling the decisions of their courts, and unsettling the
360
titles to their property.” Such an “intrusion” would be considered
“worse than that of a country subjugated by war, whose conquerors
rarely interfere with the laws affecting merely the pecuniary interests
361
and civil relations of society.”
A ten-page report of the Committee of the Louisiana Bar
submitted as part of the same 1848 petition took this line of criticism
even further, arguing cogently and passionately that the application of
uniform equity in Louisiana federal courts was simply
unconstitutional. This report echoed the concern that the application
of equity in Louisiana federal court would lead to the gradual
extinction of Louisiana’s distinctive—and superior—legal system:
“[T]hat under the guise of mere forms of practice, a system of law

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

S. MISC. DOC. NO. 30-144, at 1 (1st Sess. 1848).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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wholly foreign to our habits and usages may supersede our own as far
as it can be done by the authority of the federal courts . . . and the
State laws [would] be abrogated without the authority or sanction of
362
our legislature.” The report further argued that as long as equity
principles were applied in Louisiana federal court, and,
as long as the rules enacted by ourselves for the equitable
interpretation and enforcement of our own laws are cramped,
controlled, and set at naught by others originally adopted some
hundred years ago to govern the anti-jury tribunals, and enforce the
feudal laws of a distant monarchy, so long will our rights be
impaired, our property perilled, our very liberties rendered
precarious, our territorial legislation converted into a solemn farce,
and our system of jurisprudence itself be eventually jostled out of
363
existence.

In 1849, a resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on
364
the Judiciary in response to these petitions, and the following year
the committee introduced a bill that would have required federal
365
judges to conform to Louisiana state law and judicial practice. But
the 1850 bill went nowhere and it seems to have generated little
interest or debate. An 1851 report of the House Committee on the
Judiciary that provided a negative recommendation on a similar bill
sheds a little light on the lack of support for the Louisiana petitions.
The House Committee’s report is short and defers entirely to the
Supreme Court: “[T]he court in the last resort having repeatedly
decided that the distinction between law and equity, and to be
exercised by the federal judiciary, is a constitutional one: the question
366
is therefore settled against the proposed reform.”
The report’s characterization of the Court’s insistence on
uniform exercise of federal equity power as a constitutional decision,
and therefore insulated from legislative reform, seems overstated
given that Congress already regulated the federal courts’ equity
powers in various ways. But the Committee’s report intimated that its
members understood there to be constitutional limits on the extent to

362. Id. at 13.
363. Id. at 15.
364. See S. JOURNAL, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1849).
365. S. 112, 31st Cong. (1st Sess. 1850). The bill passed to a second reading, S. JOURNAL,
31st Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1850), but then disappeared.
366. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PRACTICE OF STATE COURTS, H.R. REP. NO. 31-67, at 1
(2d Sess. 1851).
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which Congress could regulate the federal courts’ equity powers
because of Article III’s extension of the judicial power to cases
brought in equity.
Whatever the force of the theory that Article III restricted
Congress’s authority to restrict federal equity power, the suggestion
of such limits at the very least indicates that there was no general
sense that constitutional principles—such as federalism or separation
of powers—prevented federal courts from applying uniform equity
principles, even when those principles departed from state law or
equity, as they often did.
3. Federal Equity and Institutional Uniformity in Louisiana.
Careful reconstruction of debates regarding equity in Louisiana
federal courts illustrates the underappreciated relevance of judicialreform debates to early-nineteenth-century attitudes toward the
application of nonstate, judge-made law in federal equity cases. It also
helps to explain why Louisianans’ objections to the application of
uniform equity principles had little influence in the early nineteenth
century.
Federal equity’s critics decried the Supreme Court’s uniform
equity doctrine as colonial in its aspirations. But the historical sources
reveal that such criticism reflected an extreme states’-rights
understanding of the limits of federal judicial power. Given the
prevalent concern about disuniformity in, and the incapacity of, the
federal judicial system, critics’ complaints about federal equity’s ill
effects were unlikely to resonate with many national legislators or
with members of the Supreme Court. With the Gaines case in the
newspapers and a recent petition to impeach one of Louisiana’s
federal judges in part because of his rejection of federal equity,
Congress’s refusal in the 1840s and 1850s to take any further
measures to protect Louisiana’s legal system from alleged federal
judicial overreaching is unsurprising. The temporary breakdown of
the administration of justice in the Louisiana federal court over the
issue of federal equity underscored the profound need for uniformity
in the federal courts, helping to explain why the Supreme Court
insisted upon, and Congress acquiesced to, application of uniform
equity principles.
Considered in conjunction with Congressional debates
concerning the Process Act of 1828, disagreement over the
application of equity in Louisiana federal court also calls into
question the relevance of an explanation frequently offered to

COLLINS IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

10/17/2010 10:06:06 PM

2010] ARTICLE III, EQUITY, AND JUDGE-MADE LAW

329

account for the development of general common law. Earlynineteenth-century judges, the argument holds, simply did not
understand themselves as engaged in lawmaking at all. Rather, when
employing a common law rule of decision, they were declaring law,
not making law. In such accounts, the Swift case is explained as the
product of a radically different, prepositivist jurisprudential moment,
and hence cannot be understood to have ratified judicial lawmaking
367
as that concept is understood today.
One could easily formulate a parallel account tailored to equity
jurisprudence—a field of adjudication in which judges purportedly
understood themselves to be applying a common reservoir of
equitable procedures and remedies, not adjudicating substantive
liabilities or making law. One finds such language in some early368
nineteenth-century equity cases. Under this theory, federal judges
applying uniform equity principles were not making law at all. Hence,
contemporaries would not have seen the federalism and separationof-powers problems posed by the federal uniform equity doctrine.
But one of the most interesting aspects of the early-nineteenthcentury debates over federal equity is their modern-sounding—even
positivist—resonance. Critics of federal equity were under no illusion
that federal courts sitting in equity were merely declaring the law,
prescribing remedies, or drawing on general equitable principles that

367. In Swift, Justice Story proclaimed that the decisions of courts “are, at most, only
evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws.” Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
1, 18 (1842). Some modern commentators contend that this alternative jurisprudential
understanding of the common law helps to explain why, during the Swift era, the general federal
common law did not offend contemporary sensibilities about federalism and separation of
powers. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 10, at 1284–85 (explaining that, at the time it was decided,
Swift offended neither federalism nor separation of powers principles, in part because the Swift
Court “ascertain[ed] the applicable rule of decision,” and did not make law or policy). That
theory of judicial role has been called into question by Morton Horwitz and William Nelson,
both of whom contend that in the early nineteenth century, judges abandoned the declaratory
understanding of the common law in favor of an “instrumentalist” or policy-oriented
understanding. See HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 22; WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION
OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–
1830, at 172 (Univ. of Ga. Press 1994) (1975).
368. Chief Justice Taney drew this distinction when sitting as a Circuit Justice. See Meade v.
Beale, 16 F. Cas. 1283, 1291 (C.C.D. Md. 1850) (No. 9371) (recognizing that equitable remedies
in federal court would be supplied by English chancery practice, but insisting that “the right
must be given by the law of the state, or of the United States”). Justice McClean also drew this
distinction in the Gaines case. See Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 619, 650–651 (1844) (“In
deciding controversies in [Louisiana] the local law governs, the same as in every other
state. . . . [The application of equity is] only a change of mode, which produces uniformity in the
federal courts, throughout the Union.”).
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were universally applicable. Instead, they were quick to observe that
the federal courts were imposing new laws associated with other
sovereigns on the people of Kentucky and Louisiana, thereby
treading on the powers of state legislators and the rights of the
people. Senator Rowan cogently urged that federal judges were
improperly legislating from the bench: “We have been contending at
the boundary line which separates the legislative from the judicial
369
power . . . .” The 1848 memorial from the judges and members of
the New Orleans Bar made the same point. The application of
uniform equity principles in Louisiana federal court would mean that
“those courts may decide, not according to local law, but according to
a system of laws foreign to our own laws and usages. . . . [I]t would
370
make them legislators.”
In short, despite competing jurisprudential views concerning
what, exactly, judges did when deciding cases in equity, this was not a
situation in which contemporaries were unable to comprehend the
potential separation-of-powers and federalism problems posed by
federal equity power because they were schooled in a radically
different jurisprudential philosophy. Yet, even though litigants and
lawmakers very clearly articulated those concerns, such views
garnered little support on the Supreme Court or in Congress. By
reading the debates over federal equity in Louisiana as judicialreform debates, one can see that such arguments found little general
support at least in part because conformity with Louisiana law in
federal equity cases would have compromised the fragile institutional
integrity of a fledgling federal judicial system.
D. Instituting the Federal Courts and Courting the Nation
No single factor can explain a complex phenomenon like the
development of the federal uniform equity doctrine in the early
nineteenth century. And this Article makes no attempt to dismiss
entirely the explanations frequently offered for the parallel
phenomenon of the general common law, such as the need for a
uniform commercial law or alternative jurisprudential theories of the
judicial function. But careful attention to debates concerning federal
equity power reveals other forces that shaped the uniform equity
369. 4 REG. DEB. 368 (1828) (statement of Sen. Rowan); see also id. at 363 (“Does the Chief
Justice, do all the Judges together, possess legislative power?”); id. (“The Judges possess no
legislative power.”).
370. S. MISC. DOC. NO. 30-144, at 10 (1st Sess. 1848) (emphasis added).
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doctrine, including institutional concerns and pressures. In this
respect, the story of federal equity power can enrich and complicate
modern scholars’ and jurists’ understanding of how ideological beliefs
regarding federal and state power were informed and mediated by
historically contingent institutional limitations and pressures.
Analyses of early-nineteenth-century federal judicial power
account for particular institutional dynamics of the Supreme Court,
371
largely by referring to its consolidationist ambitions at that time.
But as recent work by political scientists urges, and as the historical
sources discussed in this Article confirm, students of the federal
courts would do well to broaden and refine their conception of the
institutional constraints and pressures that shaped and characterized
372
judicial and legislative behavior in the early nineteenth century.
First, laws are the result not only of societal interests or the
ideological predisposition of government officials; they are also
373
shaped by particular institutions. As Professor Keith Whittington
and others have argued, institutions constitute preferences in part by
generating particular interests, incentives, and habits of mind in the
people operating within those institutions. Thus, “justices are likely to
think about and act on public problems differently as a consequence
374
of their experiences and expectations on the Court.” Second,
institutions also largely determine the range of actions available to
375
officials seeking to achieve a particular policy goal.
We can see both of these institutional dynamics at play in the
Supreme Court’s insistence on uniformity in federal equity cases.

371. See White, supra note 194, at 673–77 (summarizing several authors’ analyses of the
Marshall Court); cf. Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction 6 (Univ.
of Chi. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 297, 2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558612 (“The Marshall Court’s jurisdictional
decisions emerged from a complex array of causes that cannot be attributed simply to an
overarching nationalist project.”).
372. For example, Professor Paul Frymer cautions against conflating institutions with “a
more porous and less analytically rigorous ‘political context.’” Paul Frymer, Law and American
Political Development, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 779, 781 (2008) (book review).
373. See Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Approaches to
Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 608 (2000) (book review) (explaining the theory
of “New Institutionalism,” which claims that judges do not decide cases based solely on their
“personal policy preferences”; rather, “[b]oth the internal procedures and norms of the Court
and the external relationship between the Court and its larger political environment affect
judicial outcomes”).
374. Id. at 615; see also Frymer, supra note 372, at 785 (“[I]nstitutions create and shape the
interests of those who work within them . . . .”).
375. See Whittington, supra note 373, at 614.
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Concerns about the lack of uniformity in the federal judiciary were
not abstract. The Supreme Court Justices’ particular institutional
position within the federal judiciary sensitized them to concerns
about disuniformity in the federal courts. Through circuit riding in
particular, Justices experienced the failures of the system first hand.
Originally, circuit riding was the primary way that the federal judicial
system would bring federal justice “to every Man’s Door,” while also
ensuring that the Justices stayed in touch with the mores of the
376
people. But circuit riding of the scope originally mandated quickly
became implausible. By the 1810s, reliance on the circuit-riding
377
system left many states without a Circuit Justice at all. The Justices,
more than other federal officials, were thus intimately aware of, and
sensitive to, the ways that existing institutional arrangements were
failing to ensure uniform administration of justice in the lower federal
courts.
Though the Justices were personally aware of the disuniformity
in the lower federal courts, their particular institutional position
limited the manner by which they could effect change in the system.
Justices petitioned Congress personally for judicial reform on
numerous occasions, spelling out the crisis in terms familiar to
litigants and western legislators. But they achieved little significant
378
effect. Although the Justices were powerless to directly influence
judicial-reform legislation, they could shape the Court’s jurisprudence
in ways that would diminish the reliance on circuit riding and ensure
that federal courts served the rudimentary function of providing a
forum that would administer justice uniformly throughout the
379
nation. In short, by insisting on the application of a uniform body of

376. John Jay’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York
(Apr. 12, 1790), in 2 The DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT, 1790–1794, supra note 206, at 25, 27–28.
377. See sources cited supra notes 206–08.
378. See sources cited supra note 206. In addition to letters and petitions seeking to modify
circuit-riding duties and the circuit system, the most overt effort by Supreme Court Justices to
influence judicial legislation in the early nineteenth century was “The Judges’ Bill,” drafted by
Justice Story in 1816 and endorsed by all of the sitting Justices. The bill would have granted the
circuit courts the full scope of federal question jurisdiction allowed by Article III and raised
judicial salaries. See 1 WARREN, supra note 225, at 442; 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY,
supra note 251, at 300 (quoting a manuscript in which Story discusses the reception of the bill by
the other Justices).
379. Uniform federal equity was not the only doctrinal tool at the Justices’ disposal.
Insistent enforcement of Section 25 and recognition of federal question jurisdiction in certain,
albeit limited, instances also evince the Court’s effort to secure uniformity. For an insightful
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equity principles in cases like the Gaines case and myriad other
mundane cases, the Justices crafted a doctrine that catered to a desire
for uniformity in the federal courts.
Attentiveness to institutional dynamics—in particular the
complex relationship between Congress and the federal courts—also
helps explain Congress’s role in the evolution and entrenchment of
the uniform equity doctrine. On the one hand, one might expect that
the objections to federal equity articulated by Senator Rowan and the
Louisiana petitioners would have led Congress to restrict federal
equity power as much as was constitutionally permissible. And at
least hypothetically, national legislators would have had an interest in
protecting the prerogative of federal and state legislators by
constraining federal equity power. But Congress acquiesced to and
even extended the geographic reach of the federal uniform equity
doctrine in the aftermath of the Kentucky crisis, and despite
substantial lobbying by Louisiana officials.
Once again, the shared concern about the need for federal
judicial reform and the related concern about the uniform
administration of justice provide an essential context for
understanding Congress’s failure to rein in the federal equity power.
Congress knew that judicial reform was needed. But due to the
legislative stalemate caused by fractious coalitions and the
controversial nature of any federal judicial reform, significant
380
legislative action was impossible. For legislators who wanted to
secure uniformity in the administration of the federal courts, but who
were unable to do so directly through legislation, acquiescing to the
uniform equity doctrine was one way to achieve a modicum of
uniformity in the federal courts. Moreover, some national legislators
may have been quite happy to turn judicial reform over to the courts
381
to avoid any political consequences that might be associated with it.
Again, the Supreme Court’s uniform equity doctrine was by no means
analysis of the Marshall Court’s effort to secure uniformity of federal law through federal
question jurisdiction, see LaCroix, supra note 371, at 43–52.
380. See supra notes 212–26 and accompanying text.
381. In this respect, my findings are consistent with Whittington’s important analysis of the
political operation of judicial review in the early national period and his observation that
“structural characteristics of political systems such as the United States encourage cooperation
between judges and political leaders to obtain common objectives.” Keith E. Whittington,
“Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Support of Judicial Review by the United States
Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 584 (2005). See generally Mark A. Graber,
Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 425 (2005) (discussing new research in
political science that explores the relationship between judicial review and elected officials).
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an adequate substitute for substantial changes to the circuit-riding
system or other necessary judicial reforms. But in a world of little
legislative resolve and imperfect solutions, the crisis in the federal
judiciary likely made acquiescence to, and even acceptance of,
uniform equity a palatable alternative.
Constructing a federal judicial system that would simultaneously
serve the country and respect state sovereignty was not a
straightforward project. Individual actors undoubtedly brought
partisanship and ideologically charged policy views regarding courts
and commerce to the task. But they were also confronted with the
practical governance problems that inevitably arose in a polity
characterized by dual sovereignty, multiple states, concurrent
jurisdiction, and vast geographic territory. These concerns shaped
judicial-reform debates in Congress and animated the Court’s
response to the particularly acute disuniformity that would result if
the federal courts attempted to conform to the various state equity
systems. Seen in this light, the Court’s effort to define and defend
federal equity power appears as evidence less of its raw
consolidationist ambitions than of the Court’s institutional costewardship of the federal judicial system—a role it shared, albeit not
always easily, with Congress.
III. “A CONSIDERABLE SURGICAL OPERATION” AND THE
ERASURE OF FEDERAL EQUITY
For some students of federal courts, the most significant aspect
of the early-nineteenth-century federal uniform equity doctrine is not
why it thrived but rather the fact that it existed at all. One of the stock
historical narratives that continues to shape modern understanding of
federal judicial power is that the application of nonstate, judge-made
law was generally disapproved of in the early period and was
extremely limited in scope. In this account, Section 34’s apparent
requirement that federal courts apply state law in the absence of
governing positive federal law is held up as the general rule, with
Swift and other departures marking aberrations that must be
explained away or repudiated. Erie thus stands as a triumphant return
382
to the true principles of separation of powers and federalism.
382. See Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829,
846 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000)).
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383

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, a case in which the majority of the
Court recognized a narrow species of federal common law in the
384
context of the Alien Tort Statute, provides an example. Justice
Scalia’s dissenting proclamation reveals conflicting impulses to
recognize the modernity of the Erie doctrine while also grounding it
in founding-era principles: “Despite the avulsive change of Erie, the
Framers who included reference to ‘the Law of Nations’ in . . . the
Constitution would be . . . quite terrified by the ‘discretion’ endorsed
385
by the Court.” Sounding a similar chord, Professor Martin Redish
explains Section 34 as an attempt by the first Congress “to preserve
the political values of federalism by curbing the one branch of the
386
federal government most feared as a threat to state power.” The
assumption underlying both of these statements is that during the
founding era, there was a shared understanding of the profound limits
on nonstate, judge-made law in the federal court—an understanding
recognized and restored in Erie.
Telling the story of judge-made law in the federal courts through
the lens of federal equity power calls that assumption into question.
Regardless of whether Swift was consistent with contemporary
387
practice, any account that focuses exclusively on cases brought in
law mistakes a part for the whole of federal adjudicative activity
during the period. On the equity side of the docket, application of
388
uniform, nonstate, judge-made law was the norm. Viewed in light of
the history of federal equity power, then, any analysis that attempts to
draw an easy line connecting modern limitations on federal judgemade law and historical beliefs and practices deserves skeptical
scrutiny.
This point is hardly noteworthy to legal historians, who have long
lamented lawyers’ and jurists’ efforts to simplify the past for
383. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
384. Id. at 724.
385. Id. at 749 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
386. Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive
Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 792 (1989).
387. See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
388. This is not to suggest that jurists were insensitive to the problems associated with
judicial legislation. Concerns were raised in the context of federal equity power, even if they did
not represent the dominant view in the early nineteenth century. See supra Part II.B–C. And the
perils of federal criminal common law led to significant limitation of federal judicial lawmaking
powers in criminal cases. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding
that federal courts do not possess an implied power to exercise common law jurisdiction in
criminal cases).
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expedient purposes. Although it is well beyond the scope of this
Article to examine the perils and possibilities of utilitarian
390
invocations of the past in federal courts’ jurisprudence generally, it
is germane to consider how the pull of conventional legal reasoning
has shaped modern understanding of the history of equity power.
Such an inquiry illustrates why the history of uniform federal equity
power has been minimized in modern doctrinal and scholarly
accounts and highlights some of the costs of its erasure.
In 1945, Justice Frankfurter was faced with a problem: Seven
years after Erie announced the end of general common law on the law
side of the federal docket, the question of Erie’s status in equity cases
391
remained unresolved. By this point in time, law and equity had been
392
officially merged by virtue of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Yet even after the merger, the long-standing norm of uniformity on
the equity side of the docket weighed strongly against the wholesale
application of the Erie principle in equity cases. Indeed, it remained
393
so powerful that in York v. Guaranty Trust, the Second Circuit
found that Erie did not mandate the application of a state statute of
limitations in a case in which equitable remedies were sought. In
reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit cited, at the top of a very
394
long list of cases, Robinson v. Campbell.
389. See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 167–
90 (1996) (discussing the different practices of lawyers and historians and the differing ends to
which they characteristically apply evidence).
390. Moreover, Edward Purcell and Susan Bandes have each provided elegant discussions
of that subject with particular attention to Erie. See PURCELL, supra note 382, at 3 (observing
that Erie has been “widely misunderstood, in large part because judges and legal scholars have
too often divorced it from its full and vital historical context”); Bandes, supra note 382, at 830
(discussing how principles like federalism are often cast into abstract terms, ignoring historical
and social realities).
391. Because the Rules of Decision Act did not apply in federal equity cases in any
straightforward way, it was not clear whether or how Erie would apply in these cases.
Immediately following Erie, the Court announced that the core Erie principle—that federal
courts sitting in diversity must follow state substantive law—“applies though the construction
arises not in an action at law, but in a suit in equity.” Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202,
205 (1938). Two years later, however, the Court expressly left unanswered the question of
whether, in federal equity cases, the Erie principle required conformity with state remedies. See
Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 294 (1940) (“[W]e have no occasion to consider the extent to
which federal courts . . . are bound to follow state statutes and decisions affecting those
remedies.”); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 112, §§ 4504 n.6 & 4513.
392. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (“There shall be one form of action known as ‘civil
action.’”).
393. York v. Guar. Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev’d, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
394. See id. at 521–22 (citing Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222 (1818)).
The York court urged that in equity cases, federal courts were under no obligation to follow
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The Supreme Court opinion reversing the Second Circuit is now
a staple component of the Erie doctrine. In Guaranty Trust v. York,
395
the Court announced the “outcome determinative” test, which in its
modified form remains an essential principle in vertical choice-of-law
396
analysis today. But Guaranty Trust is important for another reason.
In the first several pages of the opinion, Justice Frankfurter
unequivocally extended the Erie principle to federal cases in which
397
equitable remedies were sought. Guaranty Trust finally eviscerated
the federal uniform equity doctrine, largely ending equity’s reign as a
distinctive site of nonstate, judge-made law in federal diversity
398
jurisdiction cases.

state statutes or state decisions “with respect to equitable ‘remedial rights.’” Id. With respect to
substantive law, the court provided a more equivocal description, contending on the one hand
that “as to substantive rights, a federal court sitting in equity, in a suit where jurisdiction rests on
diversity of citizenship, must apply state statutes and, usually, state decisions,” id., and on the
other hand that, under Swift, “federal courts, in diversity cases, [were required to] follow state
decisions except where there is no pertinent state statute and where a question of ‘general law’
is involved,” id. at 522. As described previously, the application of substantive nonstate equity
principles in federal court predated Swift—as the Swift Court acknowledged—but by 1944, that
was irrelevant, as the Supreme Court in Ruhlin had made clear that, with respect to substantive
law, the Erie principle applied in federal equity cases. See Ruhlin, 304 U.S. at 205; supra Part
I.B.2.c.
395. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“[T]he intent of [Erie] was to
insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the
diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be
if tried in State court.”).
396. The centrality of Guaranty Trust to the Erie doctrine has been acknowledged for some
time. See Philip B. Kurland, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 67 HARV. L. REV. 906,
907 (1954) (book review) (suggesting the renaming of the Erie doctrine to reflect the
importance of Guaranty Trust).
397. Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 99–108.
398. The early-nineteenth-century federal equity cases are not completely without force, as
they continue to animate modern interpretations of the Court’s equity powers by defining the
limits of the federal courts’ remedial powers under FED. R. CIV. P. 64. See Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332–33 (1999) (“Because such a
remedy was historically unavailable from a court in equity, we hold that the District Court had
no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing petitioners from disposing of their
assets pending adjudication of respondents’ contract claim for money damages.”); Judith
Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND.
L.J. 223, 234–35 (2003) (discussing the Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 527 U.S. 308 (1999),
opinion and how the Court relied on history in forming its decision). Others have shown how
traditional equity doctrines remain a powerful source of remedial authority in the context of
federal question cases, and particularly in the context of constitutional litigation. See, e.g., John
Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 990 (2008) (“Anti-suit injunctions have been a
staple of equity for centuries, so the injunction approved in [Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908),] did not rest on a novel cause of action derived from the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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It is unfortunate that the first portion of the Guaranty Trust
opinion is generally given so little attention in casebooks and legal
scholarship, as it illustrates rather starkly the problems facing jurists
who strive to provide a seamless historical account of federal judicial
power even as they abandon past practices. Rather than concede that
the opinion marked a significant—even seismic—change, Justice
Frankfurter disavowed the existence of a long history of federal
judicial “power [in equity] to deny substantive rights created by State
399
law or to create substantive rights denied by State law.” Instead, he
explained, “federal courts, in the long course of their history, have not
differentiated in their regard for State law between actions at law and
400
suits in equity.” Frankfurter’s rather liberal treatment of the history
of federal equity power enabled him to craft a story of continuity
concerning the metes and bounds of nonstate, judge-made law in the
federal courts. In his account, the application of Erie to equity cases
was a natural extension of “the Framers’” vision of the role of the
401
federal courts and hence a natural extension of Erie’s return to
timeless limitations on federal judge-made law.
But just as Justice Brandeis’s turn to history in Erie has been
402
called into doubt, Justice Frankfurter’s account of early federal
403
equity power is similarly suspect. It is practically impossible to
ascertain what source of equity principles the Framers intended to be
404
applied in federal court. But in the early national period, federal
courts routinely applied federal and English judge-made equity
principles. This included, under certain circumstances, application of
substantive principles in the form of equitable rights, and application
of equitable remedies in ways that altered state-created rights.
Archival evidence suggests that Frankfurter and at least one other

399. Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 105.
400. Id. at 103; see also id. at 106–07 (“Whatever contradiction or confusion may be
produced by a medley of judicial phrases severed from their environment, the body of
adjudications concerning equitable relief in diversity cases leaves no doubt that federal courts
enforced State-created substantive rights if the mode of proceeding and remedy were consonant
with the traditional body of equitable remedies, practice and procedure, and in so doing they
were enforcing rights created by the States and not arising under any inherent or statutory
federal law.”).
401. Id. at 111.
402. See text accompanying notes 55–62.
403. Professors William Crosskey and Laura Fitzgerald have also observed Justice
Frankfurter’s liberal treatment of the history of federal equity power. See CROSSKEY, supra
note 17, at 878; Fitzgerald, supra note 151, at 1270–72.
404. See supra Part I.B.1.
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Justice were well aware that the Guaranty Trust opinion took
significant liberties with the historical sources. In his personal file on
the case, Frankfurter saved a memorandum in which he carefully
recorded a telephone conversation with Chief Justice Stone. Stone
commended Frankfurter’s opinion, and particularly his “surgical”
approach to the historical record:
I have now read your opinion in the York case and I must say that
you have performed a considerable surgical operation with great
delicacy. I say considerable surgical operation because I think that
there was a good deal more of historical material to clear away than
the uninformed reader might realize—and you had to deal with it as
405
delicately as you did if it was to be avoided in your decision.

Chief Justice Stone’s observation concerning Frankfurter’s
erasure of the history of federal equity power was an understatement.
One can, however, understand why Justice Frankfurter, a member of
the Court’s Progressive wing, would seek to diminish federal equity’s
406
robust past. Faced with the seismic changes of the New Deal period,
Frankfurter felt compelled to help minimize the federal judiciary’s
407
power to block Progressive legislation. Not only had the “switch in
time” ended the Court’s Lochner-era penchant for invalidating
economic regulation, but as Professor Edward Purcell has explained
in elegant detail, Erie required federal judges to abandon general
common law—which often favored corporate interests—for state
common law—which tended to favor Progressive interests such as
expanded tort liability for industrial employers and minimum-wage
408
laws. Given that equitable injunctions, in particular, had become a
means of suppressing labor strikes and generally controlling
organized labor—a fact that Frankfurter had chronicled in depth
409
during his years as a law professor —Guaranty Trust gave him an
opportunity to limit such uses of federal equity power by requiring
410
federal courts to conform to state law in equity cases.
405. Memorandum of Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 17, 1945), Papers of Felix Frankfurter,
Harvard Law Library, Series 7, Subseries G, Paige Box #12, No. 264 (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
406. See PURCELL, supra note 390, at 208–09.
407. See id.
408. See id. at 141–64.
409. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); see
also PURCELL, supra note 390, at 70–77.
410. Justice Frankfurter was by no means a solo actor in the effort to defeat federal equity
power during the New Deal period. Other opponents of robust federal equity power were
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In disclaiming the long history of federal uniform equity and the
attendant authority to apply nonstate, judge-made decisional
principles, Justice Frankfurter also made space for his particular
vision of the federal courts. This vision was consistent with the
modern institutional structure of the federal courts that Congress had
finally anointed through important judicial-reform legislation. By
1945, the federal courts were no longer a fledgling system of far-flung
federal emissaries and Supreme Court Justices navigating streams to
bring justice to every man’s door. In 1869 and 1891 Congress finally
created several circuit judgeships to alleviate the circuit-riding
411
burdens and improve access to federal circuit courts. Importantly, in
1875, Congress made the existence of a federal question an
412
independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In 1934, Congress
enacted the Rules Enabling Act, endowing the Supreme Court with
broad procedural rulemaking authority and creating a process by
413
which such rules would be drafted and then ratified by Congress.
And in 1938, the Supreme Court, empowered by Congress, approved
414
the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When Guaranty Trust
was decided, therefore, the federal courts were a highly organized and
structured system of elite judges supported by significant staffs of
415
lawyers and nonlawyers.
Given this massive institutional transition from the early
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century—a transition that
Frankfurter and James Landis examined in great detail in The

essential to the larger mission. For example, Woolhandler and Collins explain that Justice Hugo
Black “campaigned relentlessly to reduce the role of federal equity in the area of economic
regulation and elsewhere by developing abstention doctrines that required federal courts to
dismiss suits that were clearly within their equitable jurisdiction.” Woolhandler & Collins, supra
note 150, at 681. Unsurprisingly, Justice Black joined Frankfurter’s opinion in Guaranty Trust.
411. See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44 (creating nine circuit judgeships). In 1891,
Congress established permanent federal courts of appeals. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891 (Evarts Act),
ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
412. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 474.
413. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§
2072–2074 (2006)). For a discussion of the Act’s origins, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1043–98 (1982).
414. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 970–73 (1987).
415. Professor Judith Resnik provides a searching examination of the growing
organizational and lobbying capacity of the federal courts in the early twentieth century. See
Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113
HARV. L. REV. 924, 959 (2000) (“With the creation of the Conference of Senior Appellate
Judges in 1922, the potential for the judiciary to speak as an institution emerged.”).
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416

Business of the Supreme Court —there was no longer a pressing
need to secure uniformity in the federal courts through uniform
equity. Instead, every reason existed to push for federal equity’s
diminution. According to Frankfurter, diversity jurisdiction was
becoming increasingly outmoded, especially when it allowed federal
judges to meddle with matters that he considered to be reserved to
state and federal legislatures. Well before Erie was decided,
Frankfurter criticized Swift as “mischievous in its consequences,
baffling in its application, untenable in theory, and . . . a perversion of
417
the purposes of the framers of the First Judiciary Act.”
Seventeen years after writing those words, Justice Frankfurter
was assigned to draft the opinion in Guaranty Trust and was thus
given an opportunity to further erode the significance of diversity
jurisdiction by fully extending the Erie principle in equity. Hence, in
Guaranty Trust, Frankfurter dismissed a long line of precedent that
suggested a different view of federal equity power and once again
credited his vision of the limited role of federal courts to “the
418
Framers.” Frankfurter’s invocation of the Framers in Guaranty
Trust is particularly notable given that two years earlier he had
accused other Justices of “finding in [their] own personal views the
419
purposes of the Founders.” But in Guaranty Trust, the Founders’
purposes—as Frankfurter presented them—would help further
minimize the significance of diversity jurisdiction and clear the way
420
for the outcome determinative principle.
Viewed in historical perspective, however, the outcomedeterminative analysis represented a complete inversion of the
principles that had governed federal equity power in the early
national period. As per the traditional restrictions on courts of equity,
equity jurisdiction did not attach unless no adequate or complete

416. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 19.
417. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 526 (1928); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the
Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of the Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 679, 700 (1999) (discussing “Frankfurter’s well-known opposition to diversity and his
powerful attacks on the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson”).
418. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111–12 (1945) (“The Framers of the
Constitution . . . entertained apprehensions lest distant suitors be subjected to local bias in State
courts . . . . And so Congress afforded out-of-State litigants another tribunal, not another body
of law.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
419. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 666 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
420. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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legal remedy was available. And once the general principle was
transposed into the federal system, equity was by its very nature
outcome determinative vis-à-vis state law. Given this traditional
function of federal equity power, Justice Frankfurter had a choice
when explaining his new outcome determinative principle. He could
either minimize the long history of uniform nonstate equity, or he
could acknowledge Guaranty Trust as a dramatic break from
precedent and past practice. The former was apparently the easier
course of action.
The point to be made is not that Guaranty Trust was wrongly
decided as a matter of modern judicial policy, or that Justice
Frankfurter was disingenuous in drafting the opinion. Rather, the
goal is to underscore the extent to which the intellectual and
discursive conventions of legal practice push judges and lawyers to
account for doctrinal development in ways that call on historical
sources as authority, while simultaneously reconstituting those
422
sources to reflect modern legal norms and policies. The Framers, in
this convention, often function not as a source of precedent, but as a
source of “timeless elements out of a past that [are] assumed to be
‘correct’ or ‘providential’ . . . or ‘clear,’” infusing a judicial opinion
423
with the aura of inevitability and certitude.
In the case of Guaranty Trust, as in judicial discourse generally,
masking the transformative nature of certain judicial opinions has the
salubrious effect of enhancing the appearance of law’s stability and
424
consistency. Erie and Guaranty Trust announced a return to the
Framers’ wise design, and Swift and its progeny were a departure
from that design that resulted from institutional- and economic-power
distortions and misguided jurisprudential thought. Seen in this light,
Erie may have marked an “avulsive change,” but it was a change that
inevitably amounted to no change at all. Instead, it returned the

421. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
422. For an eloquent discussion of this general trend, coincidentally focusing on the judicial
craftsmanship of Justice Frankfurter, see Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary
Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201 (1990), and see also Horwitz, supra note 23.
423. Ferguson, supra note 422, at 215.
424. See KALMAN, supra note 389, at 180 (“[A]uthors of lawyers’ legal history value text,
continuity, and prescription.”); Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Contingency of the Role of
History, 90 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 (1981) (“By and large, the dominant tradition in AngloAmerican legal scholarship today is unhistorical. It attempts to find universal rationalizing
principles.”).
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federal judiciary to the timeless institutional arrangements
implemented by our prescient eighteenth-century ancestors.
By analyzing the history of judge-made law in the federal courts
through the lens of equity, however, we see that the story is not one
of stasis or return. Rather, it is a story of change. Given what Justice
Frankfurter believed to be at stake in Guaranty Trust, it is little
wonder that he sought to limit the precedential force of over a
century of case law that could be used to support the exercise of
nonstate equitable principles by federal judges. However, his
description of the history of federal equity should not be understood
as a declaration of an unalterable truth about federal judicial power.
Nor should it be viewed as the restoration of the original meaning of
Article III or the Rules of Decision Act through further repudiation
of Swift v. Tyson. It should instead be understood as a product of
significant shifts in the political and ideological alignment of the
Supreme Court and of the changed institutional needs and capacities
of the federal judicial system.

